CABINET MEETING NOTES
August 26, 1974

GF - There will be a dinner at the White House Wednesday evening, all are invited!

The purpose of this meeting is to disucss:

1. Economic Summit
2. Budget
3. Alan Greenspan
4. William Seidman

Welcome Alan.

Herb, you are welcome back anytime.

5. Dean Burch-political responsibilities

Ash - President is committed to a budget of below $300 billion.

How do we get there?

Reviewed charts:

1. FY 1975 Budget - Comp of Outlays (billions of dollars)

   Mandatory $225.1 billion

2. Entitlement Program

3. Reduction Programs
   a. pay raise deferral
   b. personnel cuts

Congress needs to help in reduction program

GF - Good alternatives - tough decisions

We are going to make a maximum effort to get below $300 billion.

Likelihood of getting Congressional concurrence is slim.

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GF - I need your recommendations as to what other areas you can cut into, and also, your evaluation as to what is attainable.

Clearly label your chart as "discussion points only."

Simon - Don't give us a chart.

GF - OK

Butz - Two-thirds of my budget is welfare.

GF - Introduce Alan Greenspan

Greenspan - We hope to accomplish two items in the Economic Summit:

1. The U.S. cannot survive double digit inflation long. Institutions, banks, utilities are all in trouble.

2. Outlook is gloomy - no immediate improvement Particularly for 6 - 9 months.

We want to get agreement in as many areas as possible.

The CEA will take results of meetings to all groups.

We know the impact of agricultural prices has not set in.

The CPI is up because food prices are going up.

Industrial prices have subsided.

Base rate of inflation is 7%.

Now running at 10%.

Clothing prices are going up; textiles are going up.

There are no good numbers this year.

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GF - I noticed Helmut Schmidt urged the U.S. not to take unilateral action in this area. What does that mean?

HAK - Schmidt is potentially our strongest ally in Western Europe.

From a foreign policy standpoint, he will agree if you talk with him. You should. Rush endorses and so does Greenspan.

Schlesinger - Demand is not the problem, rather it is employment.

Brennan - The BLS release on poverty and unemployment

Black youth - the biggest problem is motivation.

GF - Truth is the best thinking we can do
"We want the unvarnished facts out"

Morton - What we are faced with is "what is politically 'do-able'"

Saxbe - Concerning the Congress, the Senate will cut departmental budgets but not "the people programs."

"presume to increase spending, not to cut it"

Justice, Defense, Foreign Aid are easy to cut.

Butz - Cut food stamps. There are enough abuses to bring this back into control.

GF - We can provide transportation for Members going to out of town events.

We have to meet this time schedule.

At Summit, we will:

1. implement $300 billion budget
2. support for our position
3. monitoring device in hand

"Rush will be Chairman when I'm not present."

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Lynn - Mayors will want to balance budget by taking money out of defense.

GF - I'm not going to have defense program or foreign aid program gutted.

We have to be cold blooded to counter defense cut argument by presenting tied down proposals in each Mayor's area.

HAK - If our defense budget gets cut, our position at SALT goes down.

Saxbe - Watch out for show-boating in open sessions on TV.

GF - But in open sessions, they will embarrass themselves.

Schlesinger - Problem of inflation - our biggest economic crisis since 1930.

Expand productivity.

Burch - Fall Campaign

Will center on inflation

President's schedule will be limited and only campaign after Congressional adjournment.

The Vice President cannot campaign until confirmed.

The Cabinet is to devote as much time as possible to the campaig

GF - "We have 10 weeks to make a change in Congress"

"We want an inflation-proof Congress."

"We will support those with us on inflation."

"Inflation is Public Enemny Number One."

"Be respectful of cooperative Democrats."

Adjournment

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PARTICIPANTS

- Secretary Kissinger
- Secretary Simon
- Secretary Schlesinger
- Attorney General Saxbe
- Secretary Morton
- Secretary Butz
- Secretary Dent
- Secretary Brennan
- Under Secretary Carlucci
- Secretary Lynn
- Secretary Brinegar
- Director Ash
- Counsellor Burch
- Counsellor Rush
- Ambassador Scali
- Counsellor Hartmann
- Counsellor Marsh

Absent

Secretary Weinberger (Europe)
Counsellor Armstrong (Texas)

Others

- Herb Stein
- Alan Greenspan

Staff

- Alexander Haig
  Jerry terHorst
- William Seidman
- Bill Baroody
- Virginia Knauer
- Brent Scowcroft
- Dave Parker

John Cavanaugh
Roger Porter
Jack Hushen

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 11, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: JERRY JONES

FROM: JOHN GUTHRIE JG

SUBJECT: Notes on Cabinet Meeting, October 11, 1974

The President opened the meeting at 10:38 a.m. thanking the attendees for coming. The President made the following points: the upcoming speech in Kansas City will stress the importance of volunteerism; there is generally strong support for his economic address; a better explanation of the surtax proposal needs to be made. Secretary Simon explained that of the 82.5 million tax returns filed annually, about 28% will be affected by the proposal. He further explained that opposition was coming primarily from Republicans and not Democrats. Dean Burch noted that there was substantial support shown in Philadelphia following the President's address there.

Roy Ash reported on Personnel Reduction. He said that there have been a remarkably small number of appeals on the target figures given each department for personnel reductions. The President stated that as soon as the transition problem is solved we are going to cut down the White House staff.

Roy Ash then reported that the Council on Wage and Price Stabilization will work on the elimination of rules and regulations causing inflation. He further stated that the inflation impact statements will be first carried out under executive order then be followed by an OMB circular prescribing the method of testing future rules and regulations against inflation impact.

Secretary Schlesinger commented that he feels productivity could be increased while at the same time reducing the overall number of jobs if we can solve the problem of culling out incompetence which drags down the whole attitude of the bureaucracy. A general discussion followed on this subject. Roy Ash then stated that he will meet with Bob Hampton of the CSC and report back to the Cabinet with an analysis of what can be done.

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Under Secretary Shubert stated that we need to develop a more effective way of identifying and encouraging better management techniques. Roy Ash agreed with this point and stated that it is particularly important at the lower level schedule C positions where the dealings are directly with the bureaucracy.

Dean Burch reported on the status of the political campaigns pointing out that the President has a very active schedule and is going into those areas where his appearance can make a difference. He stated that he may be calling on members of the Cabinet with very short notice asking for their support as we get into the campaign. He noted that Secretaries Butz, Morton and Dent had been particularly active and he hoped that the rest will follow these examples. A discussion followed on specific candidates and states.

The President asked the Attorney General to report on the situation in Boston. The Attorney General stated that he feels the whole thing would blow over if we could get two days of relative peace - even if caused by bad weather. He further noted that there is no justification for federal involvment in Massachusetts because the Governor has not yet used all of the means at his disposal.

The President remarked that he wants everyone to get their proposals for his State of the Union message and other legislation in early so that complete coordination could be made before submission.

Secretary Dent said that the Census Bureau shows that less than 50% of the voters will vote in House elections and that he would report back to the President on further developments.

Secretary Brinegar stated that the Transportation Bill has been put over to the next Congress, apparently due to an internal disagreement between the House and Senate Banking Committees and the Rules Committees. The President noted that he feels that it is a good bill and typical of how we have worked with the Congress to develop a bill but in this case how they dropped the ball.

Attorney General Saxbe reported that the Fair Trade Laws in several states tend to eliminate competition. He also said that the proposed Freedom of Information Act has several real problems. Under Secretary Shubert agreed with this and discussed some of the limitations.

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Under Secretary Mitchell stated that the Housing Bill proposal is probably going to be acceptable but an evaluation at this time is difficult due to differences in definition of terms. The President said that the failure to pass the Housing Bill is another campaign issue our candidates should be using.

At 11:34 a.m. the President concluded the meeting.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 30, 1974

GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

MEMORANDUM FOR: JERRY JONES

FROM: JOHN GUTHRIE JG

SUBJECT: Notes from the Cabinet Meeting
October 30, 1974

The President opened the meeting at 11:06 am thanking the attendees for coming to this working session. He asked Roy Ash to report on personnel reduction and progress toward meeting the $300 billion FY75 budget goal. Mr. Ash indicated that personnel reduction was on schedule. The programs which have been identified by each department for possible elimination would more than achieve the goal - thus permitting the President some options in the selection of actual programs to be eliminated. The President stated that in his Economic Message he had presented a finely tuned package of proposals to meet the economic needs of the nation. He further stated that the polls indicate that 82% of the American public are more concerned about inflation than any other issue.

The President referred to three charts which had been prepared by Bill Seidman and were displayed in the room (see attachment A). He pointed out that each of the initiatives had been assigned for action and follow-up to one of the departments. In this manner there will be no question about who is responsible for that action and the success of the initiatives. NOTE: Reports given by each Cabinet officer will be referred to in the comprehensive handout included as Tab B.

Secretary Butz reported on the items listed in Tab B. With respect to the rice legislation the President agreed to make a personal phone call to Dave Martin in an effort to move the bill out of the rules committee. The President asked Secretary Butz how the voluntary reporting system on exports was progressing. The Secretary said it appears this system is working well and that whenever a corporation requests to export over 50,000 tons, he checks with the State Department. He cited the example of recent orders for wheat shipments to Iran. The President asked the Secretary what impact the announcement of the Russian wheat deal had had on the farm market. The Secretary replied that initially prices dropped significantly but they have generally recovered.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: [illegible]

FROM: [illegible]

SUBJECT: [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Secretary Dent reported on industry conservation audits (see tab B). The President asked if the energy conservation measures were having an adverse effect on production. The Secretary replied that at full production most industries maximize the efficient use of energy, but that at less than full production efficiency falls off. The Secretary then brought up a problem of the ammonia barge which sunk in the Pacific and the difficulty with the Jones Act of making shipments on foreign bottoms. A discussion followed with comments by Secretaries Schlesinger, Brinegar, Brennan, Counsellor Burch and Director Seidman. The President summarized the problem as a decision whether the emergency should be met by an executive directive or legislation. Bill Seidman reported that he is preparing an executive order which will be ready in two days. The President asked Mr. Seidman to be sure to work with Secretary Brennan so the unions would understand that the President feels that this is the only solution to a serious problem and that new shipping will be built in American shipyards.

Secretary Lynn reported on the initiatives listed in Tab B.

Secretary Morton reported on the initiatives listed in Tab B. The President asked Secretary Schlesinger what the problems are with respect to continued military exploration in Alaska. Secretary Schlesinger stated that he thought the problem was one of tactics - exploration or exploitation. Secretary Morton stated that he favored opening up PET-4 for commercial exploration and exploitation. The President then asked why we are not getting more production out of PET-1. Secretary Morton replied that the Armed Services Committee wants to maintain this as a reserve. The President then asked for a joint option paper from Secretary Morton and Secretary Schlesinger.

Deputy Attorney General Silberman reported on the Justice initiatives listed in Tab B. The President stated that he wants to include a scorecard on the number of anti-trust cases tried by Justice.

Secretary Brennan reported on the Labor initiatives listed in Tab B. The President stated that he wants the status of CETA added to the list of initiatives.

Under Secretary Barnum reported on the Transportation initiatives listed in Tab B. Under Secretary Barnum reported that in the Pan Am situation short-term loans for $150 million have been located which should get the corporation through the low travel winter months. With the Pan Am / TWA route swap Pan Am should improve their situation somewhat.

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Secretary [illegible] reported on [illegible] conservation [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. The President asked if the energy conservation measures were having an impact either on production. The Secretary replied that all the production that [illegible] energy the efficient use of energy, but that it was true that [illegible] [illegible]. The Secretary then reported on a problem of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

The President asked what we can do to insure better adherance to 55 mph speed-limits, Barnum replied that if necessary we could withhold highway safety or construction funds from those states that do not enforce the law. The President stated that we should do that or whatever else is necessary to insure compliance because the states are accountable for adhering to regulations. He then stated that he wants to see a monthly report on action taken in those cases where the states are not enforcing the law. The subject of energy conservation was also discussed - Secretary Morton reported that he is working on a total energy conservation package. Both DOT and Commerce have available at cost a computer carpooling package for state and local governments. The President said that he feels that the people of this country want to cooperate but we need to have better publicity on how to do it - we need to publicize the scorecard of each of the states.

Deputy Secretary Gardner reported on the Treasury initiatives listed in Tab B. Secretary Morton stated that he would like to see the windfall profit tax enacted separately from the tax reform bill so that it does not get lost.

The President asked Don Rumsfeld to give a status report on former President Nixon's health. Mr. Rumsfeld stated that as covered in the press he had gone into shock but that Dr. Lukash had informed the President just prior to the Cabinet meeting that former President Nixon's health is critical but stable.

Roy Ash reported on the OMB initiatives listed in Tab B not previously discussed. The President asked Bill Seidman to work with Russell Long on the Trade Reform Act which is a must for submission to the lame duck Congress. Secretary Morton distributed a handout (attached at Tab C).

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The President asked Bill Timmons to find out the status of legislation on nuclear plant licensing.

Russell Train reported on an EPA initiative listed at Tab B.

Mr. Hartmann discussed the status of the WIN program - organizational efforts are due to be completed by Thanksgiving. The biggest problem which has been determined is that of finding enough non-government money to support the organizational structure. Four task forces are being developed: media, recycling, WIN gardens, and local committees. The public is going full speed ahead - all button manufacturers are producing WIN buttons at maximum capacity. Mr. Hartman then read numerous letters and showed articles and posters indicative of public interest. He passed the President a button which showed a chewed bullet with the caption "I'll bite - Ford's right".

The Assembly voted down an act to create special offenses for 16 and 17 year olds. Backers argued that it discourages young people from committing crimes. Opponents said it would clog the courts with cases that should be handled by juvenile authorities.

Assembly Majority Leader Stanley Fink (D., Brooklyn) said he would try to bring the measure back for reconsideration next week. "We have agreed that we will not withdraw the bill," he said.

Assemblyman Daniel Cohalan (D., Staten Island) said he would introduce a bill to create a commission to study the problem of violence in schools. The commission would be composed of educators, parents and students, he said.

Assembly Speaker Perry B. Duryea Jr. (R., Montauk) said he would appoint the commission after consulting with Governor Cuomo and Democratic leaders.

The Assembly passed and sent to the governor a bill to provide $45 million in additional state aid to public schools in New York City. The measure would increase the city's share of basic school aid from 36% to 38% of the total budget.

Assemblyman Frank Padavan (R., Queens), chairman of the Assembly Education Committee, said the bill was needed because the city had been forced to close libraries, curtail programs and increase class sizes because of budget problems.

The Assembly also passed and sent to the governor a bill to increase the penalty for assaulting a police officer from a misdemeanor to a felony. Violators could be sentenced to up to seven years in prison.

The bill was opposed by Assemblyman Arthur Eve (D., Buffalo), who said it would do little to deter violence against police officers.

Assemblyman Daniel Feldman (D., Forest Hills) said he would introduce legislation to create a task force to study the problem of violence against police officers.

The Assembly also passed a bill to increase the penalty for selling drugs to minors from a misdemeanor to a felony. Violators could be sentenced to up to four years in prison.

Assemblyman Frank Padavan (R., Queens), chairman of the Assembly Education Committee, said the bill was needed because drug dealers often target young people.

The Assembly also passed a bill to increase the penalty for selling drugs to minors from a misdemeanor to a felony. Violators could be sentenced to up to four years in prison.

Assemblyman Frank Padavan (R., Queens), chairman of the Assembly Education Committee, said the bill was needed because drug dealers often target young people.

Secretary Brennan asked for the President's guidance on recent problems of leaking statistics particularly the unemployment statistics. Mr. Rumsfeld stated that a recent decision has been made with respect to all sensitive government statistics that they will be very closely held and sent only to the President via Sidney Greenspan. The President stated that there had been other problems with leaks - notably State and Defense and that he rather than calling the FBI has made it the departmental responsibility to solve an internal problem.

At 12:56 pm the President concluded the meeting stating that he hopes to have another working session in the next few weeks.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 15, 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR: JERRY JONES

FROM: JOHN GUTHRIE JG.

SUBJECT: Notes from the Cabinet Meeting, November 15, 1974

The President opened the meeting at 11:14 am, thanking the Cabinet for attending this working session.

The President asked each of those responsible for the 31 Economic Initiatives to give a brief update on their areas of responsibility. (NOTE: Each report was covered in the sequence shown in the handout included at Tab B.)

Under Secretary Campbell stated that with respect to rice legislation he feels the President may be able to assist by making some calls. Other initiatives are being followed closely. The President asked if there is enough fertilizer for the farmers next year. Under Secretary Campbell reported that although there is not as much as the farmers would like, there is enough to make next year's harvest the biggest in history - if the weather is reasonably good.

Secretary Dent reported on actions in industry to conserve energy stating that there has been an overall reduction of about 4% per product output.

Secretary Lynn reported that he is working with Secretary Simon in a joint effort with the Congress to solve mortgage credit problems.

Secretary Morton reported that the deep water port facility legislation was scheduled to be before the Congress on Nov. 18 and surface mining legislation on Nov. 19. He noted that the President had participated in a meeting with the coastal states governors to encourage their cooperation in the development of energy sources.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
ML 93-2 #36 NSC Ltr. 6/30/93
By LLF NARA, Date 10/15/93

Deputy Attorney General Silberman reported that increased penalties for anti-trust violations are going to be worked on next week. The Attorney General has been dealing with Senator Hruska in an effort to strengthen the investigative powers of the anti-trust division. He noted that actions are being taken in the area of price fixing and that in fact the Department of Justice is bringing suit against the largest real estate board in the nation - the same group the President addressed last night. He also mentioned that FBI agents with accounting backgrounds are being trained to investigate price fixing.

Secretary Brennan noted that his legislative initiatives are moving forward but that under the CETA program only 50,000 of an authorized 170,000 jobs have been filled. The President stated that Labor should keep pushing CETA.

Secretary Brinegar reported that the Surface Transportation Act is very complex and is receiving much attention from DOT. He also noted that the Mass Transit Bill looks good and has gone to the Senate. In the areas of fuel economy, Secretary Brinegar is meeting with auto industry leaders. DOT is studying the possibility of recommending a further extension of the 55 mph speed limit order. He also noted that car pooling is the best solution found so far to the traffic control problem.

Secretary Simon stated that in the Financial Institutions Act there remains only one area of disagreement which is being worked out. Other initiatives are proceeding on schedule. Secretary Simon also discussed the effective date of legislation authorizing the sale of gold by private citizens and possible actions the government should take with respect to the sale of gold reserves. The President asked Secretary Simon for specific recommendations in this area.

Director Ash noted that ERDA legislation is on track and will be available by January 1. Other initiatives are proceeding on schedule. Mr. Ash also reported that a list of over 100 items has been drawn up for submission to the Congress for FY75 budget cuts. The President made a point of thanking all of the Cabinet members for their fine cooperation and voluntarily recommending these cuts. Mr. Ash stated that in the area of personnel reduction, the objective being 40,000 by June 30, he now has appeals for over 13,000. He stated that part of these would be eliminated under the recommended budget cuts but that he is going to have to get with each of the Cabinet members to work out the remainder of the appeals. The President stated that he would talk further to Mr. Ash on this area.

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The President stated that we must make a very strong pitch for the Trade Reform Act to be passed during the lame duck Congress. Secretary Kissinger stated that he had been asked to testify on this legislation and that he foresaw some problems due to additions such as linking trade with cooperation in areas such as MIA.

Russell Train noted that he hopes that in the President's message on Monday the Congress will be urged to pass the Clean Air Act. He also mentioned that Secretary Morton has appointed him to head up an inter-agency board to coordinate environmental matters.

Secretary Morton reported that he is working with Secretary Simon on natural gas deregulation initiatives. He stated that with respect to conservation within the government, GSA is actually handling the monitoring system but he is concerned with the validity of units of measure and criteria to be used in reports. The President asked Secretary Morton for a report on how we are doing. Secretary Morton reported that in efforts to achieve a voluntary energy conservation goal of 1 million barrels per day one of the biggest problems is the increasing public awareness of the long term shortage. He noted that an increase in price has been shown to reduce the demand, but he pointed out that he was not recommending a federal tax on gasoline. The President said that he wondered if the Secretary had heard what he said in his press conference last night. The Secretary said that he had, he only wished that the President had heard what he said when he was misquoted.

Bill Baroody reported on the WIN program. He stated that over 20,000 letters are being sent to state and local government officials, businesses and other groups on how to support the WIN program.

Bill Timmons discussed the lame duck session of Congress noting that they are expected to return to session Monday, the 18th of November until the 21st of December. He pointed out that much of that time is taken up with administrative matters so that really only the three weeks will be available for significant accomplishments. The President emphasized that there will only be three working weeks and stated that all of the Cabinet members have got to be available to work with Congress to get the lame duck legislation passed.

Secretary Kissinger reviewed his trip to the U.S.S.R., the sub-continent and the Mid East. The trip to the U.S.S.R. was to review general possibilities ahead of us and to make preparations for the President's meetings in Vladivostok. The purpose of the trip to India was to respond to their obvious desire to improve relationships with the United States

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The President stated that he does have a very strong point for the trade deficit but he pointed out the fact that Congress, Secretary Kissinger stated that he had been asked to testify on this legislation and that we do have some problems that is obvious such as Libya, Iran this support that is cause such as this.

Russell Train asked that he input that to the President's message on today the Congress will be urged to pass the Clean Air Act. He also mentioned the Secretary Haig has appointed him to head up an inter-agency group to coordinate environmental matters.

Secretary Haig reported that he is working with Secretary Lyng on certain problems in Europe. He stated that while respect to modernization while the programs, the is actually building the negotiating system but he is concerned with the military of terms of numbers and systems to be used in Europe. The President said Secretary Haig that a report on this as was asked. Secretary Haig stated that he is trying to schedule a Secretary energy Secretaries and of a talking because you day one of the biggest problems in the increasing public awareness of the long term shortage. He noted that we increase in price the more there to reduce the demand, but he pointed out that to use the remembering a history can be problem. The President said that he believed if the Secretary had known what he said in his press conference last night. The Secretary said that he did, he only stated that the President had known what he said when he was reported.

Bill Baroody reported on the PIC program. He stated that over 25 new letters are being sent by Jack and Lois concerning attitudes, businesses and other groups on how to support the PIC program.

Bill Timmons discussed the June deficit session of Congress saying that they are expected to produce to obtain Senate, the area of economic still the lack of economic. He pointed out that most of that time is taken up with administrative matters so that really only the third week will be available for substantive accomplishments. The President explained that there will only be three working weeks and stated that all of the Cabinet members have got to be available to work with Congress so are the same more important persons.

Secretary Kissinger discussed his trip to the U.S.S.R., the conversations with the old Czar. The trip to the U.S.S.R. may be only to general possibilities should of us and to have preparations for the President's meetings in September. The purpose of the trip to India was to prepare to help nations desire to improve relationships with the United States

thus reducing Soviet influence in that area. In the Mid East he pointed out that much of the current difficulties are due to the Israeli's initial refusal to deal with anyone but the Egyptians - thus procluding any flexibility in the negotiations at the Rabat summit. He emphasized that it is important for the Israeli's to understand that their future depends on negotiating with all of the Arab nations. The Secretary then described the purposes of the President's trip to the Far East. He noted that the President had agreed to keep the commitment made by former President Nixon to Prime Minister Tanaka the very first day he took office. He pointed out that sensitivities in Japan are such that there is no possibility of cancelling this trip regardless of unrest or Tanaka's future. In an aside Secretary Kissinger pointed out that in dealing with Japanese we deal with a consensus - that there will be no decisions made by any one person - that expecting to get a significant decision on this trip is like reaching out to an anthill, picking up one ant and asking it to make a decision for the whole anthill. What is critical on this trip is to create a mood for future relationships. The trip to Korea is being made because not to make it when the President is already in that area of the world would create serious international misunderstandings - that it is important to us to restate our commitment to Korean security. He also pointed out that the Japanese appreciate that their own security is tied to the security of South Korea. The trip to Vladivostok is being made primarily because it is more convenient at this time rather than waiting for the trip to Europe when a European trip would become dominated by news of U.S./U.S.S.R. announcements.

The President informed the Cabinet he wants to get together with them on two Saturdays in December to finalize the legislative programs in the Departments. He stressed that he wants the Cabinet to be a vigorous part of this government and he wants each member to be involved in the formulation of programs and policies - that he wants to insure that they are continuously available throughout this period.

The President also stated his very deep concern about the confirmation of Governor Rockefeller - he stressed that he considers it mandatory that this confirmation be made before adjournment of the Congress. He stated that he feels Governor Rockefeller has put up with more than most people would stand for and that he has come out very well The President stressed that he would like the assistance of all members in any area that they feel they can be effective to support this nomination.

The meeting adjourned at 12:24 pm.

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[redacted]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Cabinet file

First Cabinet Meeting of New Year
January 8, 1975

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11:10 a.m. President arrived in Cabinet Room.

11:11 a.m. Press was admitted.

11:14 a.m. Press departed.

11:15 a.m. President opened the meeting.

President -Welcomed Vice President Nelson Rockefeller to his first Cabinet Meeting and indicated a very warm welcome to him from all the Cabinet members and senior advisers assembled.

-Indicated that he had already given Mr. Rockefeller a major public responsibility and that we will do all we can to keep Mr. Rockefeller and his staff busy.

-The President then introduced the new Cabinet Secretary, Dr. James E. Connor, and indicated that he had a substantial background and had worked with some of the Cabinet officers in the room; specifically mentioning Secretary Lynn and Alan Greenspan.

-Mr. Connor's duties were delineated and the President gave him a very warm welcome.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

MR95-83, #23; NSC Ltr. 10/25/96.
By lct NARA, Date 11/10/97

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President -The President then turned to Donald Rumsfeld indicating that there were four major topics for discussion on the agenda today and that he would first like Don Rumsfeld to address the matter of the White House organization.

Rumsfeld -Mr. Rumsfeld in opening indicated that the White House organization directly reflected the President's desire to deal with principals and have multiple sources of information, in addition, to his desire to have an orderly decision making process.

-Mr. Rumsfeld then reviewed the organizational charts, specifically the nine boxes representing the principal advisers to the President, indicating that each one of them has a deputy who will work with the President in the absence of the principal.

The President had indicated a strong desire to work both with his principal advisers and their deputies so that an accelerated process and meeting schedule could be kept.

-He talked also about the changes of titles, and that they reflected the President's wishes to have more descriptive titles as opposed

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Rumsfeld

to the Special Assistant, Deputy Special Assistant, and Staff Assistant titles which have been used in the past.

-He also mentioned that he had taken action on the requisites in the White House regarding office space, parking spaces, and White House Mess privileges.

-He indicated a strong desire to have the staff of the White House, not work twenty hours a day and not to detach themselves from the community. They should be able to have a normal life and be a part of the community.

-He mentioned further that Cabinet officers were to let him know whenever they felt that WH procedure was not going well so that he could make adjustments. They are there to serve them and work together.

-He indicated further the strong desire for the White House Staff and the Cabinet agencies to be integrated and to coordinate their efforts in providing services for the President and the country. This is to be a unified Administration.

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President -He then interrupted and mentioned that while the Vice President's Staff is not reflected organizationally on the chart, it is an integral part of the White House Staff. That in the past the Presidential and Vice Presidential staffs have frequently had jealousies and conflicts and that that would not be tolerated in this Administration and that he expects his people to work closely and in harmony with the Vice President, to which the Vice President nodded his head in agreement.

Rumsfeld -Mr. Rumsfeld then menioned while energy as a separate box on the organizational chart was not mentioned, that Secretary Morton, Frank Zarb, ~~and Dr. Seamans~~ would be attending the Cabinet meetings. In fact Frank Zarb was attending his first Cabinet meeting today along with Nelson Rockefeller.

-Don Rumsfeld then turned the time over to President Ford.

President -He mentioned that there was a special election held in Louisiana; an election which a Republican had won by 44 disputed votes on November 5th, and that during the special election yesterday, he had won by 11,000 votes,

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President — to which there were very positive comments. (The next item on the agenda was a discussion by Jack Marsh on the New Congress.)

Marsh — -Mr. Marsh indicated that the Congress with which the Administration will be dealing, is an intelligent, articulate, young group of men and women.

-While many of their elections were won on the broad national issues of economy, energy, and Watergate, he mentioned also that many of the races were decided on state and local issues; such as the environment, consumerism, and reform, specifically, tax reform. However, far and away the economy was the most important consideration from all appearances in the national elections.

-He mentioned in the new group of 100 plus members of the Congress, that forty are attorneys, which is the largest professional group. However, there was a broad cross section of disciplines represented.

-He indicated that they are very well organized and that they dealt with the leadership as a group, which has not been traditional, but which he feels was very effective. He indi-

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Marsh

cated that had we placed the newly elected members back in the 93rd Congress, that we would have suffered erosion on key issues.

-Mr. Marsh did say that he feels the new Congress is a responsible and responsive group of men and women with whom a close working relationship is important.

-Mr. Marsh then introduced Max Friedersdorf who will be the principal mover behind the Congressional relations operation.

Friedersdorf

-Max Friedersdorf handed to the members of the Cabinet and senior staff biographical sketches of all of the new Congressmen, as well as, a picture and probable committee assignments. He said he would like the Cabinet agencies and specifically the Secretaries, to contact the new Congressmen at the earliest possible date and to establish a good working relationship with them as early as possible.

-He then reviewed the White House Staff in the Congressional relations area as it would relate to their work on the Hill.

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Friedersdorf

-He first mentioned Vern Loen with seventeen years of experience would head up the House side. Assisting him will be Charlie Leppert, who has a background in labor.

Doug Bennett will concentrate on ways and means with emphasis in taxation.

-In the Senate, the key representative will be Bill Kendall, with fourteen years of experience, formally of Senator Mathias' staff. Assisting him will be Pat O'Donnell.

-Also joining the Congressional team Bob Walthieus, formerly of Senator Bennett's staff.

-Max mentioned that the total number of years experience of the Congressional Staff in the White House is 92.

-Max went on to mention that the Congressional Staff of the White House will be pleased and happy to work with the Congressional relation offices of the various agencies. They should continue to send their reports to the WH and indicated to them that we are here to help and to serve and that we will do everything we can to make their jobs easier.

-Max then turned his time back over to Jack Marsh.

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Marsh

-In summarizing, Jack Marsh indicated that this is not the 89th Congress that can speak with a single voice and with a Democratic President; it is the 94th Congress. Therefore, the method of dealing with them is going to be substantially different than any previous Congress.

-The concept "floating coalition", which was suggested by the President, is a term which is going to be used to indicate the approach to Congress.

-Essentially Mr. Marsh mentioned that the base of the floating coalition is the Republican sector of the House of Representatives; but that in order to be effective, we must move beyond that base. However, never forgetting it.

-Congressmen must be approached on an issue basis and that we must be willing to move to the Democratic side of the aisle to get support; in fact we must be willing to move to the center and, even perhaps slightly left of center, to draw the Democratic votes necessary to secure needed support for the Presi-

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Marsh — dent on particular issues.

-However, members will not be penalized on future issues for not going along; therefore, the term "floating coalition" which will be used on an issue by issue basis.

President — -The President then interjected indicating, as an example, that when he was a member of Congress and Minority Leader of the House, the floating coalition was used in the foreign aid area where they would get an entirely different group of people to support foreign aid commitments by the President as opposed to other issues which may have been presented to the House at that time. That was his first experience with floating coalition and he felt it worked very well; therefore, his decision to use it in regard to working with the 94th Congress.

Marsh — -Jack Marsh then continued summarizing.

1) Have all Cabinet secretaries make contact with new members on committees. However, not to forget any old members who have been reassigned to new committees.

2) Use Assistant Secretaries whenever possible to contact new members of the Congress

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Marsh

because very few members of the Congress "old and new" ever have an opportunity to meet the Assistant Secretaries.

3) Always pre-notice ranking members of committees before contacting the new members. It is a mistake that the White House has consistantly made and which has offended many people. Mr. Marsh indicated that it is good manners to pre-notice ranking members.

4) Move to jursidicational committees; get to know the members, particularly the new ones, but also the old ones. Develop a consultative approach to issues.

5) Move to areas of collateral and peripheral interest of each agency or Cabinet level organization so that one can influence as much legislation as possible.

6) Survey the legislative affairs section in each Cabinet office; fill the vacancies with good people.

7) The secretary should identify with the legislative affairs people and should be seen with them on the Hill. Congressional members should know that the legislative affairs people in the various agencies have access to their Secretary.

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Marsh

8) Do your homework in subcommittees. When the bills are first being put together with the staff, ranking members and lesser members of the staff, that is the time to talk with them about the substantive decisions that will be put into the bills.

9) Always be prompt in responding to committees; don't allow time to elapse between notification and response.

10) Establish regular contact with the members of Congress, specifically, those in your immediate area of interest.

11) Exchange information with the White House. Let us know what you are working on, what your desires are, and we will let you know what the President's position is and how we can cooperate to achieve good legislation.

12) When you are filling vacancies in your legislative affairs area, we want legislative assistants who will represent this Administration to the Hill, not legislative assistants who will represent the Hill to this Administration.

-Mr. Marsh then thanked members of the Cabinet and others assembled for their attention.

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President -The President moved to the next agenda topic and introduced Alan Greenspan who gave an economic overview.

Greenspan -Mr. Greenspan indicated that the new data is generally negative and that the industrial index is continuing downward.

-He sees general erosion continuing in the economy with the homebuilders and auto industries being very weak and inventories being disgorged at a rapid pace.

-However, he does not see any indication that there is an acceleration of deterioration which he considers to be very important and perhaps a sign that several months out, we will see a bottoming of the current decline.

-He indicated also that most retailers have reduced prices in order to relieve their vast inventories and that the retail market is generally holding up quite well.

-He does not anticipate the January rise in unemployment to be significant, certainly not as significant as the December rise. While the January figure could be higher, he doesn't anticipate that it would be dramatically or shockingly higher. Therefore, his conclusion is that the rate of deterioration is peaking out.

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Greenspan

-He also discussed the psychological problem that many Americans are facing in regard to being laid off. He feels that the lay off rate is peaking; however, the labor force is very concerned about loosing its job which relates to the lack of confidence they have right now. While he thinks that unemployment will continue for some time, he feels the lay off rate will not continue very much longer.

-He also said that he does not see a strong upturn in sight and that in the late spring to mid-summer, perhaps we will see a bottoming out. We might then see an economy which is relatively flat for several months with an upswing not coming probably until spring of 1976.

-He indicated that plant and equipment expenditures for all of 1975 will be only about 4 1/2 percent.

-He does think however that we will see an unwinding of heavy inventories, namely automobiles in mid-summer to early fall.

-He said that if there is a restoration of confidence by consumers, we may see very good signs in production in early 1976.

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Greenspan -Mr. Greenspan continued that his economic report was, in his best judgement, what we could see for the next few months.

President -At the conclusion of his remarks, the President ~~applauded~~ complimented Mr. Greenspan for the fine work he had done in preparing detailed recommendations on options for the President and his advisers.

-He went further to state that all of the people who have worked in the energy and economic field over the last few months and weeks have all done a superior job in preparing the information necessary for the President to make his decisions and that he was very, very grateful for the fine job that they have done.

-The President then turned to Henry Kissinger and indicated to Henry that he would like him to discuss foreign policy as he sees it developing over the months ahead.

Kissinger -Secretary Kissinger indicated that there are two areas that he would like to talk about. First, the traditional foreign policy agenda; and second, the structural problems within that agenda.

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Kissinger

-The Secretary indicated that the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union and the United States and the Peoples Republic of China looked very good.

-Secretary Kissinger and the President met with the Ambassadors of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey yesterday and indicated that things looked very good in that area and that the Greeks are ready to make some concession which could allow a major peace.

-In the Mideast the possibility for a settlement continues to be good; the parties are communicating effectively and it may be possible to go to Geneva with a good understanding and possibility for a multilateral agreement. This would mean that the possibility of war in the Middle East has been greatly reduced in 1975.

-In returning to a discussion concerning relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, the Secretary indicated that the Jackson/Vanik approach to the Vladivostok agreement has shocked Soviet leadership and the question in Soviet's minds is, "how dependent can the USSR become on United States domestic decisions?". Secretary Kissinger said he did not feel the Soviets would accept the trade bill. The President and the

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Kissinger

Secretary agreed that the testimony offered by Administration spokesmen on the Hill must be very disciplined in regard to this agreement and to this discussion.

-He indicated however that the relationship in the political field with the USSR is good while the relationship in the economic field is under question at the moment.

-The political area with the PRC is good and by that the Secretary indicated that he is getting everything he needs to offset any Soviet decisions.

-He then dealt on the broader range of developing an entirely new set of world rules and interdependencies which he feels is in the making. That the United States initiatives in regard to other world countries are essential in regard to developing a new structure of world peace and economics. He believes that the United States has an historic opportunity to develop new political and economic partnerships and leadership throughout the world.

In two years retrospectively, the United States will have made major strides in influencing this new world structure; it will in

Kissinger — fact have saved the world from major disasters.

-The Secretary thanked the President.

President — -The President thanked those present for the discussion and participation.

12:15 p.m. — Meeting adjourned.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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Notes of the Cabinet Meeting, January 29th, 1975.
President arrived in the Cabinet Room, 11:02 a.m.
Press arrived 11:03 a.m. Press departed 11:06 a.m.
President opened the meeting.

The President in opening the meeting made two strong points: 1) The three hundred million dollar Vietnam supplemental and the 222 million dollar Cambodian supplemental have been submitted to the Hill. We are for it; the Cabinet and Administration must pledge its total support to this bill. It is vital and it is right; and we will stand behind it 100%. 2) We are dealing with a delicate economic plan. Our energy and economic plan will be submitted in one bill, all in one writing, somewhere between 7 and 8 hundred pages; it will be a single plan. Congress doesn't even have a bill, let alone a total plan. We must be unified in our support of that plan, we must be strong and tough; and I want you to know that I will make the compromises, no one else in the Executive Branch is authorized to make concessions or compromises and if you do, you are wrong. I will make the compromises.

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Secretary Morton then asked the President, do we have a talking paper on the supplemental so we will be prepared either for testimony or for press conferences as we travel around the country during the next thirty days?

Secretary Simon agreed with Secretary Morton indicating that a talking paper was important; but he added that the important point to understand is that this Administration is not asking for anymore than Congress has already authorized. That is the key point in the argument.

The President then indicated that there was a column in the morning's paper by Goodwin in the Christian Science Monitor where he enunciated the results of a fall in Vietnam and the guilt complex that would be inherent in the United States' position in having withdrawn support from Vietnam. The President agrees with that position.

Secretary Morton then asked, what can that kind of money do in Vietnam and Cambodia?

Secretary Schlesinger - The Congress has authorized 90 million dollars per quarter in aid to Vietnam and Cambodia. The Congress then passed a bill on 12/31/74 squeezing the quarterly payments by almost 50%. With the result of this decrease in aid, the Vietcong will succeed in overrunning South Vietnam by late spring. Phnom Phen will fall by March or April. They are on such dire straights that they are rationing hand-grenades. It must be understood that 300 million dollars will not buy any new equipment, but it will buy ammunition, gasoline, oil, and other essential ingredients which will allow them time to build their own forces.

PR.1-3 DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
NSC 91-16, #30 NSC Ltr. 9/20/93
By KOH, NARA, Date 9/25/93

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Notes of the Cabinet Meeting, August 25th, 1971.
At Cabinet earlier in the morning, [illegible]
Mrs. Connie Smith [illegible]
Mr. Cabinet agreed the meeting.

The President opened the meeting with the closing remarks. It was agreed [illegible] Mr. Connie Smith's appointment and that [illegible] Mr. Connie Smith's appointment [illegible] to the Board. The Secretary [illegible] Mr. Connie Smith [illegible] Mr. Connie Smith [illegible] Mr. Connie Smith

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Secretary Kissinger--We are asking for only enough to make it. We must have enough! We are out of Vietnam, we brought 550,000 troops home with honor; but, now the dissenters who wanted those troops out, are asking for even more. The dissenters want to retroactively destroy everything that we have achieved. We maintain that this will hurt our credibility world-wide. Our allies must know that we will stand by them and by any agreements we have with them. It will hurt our international negotiating power, if we do not stand in South Vietnam. We will need this support for two, perhaps for three years before the Vietnamese will be able to handle themselves adequately.

The President--The same people who said get the troops out, get the troops out, and we did, now are backing away from the aid they said they would support in place of those troops.

Vice President Rockefeller--Mr. President, this deals a severe blow to our international negotiating ability, unless we stand by these two small countries. This must be understood by the American people, that we stand by our allies and deliver on commitments made. This is a necessity for our global relationships.


The President then added--Our global relationships are very important. It is necessary for people around the world to know that we will stand by our allies. As we deal internationally, what we say in the Middle East or Southeast Asia or in detente with Russia and China, that they can count on those statements as being backed by the American people, and the American Congress. It will impair our international negotiating ability if it always hinges on the domestic question of whether or not Congress will approve.

As we start the main substantive portion of our Cabinet Meeting, I do want to thank Claude, Bill, and Roy for the outstanding service they have given to our Country. I know that I, and all of you, appreciate the effort and service they have put forth. I want to mention also that next Monday afternoon and Tuesday, I will be travelling to Atlanta. We have a full day of activities planned. I think that these regional trips are very important and I would like full Cabinet support and I would like the Cabinet to participate as much as possible. Our people will be in touch with you about this.

We want to discuss the new budget act, if all the deferrals and recisions go through, we will save 3 billion dollars in '75 and 17 billion dollars in '76. Now we didn't do well last year; REA was very bad last year. Congress was wrong; 400 million dollars in limbo now that we may have to spend as the result of a Congressional decision last year.

Secretary Weinberger--Actually more savings than that, Mr. President. It looks like 300 million dollars in '75 and 500 million dollars in '76 for HEW. The legislation will be submitted soon; it is at the White House now and that legislation will save a considerable amount.

Secretary Brinegar--Most of our legislation is in the referral category. About 5 million dollars will be handled in the new highway bill that we will submit. As you know, the impoundment started sometime ago. Our strategy is to design a new highway bill and make the budget expenditures appropriate for '75 and '76.



[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

The new bill is good; we think that we will have an excellent chance. The bill is ready to go through now and will be submitted this week.

Under Secretary Campbell--Our legislative strategy is the same as of the Department of Transportation. There will be new legislation which will be introduced. Our great problem is food stamps and that bill will be very, very difficult.

Mr. Ash--At 10:00 AM on Monday, the President will sign the Budget Bill. On Saturday, the Cabinet officers will receive the budget material and an overview of all key issues. It will deal with the major new features of the budget and the two major areas of the budget. I would like to make a slide presentation now of some graphics which will give you a more detailed look at the budget we are proposing. (Note charts at Tab A.)

After Roy Ash's presentation, there followed a general discussion among the Cabinet officers and the President about the budget.

Secretary Weinberger--We find it extremely hard to get people to introduce new legislation to help us. Senator Hruska finally agreed to introduce one bill; but it was difficult to do.

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Secretary Simon--I will help you do that.

The President--Unless Congress agrees to go along with our deferrals and recisions, there will be a 71 or 72 billion dollar deficit.

Vice President Rockefeller--May I ask this question please, Mr. Ash: Do we realistically expect to achieve any of these goals and projections which you have outlined?

Mr. Ash--All are projections. We are assuming 17.6 billion dollars in deferrals and recisions. If that changes drastically, and the Congress does not go along with us, then all projections will change as well.

Secretary Schlesinger--Equally important to understand is that there is no net fiscal stimulus if these totals are met.

The President--It is important to talk about the tax cut, but equally important to talk of the curtailment of Federal spending. They go hand in hand. The two cannot be separated in our approach to the budget.

Mr. Ash--I would like to make some general comments of historical nature about the budget and its change. In 1950, the Federal debt was equal to 80% of the GNP. In 1974, the Federal debt was equal to 38% of the GNP. So we have seen a substantial reduction in Federal debt over the last 24 years. The real story of the Federal budget can be seen in the following comments: In the 1950's, the budget went up and down appropriately with the increase of activities in Korea and then the decrease. And when Vietnam came along, the spending went up for Vietnam, but the spending stayed up. As a result from 1960 to 1968, we have 50% more dollars in Federal spending; most of these are related to individual payouts. The biggest reasons for increasing deficits have been the payments for individuals. They have been growing at a rate of

8 1/2 to 9% per year, while the GNP has been growing at a rate only 3 1/2% per year. In the year 2,000, 1976 dollar expenditures for all governments, state, local, and federal, will be 2 trillion dollars. The GNP is expected to be 3.4 trillion dollars. Over 50% of the GNP will be committed dollars by the year 2,000 and this is what the President was alluding to in his speech before the Conference Board last week.

Vice President Rockefeller--If these projections are met, it doesn't seem to me that we will bring state government spending down. We need to move from a thousand different categorical grants to block grants.

Secretary Weinberger--Congress doesn't seem to be willing Mr. Vice President, to change that grant structure. They are very uncooperative.

The President--Roy, do you have figures on the Defense budget vs. the social programs.

Mr. Ash--Yes, we do and they will be included in the package which you will receive on Saturday.

Secretary Dent--It seems that an important part of this understanding of the budget is that a decline in the GNP is a new twist. Spending is based on a smaller GNP.

Secretary Weinberger--There is no need to eliminate all creative programs, but we must be able to substitute better programs for existing programs without adding to the pile and making it an increasing Federal expenditure. Congress doesn't seem to want to cooperate in substituting a better program for an existing program.

The President--We have developed a hodgepodge social program. We need a new, totally comprehensive program in social reform.

Vice President Rockefeller--Mr. President, this is a very serious political question. State and local governments will see this as a real blow and I fear for you politically. You must be able to offer them an alternative, a new program, rather than changing the structure seriously. You see, in order to get Federal funds on the categorical grants, state governments must have what is called an enrichment program. In other words, they must commit to spend dollars before the Federal government will match them; therefore, state and local governments will continue spiraling upward in dollars spent before they will get a commitment for new funds. Therefore, I would urge you to be prepared to talk about your philosophy and feelings on categorical vs. block grants; and, if you think it was bad having the New England governors down here, in my judgement, you will have all 50 governors and most mayors knocking on your door and wanting answers, unless we have an answer for them.

The President--Well Nelson, my personal philosophy is to move from categorical grants to block grants; and I am committed to that. It does give states and local governments more flexibility and perhaps we should make that view more widely known.

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[illegible] to [illegible] per year, and in the [illegible] have been growing at a more rapid [illegible] per year. [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible], and [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Under Secretary Campbell--It is a very realistic problem and that is dealing with the second layer of bureaucracy, because regardless of what kind of leadership we offer the departments, that second layer of bureaucracy wants to see categorical grants continued.

Secretary Morton--You are right Mr. Campbell, it is a real problem. I have got 70,000 people under me and 35,000 of them today are up on the Hill talking with the Congressmen about categorical grants. Everytime I talk to a Congressman, they seemed to have talked with somebody in the parks department or some other area below that second level of bureaucracy and they are making important policy decisions.

The President--This is something that we will have to look at very carefully, but let's turn to the Congressional area. Max, do you have a report for us from the Congress?

Max Friedersdorf--Organization of the Congress has been the major problem which has been in the newspapers and confronting the members of the House and Senate for the past three weeks. They now seem to be organized and ready to move off on various issues. There is a crucial vote coming up next week that all of you need to know about. That is the tariff vote. The House tax bill may get to the floor by tomorrow. So begin to talk to your House and Senate members and encourage them in the direction the Administration wants to go.

The President--Jack, do you have anything for us?

Mr. Marsh--We have developed a task force on energy that will handle all the legislation in the President's package and that task force has spent considerable time up on the Hill educating the members of Congress to the President's position. The second point that I would like to mention to you, is what we discussed previously, it is essential that you meet the new members of Congress. A great example of that is Peter Brennan, who has met every single new member of Congress in the last three weeks. I urge each of you to do this as it can strengthen our position considerably. Assignments will be given out to you and your legislative departments, we must see these people before the vote; it doesn't do us any good to see them after. Also, the comparison on the Ullman bill vs. the Administration's bill will be out this week, and will be in your hands as soon as we get it done.

The President--With the bill on the floor this week, it is important that we understand our position. The Congress is tying the debt ceiling limit to the President's ability to go with the higher tariff. You should understand that that is what we want; we want the two bills tied together. We will veto the bill if it comes to us in that form and there are not enough votes to override in either the House or the Senate. Tell your Congressmen to vote for the debt ceiling and vote against the President's ability to impose a tariff. The White House view on this and the Administration's view is that the Congress is going backwards by using a parliamentary gimmick to hurt the President's ability to handle the energy crisis and that is how we have to sell it to the public. I would like Alan Greenspan to now give us a brief analysis of the economic sector.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible], do you have anything for us?

[illegible]

[illegible]

Mr. Greenspan--While the decline continues, it is declining at a slower rate now than it was previously. The decline is giving rise to inventory liquidation which is a good sign. That cannot go on forever. I believe that we are beginning to see the first signs of a bottoming out which may take place in late summer. Again in January we will see a substantial increase in unemployment, however, the layoffs are minimal. I believe that beginning in March, we will see some new signs. Signs that there is revitalization of the economy and that the decline is at least slowing down considerably. You may also expect to see a sharp decline in GNP for the first quarter.

The President--This ends the substantive portion of the meeting. As I mentioned when we started the meeting, I wanted to give Claude, Bill and Roy an opportunity to make whatever comments and observations they choose at this time.

Attorney General Saxbe--Mr. President, it has been an honor to serve with you and serve my country and with the Cabinet. I believe that when we started our job, we wanted to remove the Justice Department from the political arena and leave it objective and professional. I believe that we are doing that. Attorney General Designate Levi will find the Department competent, proud, and in good shape; although, he will have problems as any Cabinet officer does have. In the time that I have served in the Cabinet, this morning was one of the most thrilling. To hear the President offer that strong statement of leadership which this country so badly needs; and I admire you for that. I want to thank my fellow Cabinet officers for the privilege and opportunity of working with them and serving with them. If you continue to give us that strong leadership, Mr. President, I see nothing but good times ahead.

Secretary Brinegar--I have prepared two minutes of comments about observations I would like to make. First, may I say that the strength of the Cabinet is great, there are really good, capable men serving this Administration. The Department of Transportation is in good shape. Transportation generally is better than one thinks; there are problems. The long-term problem is how do we clear the regulatory process that is strangling the railroads; and very short-term, the possibility of financial collapse of TWA and Pan American. I am leaving Mr. Coleman a lot of headaches, a lot of problems, and a lot of challenges. I have enjoyed my time here and I look forward in serving again at some future point; but, I am anxious to return to the private sector.

Mr. Ash--The Cabinet members are very able and I have enjoyed working with them. It is fun to be at the focal point of the most responsible job in the whole world and it has been a pleasure to assist you, Mr. President. May I say also that this country needs strong leadership and they are going to need it this time next year, two years from now, four years from now, five years from now, six years from now; and Mr. President, I urge you two years from last week to be our President again. I think that you should make a run at it; I think that yours is the kind of leadership the country needs. It has been a pleasure to have worked with you.

The Cabinet Meeting ended at 12:32 PM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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Notes of the Cabinet Meeting
March 12th, 1975

The President entered the Cabinet Room at 11:04 a.m.
The Press arrived at 11:05 a.m.
The Press departed at 11:07 a.m.
The President opened the meeting at 11:08 a.m.

The President indicated that we have a very full plate today and we should get started. He mentioned that this was Carla Hills' and Bill Coleman's first Cabinet Meeting and he welcomed them and looked forward to working with them. He also mentioned that this was Pete Brennan's last meeting and he joined with all of the Cabinet in thanking him for his service. He reserved time at the end of the Cabinet Meeting for Secretary Brennan to make whatever comments he desired.

As you know the Clemency Board was established last September. It has been extended upon two occasions by me principally because of a late surge in applications which we have had over the last few weeks. The Clemency Board has the authority to deal with civilian and military personnel, who were either punished in civilian court or by the military for draft evasion or AWOL offenses. In late January the Clemency Board had only 860 applications, then they made some public appearances and made the public more aware of the program and as a result, there has been a terrific increase. In fact, the response was overwhelming. The Board reports approximately 11,000 applications on hand with an additional 4,000 - 5,000 cases anticipated by the deadline. I have asked the Board to complete its work by September, which will make a one-year deadline. In order to meet this deadline I have asked various agencies to help share the workload. Supplemental staff will be needed and I am asking your cooperation. Jim Lynn has already written to you and I ask each of you to respond at this critical period so we can take care of this.

I have asked Nelson Rockefeller, because of the controversy surrounding Rule 22, to explain the rulings and the atmosphere in the Senate during this time. I might add that Rocky handled himself brilliantly and that the publicity stemmed from a basic misunderstanding of the role of the Vice President in the Senate on Rule 22. (Note Attached Chart at TAB A.)

The Vice President On January 10th I asked the President how

PA 7-9 DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
MR 91-16, #29 NSC ltr. 9/20/92
By KBH, NARA, Date 9/25/92

he wanted Rule 22 handled. The President decided that as the presiding officer of the Senate, it was the Vice President's responsibility and that I should handle it as I saw fit. As you can see by the chart, there are essentially two strategies referred to as the Northern and Southern route. Vice President Nixon gave the opinion that the Northern route was possible and during his tenure as Vice President, there were several minor attempts to have that done. However, in each instance the Senate ultimately went South. In 1967 Humphrey established the precedent of allowing the Senate to change its rules by 60% vote or majority vote, but he was overruled by Senate vote. That did establish precedent. As we approached this Senate year, the members were divided about equally and this didn't allow the leadership of the Senate to take a very strong position.

Mondale put two motions in one during this period, which is incorrect and that was disallowed. Then Senator Allen put three motions in one, which was also disallowed. Senator Byrd and Senator Griffin finally agreed on the wording of the motion, but Mansfield objected. He objected more to the wording of the motion, but he did want a 60-40 split on the vote. However, he wanted the Senate to go the Southern route. (Note Attached Statement at TAB B.) When it became apparent that the majority had the votes that it needed to choose the direction in which they wanted to move, Senator Byrd made an impassioned speech about the disasterous effect of the change where there is simple majority rule. Finally, there was a vote. The vote was 51-42. The first time in Senate history, where the Senate had voted to change the rules by majority rule. At this time the President had gone to Florida and I decided to crystalize the issue while the President was still out of town. As we move through these series of steps outlined on the chart, alternating between the Northern and Southern routes and various motions, we reached a point were I asked for the clerk to call the role. Senator Allen objected and raised a point of parliamentary inquiry. The Vice President again then asked for the role to be called; and again Senator Allen raised the point of question of parliamentary inquiry and again I asked for the role to be called.

This is where the controversy really became a public feud. The senators at that point gave me a very bad time. But according to Rule 19 in the Senate, on a point of parliamentary inquiry, the Chair is allowed, at his discretion, to recognize or not recognize the Senator. At any rate, we finally reached an agreement. There was a two hour recess during which a compromise was worked out and the final agreement was the Southern route, which is the way the majority wanted to go. Everyone was happy, the conservatives, the liberals, the Republicans, and the Democrats have all generally turned out to be fairly happy about it. I have arranged a series of small dinners with various members of the Senate to make certain that there are no hard feelings over it. The important thing to understand is that it was not the

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[illegible] The President invited each of the [illegible] to meet with him [illegible] and that I should begin it as I saw fit. As you can see by the chart, there are considerable differences between the Russian and American drafts. The Russian draft would have the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia [illegible] Soviet troops [illegible] Czechoslovakia. The American draft would not provide for the stationing of troops on the territory of any country without the consent of that country. However, in both drafts the Soviet Union and the United States would undertake not to use force against each other. In addition, the Soviet draft would provide that the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia would not enter into any alliance directed against the other. The American draft would provide that the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia would not enter into any alliance which would be inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The Soviet draft would provide that the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia would not enter into any alliance which would be inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The Soviet draft would provide that the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia would not enter into any alliance which would be inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

[illegible] The President said that he thought that the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia would not enter into any alliance which would be inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The President said that he thought that the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia would not enter into any alliance which would be inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The President said that he thought that the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia would not enter into any alliance which would be inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

[illegible] The President said that he thought that the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia would not enter into any alliance which would be inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The President said that he thought that the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia would not enter into any alliance which would be inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The President said that he thought that the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia would not enter into any alliance which would be inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

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discretion of the Chair or the rulings by the Chair that were critical in this, because as presiding officer of the Senate, I always referred the motions and the rulings to the floor of the Senate for their decision. The important element was the lack of recognition by the Senators that the minority had eroded and the majority had changed substantially and as a result, there was a greater difference in Senate response than had ever been before.

I might add, Mr. President, that I am grateful for the support that you gave me during this period both publicly and privately. I appreciate it and I believe and hope that I did what you wanted. The net result of the discussion of the Senate and the ruling of the Senate is now that 60% rules the Senate--that is 60% of the Constitutional membership. We avoided all precedents and went the route that most people wanted in the Senate and I believe that everyone is happy.

The President At this time I would like Earl Butz to tell us what has been happening to farm and food prices and what we can expect for the rest of the year. Earl -

Secretary Butz Well, Mr. President, it looks like this. There has been a fourteen percent increase in price of food in 1974 over 1973. 80% of that increase has come after the product has left the farm. This can be accounted for by higher wages, higher transportation costs, and higher fuel costs. While the increase has slowed down some, it has not stopped during the first quarter of 1975. It appears that food prices will be up 1 1/2-2% over the last quarter of 1974. So the increase has slowed down markedly. It is interesting to note that the index of prices paid by farmers is up 12%, but the index of prices received by farmers is down by about 15%. There is also a decline in grain. The statistic that you will find interesting is that 17% of the take home pay of the average American will go for food. This is down slightly over 1973 and also interesting to note is only Canada and the United States are nations below 20% of take home pay going for food. This can be attributed to several things. One third of the meals are currently eaten outside of the home. Looking toward 1975, we anticipate a leveling off or decline in food prices. There will be more beef eaten by Americans this year by about seven pounds per capita for the year. However, Americans will eat less pork and poultry per person and the beef will be relatively cheap. Fruits and vegetables will generally be less expensive and of course Mr. President, you know about our peanut problem. We have had one for years. The area where we will be shortest in everyday diets will be on grain-fed beef. Mr. President, you can expect a record wheat crop. Since 70% of all wheat in America is winter grown, that crop is already in.

[illegible] of the Chair on the eve of the Chair's [illegible] very pleased to have, because of previous [illegible] of the Senate, I always welcomed the opportunity to [illegible] of the Senate. [illegible] the Senate [illegible] the Senate [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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We have had a 6% increase in acreage, and 400 to 500 million bushels of grain above last year's crop, so we will have a record crop. We currently have 4 million acres in soybean cultivation. So we hope as we look toward 1975, the escalation of food prices is behind us.

The President Are the farmers happy, Earl?

Secretary Butz No sir, they aren't.

The President At this time I was going to ask Bill Seidman to give us an economic report, but since most of what he would say is already in the public record, I have asked him to defer.

As you know, we have several standing committees of the Domestic Council and the Cabinet and I have asked the Domestic Council Director, Jim Cannon and Jim Connor, the Secretary to the Cabinet, to review those standing committees and make recommendations as to which ones should stay or go; committees on Aliens and Privacy, I am sure will stay; but there are others perhaps that we could revise and change to give us a better organization.

Some of you may be aware of the recent decision we have had in regard to the catalytic converters. I think that it is important that we all have this knowledge and understanding so I have asked Russ Train if he would give us a rundown on it.

Russ Train Thank you, Mr. President. As most of you know, it was a very complicated and controversial issue. It was a decision that I had to make by March 3rd which I did and it has caused quite a controversy generally. As you know, autos using catalysts convert pollutants, give low operating cost, better gas consumption, and fewer maintenance problems; but they also give sulfuric acid mist which of course is dangerous. So the decision was to hold the line and continue with the interim standards or to go with the higher standards and run the risk of putting the sulfuric acid mist in the air. Our research indicated that the sulfuric acid was a very real and dangerous problem. While it isn't a national problem yet, it soon could be and we really can't afford to play the numbers game. Through our research we found that desulfurization was not a good solution for it would take some two years of research and testing to be prepared to do that on a regular basis. We also found that sulfate traps aren't a solution and not something that our technology is readily able to produce. The real concern that we had was if we moved to the new higher level of standard, which is the .9 California standard, we would actually be doubling the amount of sulfuric acid in the air. Therefore, after much thought and a lot of advice, the

We have had a 4% increase in average, and 4% to 5% skilled tradesmen of around there last year's wage, we've also had some increased wages for ourselves across to overseas subcontractors. We do not have as to look forward here, the introduction of that person is known to us.

Chairman: Are the Members happy, Sarah?

Councillor Bale: We are, Mary thanks.

Mr Trimble: At this time I was going to ask Bill Forbes to give us an economic report, but since some of what he might say is already in the public record, I have asked him to defer.

As you know, we have several standing committees of the Council that are active and I have asked the Councils Deputy Director, Jim Foster and Jim Fraser, the Secretary to the Executive, to review these standing committees and make recommendations as to which ones should stay as they sometimes we think and Parliament, I am sure still stay, but there are others perhaps that we could review and change to give us a better organisation.

Some of you may be aware of the recent decision we have had to regard to the Stratford Gazetteer. I think that it is important that we all have this knowledge and understanding so I have asked Dave Wood if he could give us a update on it.

Councillor Wood: Thank you, Mr President. As most of you know, it was a very complicated and controversial issue. It was a decision that I had to make by myself but which I did not do in the recent past a considerable amount. As you know, there were strongly opposed members, with the planning chair, Member and Councillor Lees, and other backbench members, but they also gave support and that which is stated in the Gazette. So the decision had to be said that I was not content with the planning standards set by us as the highest standards and not the risk of putting the authority and with the Inspector. But proposals presented that the majority were very real and dangerous precedent. While it isn't a national problem yet, it does seem to be and we really don't afford to ever the economy case. Perhaps our research we could have our representations but not a good decision for it would have cost the Council and having to be prepared to do that as a regular basis. We also think that market trends is a question and not something that our technology to decide if that be correct. The last reason that we had was if we went for the next higher level of standard, which is the 24 dwellings standard, we would actually be changing the nature of Stratford's area to one. Therefore, after much thought and a lot of advice, the

decision was made to stay with the 1975 interim standard, 1.5% hydrocarbon as opposed to .9%, the California standard. This of course caused considerable problems. The health services industry was not happy, the auto people were not happy, and the mayors and governors were not happy.

Secretary Weinberger I might add in Russ' defense that the information, which our health services people provided, was very serious. It was a significant health problem as we saw it, and HEW supports Russ' position and we have put out considerable information about it. However, the press has seen fit not to use it. The long term effects are unknown at this time, but it is a typical problem in showing the Congressional approach of mandatory short term standards which have forced technology faster than we could really respond.

Vice President Rockefeller Mr. President, I fear that this could really become a serious political problem and perhaps a liability next year. If the acid content is high, then I know we will have examples of garages catching on fire and people burning to death; cars catching on fire, gas stations exploding all because of the catalytic converter. If someone wanted to make this a political issue in 1976 and brought out these gruesome details and stories, they would put the burden on your back and they would be asking why you didn't tell them that this was a problem.

The President Congress should not establish standards without adequate information. In late December we got an agreement from the manufacturers that they would produce cars that would be 40% better in terms of fuel than the ones that they are currently producing and that they would do this by the 1979 model. Now it seems that whether the interim standard or the California standard is used, that they are both very dangerous.

Frank Zarb We are meeting with the auto people to reassess the standards. The auto people are having a problem because they can't seem to believe that the Government now wants to establish another standard because of this new information which Russ has just presented. It changes the standard. We need to give the auto people a real firm set of standards so they can make necessary capital investment to meet those standards.

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Secretary Coleman Manufacturers will still try to meet the standard.

The President Will they pursue revision in the arbitrary standard established five years ago?

Secretary Coleman Yes, Sir. The automobile industry will not back off the original commitment that was made.

Russ Train The reaction on the Hill has been generally quiet. Muskie gave a very ambiguous statement. Senator Randolph said that the decision was thoughtful and most of the newspapers have been basically supportive of the decision.

Secretary Coleman Chrysler will continue to meet the standard and this letter, which I have here, indicates that they are firmly committed to it.

Russ Train Mr. Vice President, what you say is true perhaps to a certain extent and if one carried it to the extreme, it could become a political liability. However, the reports about fires, explosions, and death are very fragmented at best. We simply don't have adequate information at this time to prove that this is true. If we do pull the catalyst off the automobiles at this time, we will have an increase of three times in the level of pollutants.

The Vice President I would really like to see the President take the public into his confidence and include them in this information so they feel like they are sharing in the decision and we can assist them in making their determinations and this therefore will not become a political liability at a future date.

Secretary Morton Auto companies have a tougher time and a tougher commitment to make now. I think that they will go to the smaller car. They could do it today if they had to. The auto companies are concerned that this new emission standard will tilt the market place toward foreign cars. It seems to me that technology standards should be agreed upon so the auto companies can move up and make the necessary investments.

Secretary Coleman The answer is just not small cars, because that is tied to the fatality rate which poses a problem for the Congress.

Secretary Morton I agree with you, Mr. Secretary. Perhaps we should give an incentive to the small car buyer. Maybe there is a way to help.

The President It is important that the Congress gets the necessary safety information to make the decision. Therefore, if it exists in the Department of Transportation, would you please make it available.

Secretary Coleman Yes, we have it and yes we will.

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Frank Zarb It seems that we should move to get the new standards established and then let the auto industry write letters of commitment to that new standard and get them committed once again.

The Vice President Again it seems, Mr. President, that you should take the public into your confidence on this and tell them the problems with the sulfuric acid mist as well as the difficult decision you have had to make about interim auto standards.

The President Last October we decided that an inflation impact statement should be made about all new legislation which we were proposing and the Congress was proposing. Maybe we can do the same thing here. It says something about my basic philosophy of Government. I think that we have to implement this philosophy and the consumer has a right to know what the exact impact, both pros and cons, will be of decisions which his government is making. It is not just the environmental regulations which raise this issue. There are literally thousands of examples. I recall the problem we had with the truckers regulation issued by the Department of Transportation before you arrived, Bill. I had to make a decision on New Year's when I was on vacation to let a regulation go forward because we were so far down the road. To hold it up, would have imposed economic hardship on the industry which had geared up to implement the Federal rule. As a result, we are increasing the cost of trucks and trailers 5 - 7%; and it is some very large sum like two hundred million dollars. I now understand that this regulation might force some companies out of business. I have no doubt that many energy regulations create the same kind of dislocations. Therefore, when we submit legislation and proposals, we must make certain that we know both sides of the story and what the total impact will be so we can inform the Congress and the public about everything relating to that problem.

Secretary Morton Mr. President, I should mention that I think that energy must go into this economic mix at its true value.

The President I have asked Jim Schlesinger to fill us in on the Cambodian and Viet Nam situations. So, Jim if you would please.

Secretary Schlesinger We have basically two problems in Southeast Asia. First, is the immediate funding and if we don't get that there will be no ammunition after April 15th. The second, is the extremely difficult military situation. There has been repeated prediction on the fall of Cambodia and one of the things that we have learned about our Southeast Asia experiences, is never to believe predictions in Southeast Asia. The Government controls 70% of the population; but only a small portion of the country. Communications have been essentially closed down.



[illegible] It seems that we could save a lot of money if we could get the new [illegible] and that can be done because of a lesson of experience to have the shakedown and get those [illegible] work right.

[illegible] Let's be sure, Mr. President, that we [illegible] the point that the people have paid for what we are now [illegible] and the reforms are not going to help us if we [illegible] because you have had no real [illegible] and [illegible].

[illegible] Last October we decided that we [illegible] the port authority should be undertaken at the legislative [illegible] we have everything set for Congress was proposing. Here we are at the same thing now. In that meeting there we have [illegible] of Congress. I think that we have to [illegible] the [illegible] and the decision that I have to take that [illegible] [illegible] you and I, all of business [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible]. It is [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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Route 4 and 5 have been closed as well as the Mekong River. We must fly in rice, petroleum, and ammunition. Fifteen hundred tons a day are flown in. The air field is the sole line of communication. The survival of the country depends on that air field staying open. There are rockets within 11,000 yards of the air field. The capital is encircled by some 25,000 troops and is being defended by about 40,000 troops, so we don't believe that the Capital can be overrun. The funding is the most critical part of the entire issue.

The Vice President Mr. President, I was out of town, but I read that Colby headline this morning. Could you explain that please. Is there any substance to that?

The President No, there isn't and I'll have General Scowcroft talk to that point. Brent-

General Scowcroft The headline didn't specifically indicate what the column was about. The column in substance didn't relate to the headline. It was more a scare headline than anything else. So there was no correlation between the two.

Secretary Schlesinger In Viet Nam funds are badly needed as well. Government troops are holding fairly well. There is basically a stalemate in the country at this time with erosion of Government troop control of the outer countryside happening at a steady rate.

The President At my right is Bob Ingersoll, who is substituting for Secretary Kissinger, who is travelling as you know. Do you have any comments?

Robert Ingersoll Some of the foreign embassies are moving out of Cambodia, particularly Phnom Penh. Other countries have expressed interest in assisting in the negotiations. Much has been written about Lon Nol, but the United States has no interest in asking him to step down. He has been very cooperative. He has said that he would step down if the United States asks him to do so. Of course, we are getting no help in the Congress. The votes which we have seen have been very difficult for us to accept. The Hamilton compromise which passed 5-2 is a 135 million dollar aid package, 82 million dollars of which would be military aid, the balance of which would be economic aid. It does have a June 30th deadline beyond which no aid would be given for Southeast Asia. There appears to be general economic chaos, within the country. The refugees are rolling into the capital city at the rate of several thousand per year. Even though there is economic chaos, their internal political situation is amazingly stable. There were some riots awhile ago, they were food riots; but everything appears to be all right now and is fairly stable. Again, Lon Nol is no barrier to negotiations; he has been helpful.

The President Since I became President, we have made six efforts

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Robert Ingersoll. [illegible]

[illegible]

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to negotiate. There has been no real response yet. We are going to continue to try hard. The opposition thinks that by being persistent and staying with it, that they can win. As long as they think that they can win, negotiations will be extremely hard to get. The aid will allow for a military stalemate and at that point we will have an opportunity to negotiate.

Secretary Schlesinger If Phnom Penh falls, it will be the first major city to fall since 1945.

The President The Congressional group that went to Southeast Asia were just in here recently and we sat around this very table and talked over what they had seen. I think that they came away from South Viet Nam generally sympathetic. I know that McCloskey has given some real good testimony up on the Hill which has helped and even Abzug was visibly shaken on the humanitarian side for what she had seen. Congresswoman Fenwick who campaigned on the fact that there would be no aid to South Viet Nam and that we would pull out completely and totally, gave an impassioned plea for help. She was sitting in the very seat that you are sitting in now, Rogers, and she was afraid of the liquidation of people that would take place if the Communist would take over and of course all of you know my strong feeling. We must help them until the rainy season hits. If we can do that, the opportunity for negotiating a settlement is there.

General Scowcroft What you say is true, Mr. President. In the villages that they have overrun, they have been slaughtering those people who have acted as leaders, the government people, school teachers, priests, and it has been a disasterous effect.

The President Well, that about takes care of the substantive portion of our meeting and I do want to give Pete Brennan the opportunity of saying a few words to us. Pete, I want you to know how much we appreciate what you have done while you have been here. The Department has responded and I think that you deserve particular recognition for the outstanding work you did in the development of two historic pieces of legislation in Comprehensive Education and Training Act (CETA) and the Pension Reform Act. They will both set a standard for years to come. Furthermore, I want you to know about a quality which I have always admired in Pete, and that is that he is a straight talker. You may not always agree with him, but you always know where Pete Brennan stands and I believe that to be a very important matter. So, Pete the time is yours.

Secretary Brennan Thank you, Mr. President. I do want you to

to negotiate. There has been no real response yet. We will go [illegible] to continue to try that. The negotiations should [illegible] being conducted and started with us, that they are not [illegible] to get. That is why I think it is also very important [illegible] to get. That is why I think it is also very important [illegible] to negotiate.

[illegible] If there was fully it was to the [illegible] to make them [illegible].

[illegible] The Government group that went to Russia last week will be [illegible] and [illegible] that [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

know how much I have enjoyed working with you, it has been challenging, exciting, and I believe productive. I will be returning to a large constituency, and I might add, it helped make Nelson Rockefeller what he is today. We believe that the time we have been here we have helped minorities, the handicapped, women; we have helped a great many people and we hope that it has been good and we hope that our stewardship has been good. I believe that John Dunlop is a very good man and I think that he will do a very good job. In keeping with the Biblical reference, I have written down the accounting of my stewardship and the things that John will have an opportunity to work on in the future. So, Mr. President, in leaving I give you this accounting of my stewardship. Thank you very much.

The President Thank you, Pete, and we will be seeing all of you soon. Thank you.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting
Wednesday, March 26, 1975, 2:00 PM

2:04 President arrived
2:05 Press arrived
2:08 Press departed
2:09 President opened the Cabinet Meeting

The President first welcomed several people; Special Trade Representative, Fred Dent; Dr. John Dunlop, Secretary of Labor; Acting Secretary of Commerce, John Tabor; and noted the presence of John Whitaker substituting for Rog Morton.

Secretary Kissinger had just returned on Sunday from the Middle East and the President asked for a brief report on his mission.

Secretary Kissinger: First the Secretary developed the strategy that was used in the Middle East. He said that it could be summed up in the phrase "step by step approach." At the end of the Israeli/Arab War in 1973, there was a movement toward an embargo against the industrialized nations. World opinion started to move with the Arab states and it became increasingly evident that the United States had to use a different approach to solve the Middle East problem.

President Sadat and the United States agreed to segment the issues and the countries and to develop a step by step strategy. There is no doubt that the United States during this period of negotiation has been the dominate world power. Since July of 1974, the United States has made progress with two of the most difficult countries with which to work, Jordon and Egypt.

Essentially, the roles within the Arab states evolved into two forces: the Moderates, headed by President Sadat and the Radicals, headed by King Asad.

The Radicals wanted the United States to deal with Arab countries on a block or total basis. Whereas Sadat felt that the step by step approach with each country and each issue was the better method. Sadat's theory in cooperation with the United States was accepted by the greatest number of parties and it forced the USSR to go to a moderate course in the Middle East.

Since 1967, the problem in the Middle East has been to negotiate the line which has been drawn in the middle of the Sinai.

The Israelis indicated that they would withdraw if Arab countries would sign an agreement of non-belligerence. Sadat offered giving up all military components of non-belligerence. (1) He agreed to give assurance that the Middle Eastern problem could not be solved by military power. (2) There would be no recourse to force. (3) Israel would not resort to force. (4) There were many secret assurances which cannot now be made public because of the failure of the negotiations.

Israel was negotiating over a few kilometers in distance rather than a complete withdrawal. Israel, however, wanted full non-belligerency or no pullback from the line in the Sinai at all. Sadat said that he could not make all the concessions and only have one half of the pullback. The Israelis wanted to control roads to some of the Arab oil fields by not pulling back from the 1967 occupied territory, the total distance.

Egypt countered and offered two proposals: First, in regard to the passes in the Sinai, the Western end would be controlled by the Arabs and the Eastern end controlled by the Israelis, with the middle ground being kept by a United Nations peace force. Their second proposal was for the Israelis and the Egyptians to move out of the passes, but the Israelis would be closer with the middle ground still to be maintained by a UN peace force. As the Israel position hardened, they were aware that the United States was prepared to back them. As world opinion began to polarize that position for the two countries, it became increasingly clear that the penalty that would be paid for polarization would be very severe.

Since the Secretary's return on Sunday, a break-down in communications between the individual countries within the Arab states has already started. It now appears certain the United States will be forced to go to Geneva. Since there will be no other course to follow at Geneva, the USSR will have a very strategic position. It appears that Western Europe, fearing an embargo, will probably support the Soviet Union and the Arab states. The results of the break-down present, for the United States, a very serious problem.

If the United States maintains level headiness, it appears that it can recover some of the terrain that has been lost, but only if we show substantive progress. The United States is the only power which can produce progress in the Middle East.

The Secretary indicated that it was interesting to note that during the course of the negotiations, the Israelis turned to him and asked if they were being unreasonable.

Since 1967, the provisions in the Middle East have been to negotiate the Law which has been known to the member of the State.

The Israelis believed that they could withdraw if Arab countries would sign an agreement of non-belligerency. Sadat refused, giving up all military compulsion in non-belligerency. (b) He agreed to give assurances that its troops in Eastern positions could not be ordered by military games. (c) There would be no movement by troops. (d) Israel would not proceed to Israel. (e) There were many similar concessions which caused both to doubt policy because of the failure of the negotiations.

Israel, was negotiating over a few kilometers in Sinai's notion that a complete withdrawal. Sadat, however, insisted full non-belligerency on all positions from the Law to the Israel as well. Sadat said that he could not make all the moves along that path and that is the problem. The Israelis wanted to control Israel to move of the Arab air bases by not pulling back from the 1967 occupied territory, the Arab Emirates.

Begin examined and altered the proposals. First, in regard to the powers in the Knesset, the Premier and cabinet is dominated by the Arabs and the Parties and committed to the Israelis, with the middle ground being held by a United Nations peace force. Their account proposed that the Israelis and the Egyptians to work out of the process, but the Israelis should be shown with the middle ground with an Arab controlled by a UN peace force. As the Israeli position hardened, they would ensure that the United States was prepared to back them. An Israeli spokesman hopes to publicize that pressure has the two countries, it became increasingly clear that the possibility that Israel to push for pronouncements would be very severe.

Since the Knesset's return to Russia, a break down in communications between the administration within the Arab states has already started. It now appears certain the United States will be forced to go to Geneva. Russia there will be no other course to follow as Russia, the Arab will have a very strategic position. It appears that Premier Begin, feeling so sovereign, will probably support the Soviet troops and the Arab states. The concern of the Israelis, more pressure, but the United States, a very serious problem.

If the United States succeeded Israel functions, it appears that in one country some of the Israelis don't see from here, but only if we show substantive progress. The United States in the only peace which can produce progress in the Middle East.

The Secretary believes that it is interesting to note that during the course of the negotiations, the Israelis turned to him and asked if they were being unreasonable

Secretary Kissinger responded, not only were you unreasonable, you were disasterous.

The Secretary indicated his feeling that there must be progress in the Middle East by August. The United States cannot appear to be too anxious to solve the problem. It now appears that there has been a total reversal of roles of the various forces that are playing in the Middle East. The United States can now sit back and be an observer and not appear to be overly excited about a settlement. After a period of stalemate, the parties can then turn back to the United States for the answer.

Secretary Butz: Mr. Secretary, is the only answer for Israel a return of the land?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, basically that is correct. Egypt believes the land to be occupied. At Geneva the United States must take one of two positions. If we cannot find grounds for a concession, to make another step forward, and begin negotiations once again, then the second position will be that we may be forced to take a position on the final frontiers of the countries in the Middle East. These positions and these negotiations have all the elements of a Greek tragedy, but in the final analysis, we cannot afford to have world opinion solidified against us. There are three areas of threat: the oil embargo, world opinion, and the Soviet Union. We are dealing in a very delicate and sensitive area, but the United States can come forward, perhaps by late summer, and show some substantial progress and once again return to the step by step approach to achieve peace in the Middle East.

President Ford: The President indicated his interest in consumer protection and consumer representation in the Government and asked Jim Cannon to make a brief status report on the legislation effecting consumers.

Jim Cannon: Mr. Cannon gave a status report on consumer legislation. The situation is very grave on Capitol Hill because the Congress is moving to create a new Federal agency for consumer advocacy. It is Senate Bill 200 and there are 38 senators sponsoring the bill. Its cost would be sixty million dollars for the first three years and it would employ some 600 people. The House passed a bill last year and the House will pass another bill this year. Supporters argue that the agency would be the consumer's lawyer or advocate, while opponents argue that the appointment of an official with unprecedented powers is dangerous for the Government and business.

The Administrator would be appointed by the President. He would be confirmed by Congress. He could only be removed for malfeasance in office. He could choose with whom he would side. He could produce consumer complaints; he could

Secretary Kissinger responded, not only were the Democrats, the Republicans.

The Secretary indicated his feeling that there would be progress in the Middle East in August. The Israeli Prime Minister appears to be very anxious to solve the problem. It now appears that there has been a total removal of some of the Russian forces that are playing in the Middle East. The Soviet Union has now a bit back but in an abortive way and will appear to be unable to accomplish what's passed all elements, the parties now then have back to the United States for the decision.

Secretary Ford - Mr. Secretary, is the only reason the Israeli's return of the Sinai

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, basically that is correct. Egypt believes the land is its principal. It knows the United States must take out of the positions. If we respect that give and take, to make another step forward, and begin negotiations once again, then the Israeli premier will be then on way to Israel to take a position on the final treatment of the countries in the Middle East. There positions and these negotiations turn on the statements of a Great Empire. Just as the Egypt analysis, we should adhere to have neutral agreed settlement on. There are three areas of tension: the oil embargo, world opinion, and the Soviet Union. We are starting on a very delicate and sensitive area, but the United States can make forward, perhaps by late summer, and show some substantial progress and then again return to the city for step approach to achieve peace in the Middle East.

President Ford: The President believes that interest in economic production and economic improvements in the Government and asked Alan Greenspan to make a brief status report on the legislation affecting that branch.

Alan Greenspan: Mr. Chairman I made a report on economic legislation. The situation is very grave on Capitol Hill before the Congress is starting to invite a most federal spend that economic situations. It is there $15 bill and there are 20 members representing the bill. The most would be sixty million dollars but the bill more means cut in social security more and people. The House passed a bill last year and the Senate will pass another bill this year. Supporters argue that the economy would be the economic's lowers an stimulus, while opponents argue that the appointment of an efficient more unprecedented powers to Congress to the Government and business.

The Administration would be opposed by the President. We would be confronted by Congress. We could not be prepared for confrontation to veto. We could choose with whom he would veto. We could produce consumer complexity, he could

enter any conflict between or among Federal Government agencies. He could enter any conflict in private business.

There is a feeling by the Administration that this consumer advocacy would do two harmful things: (1) It would intrude into the orderly process of Government, and (2) It would intrude into the orderly process of private business. It is important for this Administration to develop alternatives to this bill and there are two proposals currently being thought about: (1) Beef-up Virginia Knauer's consumer office, giving it much more strength to get involved in consumer affairs, or (2) by Executive Order, create a Consumer Department in each Cabinet office and agency and make it strong. It is the feeling of this Administration that an all powerful agency for consumer advocacy of the type indicated in the bill would be very harmful to the process of Government and private industry.

The President: The President stated that he had asked Jim Cannon to speak with each person during the next two weeks and to get recommendations in regard to the consumer problem. "I want you to be prepared to discuss this at the next Cabinet Meeting."

The President indicated that he had seen an article in Saturday's or Sunday's paper saying that someone was testifying before a Congressional committee and said that the economic impact statement had not been prepared by his Department. "I think that they were talking about Commerce, John Tabor, and I was wondering what you know about that."

Fred Dent: "Mr. President, I can answer that for you. I was testifying before the House Government Operations Committee at the time of the question. The question was relative to whether or not guidelines for economic impact statements had been developed for all of the agencies and departments in the Federal Government and I testified to the fact that I could not categorically say that was the case. Perhaps Jim Lynn has some comment on that."

Jim Lynn: He indicated that this was a logical sequence of discussion because the OMB was concerned about getting on top of the economic impact statement. It is important that the public and the Congress know what the economic impact of any given piece of legislation which this Administration sends to Congress is. OMB sent out a circular in January indicating that the departments and agencies were given until March 3 to decide on their guidelines. Some departments are better equipped to handle economic analysis than are others. Some have that economic capacity within their departments while others, historically, have not had that particular influence or discipline.

[redacted] key conflict between or among Federal Government agencies. We would [redacted] be private business.

There is a feeling by the Administration that this Commission should do two [redacted] things: (1) We should provide [redacted] the public's concern of Government, and (2) It would provide [redacted] that industry concern of private business. It is the [redacted] Administration to develop alternatives in this field and there are [redacted] proposals currently being thought about. For [redacted] Virginia Kramer's [redacted] office, aiming to work more closely [redacted] to get involved on insurance matters, as will the Commerce Office, create a Commerce Department to work [redacted] and agency that works strongly. It is the feeling of the Administration that an [redacted] agency for consumer advocacy at the high [redacted] in the Administration would be more sensitive to the concerns of Government and private industry.

The President: The President stated that he had asked Jim Lynn to speak with [redacted] and get the feeling that could [redacted] to get recommendations in regard to the insurance problems. "I want you to be prepared to discuss this at the next Cabinet Meeting."

The Commerce Counsel said he had seen an article in Business Week [redacted] report stating that someone was developing factors in Congressional committee and [redacted] that the Commerce Impact Statement had not been prepared by the Department. "I think that they were talking about a Commerce, Mike Pertz, and I was wondering when you were done that."

Mike Pertz: Yes, Mr. President, I was aware that this was. I was developing factors the Commerce Department [redacted] Congress on the face of the question. The question was relative to whether or not guidelines had [redacted] impact statements had been developed by the Department and I pointed to the fact that it would not [redacted] that was the case. Perhaps Jim Lynn has more comment on that."

Jim Lynn: He indicated that this was a logical response of Commerce Secretary [redacted] that [redacted] concerned about getting on top of the economic impact statement. It is important that the public and the Congress know what the economic impact of any given piece of legislation [redacted] that Administration seeks to Congress is [redacted] and not a mandate to thereby subsidizing that the Administration [redacted] is the [redacted] to [redacted] problems. [redacted] Department and [redacted] engaged in [redacted] economic analysis [redacted] that [redacted] impact [redacted] Department [redacted] Commerce, [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

The Director did indicate that Agriculture, Commerce, and Treasury all got their guidelines in early and have been doing an excellent job of developing economic impact statements. Other departments, however, have been much slower to react and develop those guidelines. In the Director's judgement, it needs to be an executive decision brought to bear on each of the department heads. That person then must take the leadership role in being certain that his staff knows that the statements are to be prepared. They should be followed and someone who can be relatively objective, will have to see to it that these are developed for every single piece of legislation.

Secretary Schlesinger: The Secretary indicated that they need additional guidance as to where it applies and where it does not, where these guidelines are to be emphatic and where they are to be less structured. The Department of Defense believes that it should be given an exemption because everything that DOD submits goes through the normal budget process. If the budget process is used, should that not qualify DOD and other departments for an exemption to the economic impact statement?

The President: Generally some departments are better equipped to handle this analysis than are others and granted there are probably some logical and specific exemptions that we should look at, however, no department should be totally exempt from preparation of economic statements. There are areas where even DOD must make impact statements. Just because inflation has gone from some 13+ percent on an annualized basis, down to about 7.3 percent, we aren't off scot-free. This Administration must keep up the fight against inflation. It could rear its head down the road in six to eight months, and unless we have protected ourselves in the preparation of this, we will be held accountable by the public. The Administration simply cannot, six months or a year from now, find itself defending its inability to produce a statement which an Executive Order indicated should be given. "So, Jim (Schlesinger), what I can say to you is that I am happy to talk to you about it privately, that we will be fair, but that we will be firm about economic impact statements being prepared."

Secretary Weinberger: The Secretary indicated that they established guidelines that took some time to develop, but they found them very helpful. The follow-up on them is very good and the reception by the Congress on the impact statement was excellent.

Director Lynn: It is important to know that just a lick and a promise won't do. There has to be more substance to that and better follow-up. The press will tear us apart if we are superficial or if they find that there is a superficiality to this Executive Order which you have given. We need hard guidelines and criteria and there must be adequate follow-up within each agency.

The Director did indicate that Agriculture, Commerce, and Forestry all got their guidelines in early and have been doing an excellent job of developing substantive impact statements. Other departments, however, have been slower to react and develop those guidelines. In the Director's judgment, it needs to be an executive decision brought to bear on each of the departments heads. That person then must take the leadership role in being certain that his staff does so that the statements are to be prepared. Many should be followed and someone who has the ultimate discretion, will have to see to it that there are developed that every major piece of legislation.

Relationship to Congress: The Governor indicated that they want statements written so he knows in advance and aware of them and, where these guidelines are to be adopted and where they are to be their statements. The Department of Defense believes that it should be given an exemption because everything that DOD contracts goes through the normal budget process. If the budget process is used, should that not qualify DOD and other departments for an exemption to the statements impact statement?

The Problem: Generally some departments are better equipped to handle the statements than are others and greater harm can probably come from the agencies complaints that we should look at, however, an impact statement should be totally prepared from perspective of economic standpoint. There are cases where some short cuts make impact statements. Just because inflation has gone more slowly the forecast was an unrealistic basis, down to about 5.5 percent, we haven't cut out cities. The Administration must step up the fight against inflation. It could even be hard times the need to win in eight months, and unless we have productive economies as the preparation of this, we may be hard pressed by the public. The Administration simply cannot, six months out a year from now, and start defending our position to contract a statement which an Executive Order believed should be given. "No, Fred Bohlinger's, what I can say to you is that I will begin to talk to you about in principle, that we will be here, but that we will be here about economic impact statements being prepared."

Relationship to Legislature: The Governor advised that they established guidelines that have been here for develop, but they have been in a helpful. The Attorney is there in very good and the exception by the Congress on the impact statement was excellent.

Procedures: It is important to know that just a bill and a process start to. Like it has to be more extensive in that and before follow-up. The press will have an agent of the are responsible or if they that that there is a significance to that the same times which you have given. "We need hard guidelines and criteria and have must be adequate [illegible] which such agency.

The President: I understand that there have been some problems in appearances before the Senate Budget Committee. Jim Schlesinger and Jim Lynn have had experience with the Committee, and I would like to ask for their observations after Jack Marsh has had an opportunity to explain.

Jack Marsh: There has been an attempt by Senator Muskie to establish new guidelines and new methodology in developing witnesses. His desire has been to go to a seminar type approach, almost a talk show technique. In talking with witnesses about budget items and about programs, they have attempted to mingle Administration and outside witnesses. When you go into the committee you are confronted with an outside expert who can test and probe you. If you have any doubts about whether or not you should appear, please check with Max or me and we will be glad to assist you in this. It is very difficult for a Cabinet officer, even more difficult for a sub-Cabinet officer, to go up anticipating a traditional committee format and then suddenly find himself being challenged by an outside expert.

Jim Schlesinger: The Secretary mentioned he had some experience with this since he was scheduled to go up to appear with Warnecke. It's the Secretary's feeling that the President's budget should be presented to the Congress by the Cabinet officer responsible. An executive agency should not be treated as just another pressure group. This format seems to be an attempt to indicate that the Executive Branch is in the same category with the Navy League or the Women's Political Caucus or any other of a number of pressure groups which might testify on the Hill. The principal responsibility, or one of the principal responsibilities, given to a Cabinet officer by his President, is to present the budget for his department and offer testimony to that fact in a confrontation with committee members only.

Secretary Weinberger: Along that line, HEW has had several invitations and has declined them all. Two have been relative to the budget and one on a specific program item, but feeling is that it becomes a show and not the kind of thing in which the department wants to participate.

The President: The Budget Committee is not the forum for the tough questions anyway. The Sub-Committee really is the place where the experts are prepared to handle the tough questioning. The members on the Budget Committee don't prepare themselves adequately or won't take the time to prepare themselves to become experts, they are using the outside witness as their expert and it appears that they aren't doing their homework. It's the President's feeling that you should not participate in the Budget Committee as the current format indicates and as you have indicated here today. Jack Marsh and Jim Connor will prepare a letter to be sent under the President's signature so instructing you.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Agreement has been reached on the Tax Bill. "I might point out that some of the provisions of the Tax Bill make it an irresponsible act. It is very important to the country, and we will spend considerable hours determining what course of action to take."

"In closing, I would like to say that we have lots of talent in this Cabinet. There are many issues which crosscut departments, which are broad in nature and effect the government generally. For instance, Dr. Levi has a strong background in education. Carla Hills, in the legal area, and many of the rest of you have talent and can contribute, far beyond your particular agency and your involvement in that agency. We will be discussing this at future Cabinet Meetings and I have asked Jim Connor to get together with each one of you to have some ideas developed about where this might take us, where we can go.

If there is nothing further, then thank you for coming and we will see all of you soon."

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Notes of the Cabinet Meeting
April 16, 1975, 2:30 p.m.

The President arrived in the Cabinet Room at 2:35 p.m. and began the meeting.

The President indicated that there was a very full agenda today and he wanted to start the meeting as promptly as possible.

The President asked Henry Kissinger to review the international situation and to give the Cabinet a view of the thinking and strategy that went into the speech the President gave on Thursday night.

Secretary Kissinger The Secretary first summarized the reasons behind the speech and the general conduct of foreign policy in Southeast Asia and more broadly in the world as it currently stands.

First, he addressed Southeast Asia, Vietnam specifically. The entire North Vietnamese Army is in the South at the present time. The Secretary indicated that he felt one Marine brigade could take all of North Vietnam. There has been a terrible violation of the Paris Peace Accords and it is obvious to the world that this has happened. This is the first time that American domestic reactions, principally in the Congress, have impacted seriously on the action of a foreign government. It is the age old problem of internal domestic argument and competition effecting the conduct of foreign policy.

The United States had encouraged the South Vietnamese to resist and fight for its right of self determination. By not giving continued aid to South Vietnam and with the Russians and Chinese giving consistent aid to North Vietnam, there developed an imbalance whereby the North Vietnamese Army had much greater force. Had the President not been strong in his speech, it would have threatened United States personnel and friendly Vietnamese who were still in Saigon. The President requested both military and economic aid as the way to achieve a controlled situation. It gives the United States time to evacuate Americans and the Vietnamese as well.

The Secretary said that there is a small chance of stabilization.

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The President asked for the full 922 million dollars. That figure was selected because of General Weyand's survey. It was a figure which the State Department and members of this Administration felt they could justify and testify about with conviction, because it was taken from a first hand report.

The Secretary mentioned that in questioning before committees today, they seemed not so concerned about the total dollar amounts, but rather the overall strategy, the overall concept of foreign policy in Southeast Asia. The great challenge to the United States is how does the Country manage its exit from this tragic situation. The answer to that will be the world's perception of the United States foreign policy. These events have a profound impact on world leaders. They are very interested in the United States position, not only in South Vietnam, but how it relates to their specific countries all across the globe.

There are two areas and questions one must ask. First, were our judgements correct and accurate in the past? And there is nothing that we can do about that now, nor are there any good answers. Secondly, how will America react to crisis? And the answer to that is what the President said in his speech.

In the Secretary's view, the worst thing that could happen would be for the President to say that he is undertaking a global reassessment of United States foreign policy. It would be disasterous to our allies and an advantage for our adversaries. The United States ability to affect events determines war and peace throughout the world, therefore, we must continue to act with confidence and assurance. The problem is lacking enough authority to get done what needs to be done in Southeast Asia. It seems that the most vocal critics during this period have been those people who got us into Indochina originally.

The Secretary's observation is that world faith in America at this time is essential to a continuation of a strong foreign policy. The United States is going through a period where it can be very creative in foreign policy if the United States uses its resources adequately in judging international situations and viewing international personalities.

The President The military situation in North Vietnam has deteriorated and changed and therefore the President asked Jim Schlesinger to give the Cabinet an update on that situation.

Secretary Schlesinger Operation Eagle Pull in Phnom Penh was very successful. The Secretary anticipated that it would take one and a half hours to complete, but because of some last minute alterations in the plan, it took two hours. One of the reasons for the delay was that many Cambodians decided at the last minute to stay behind even though they have been marked on the death list. The

The President asked for the July 4th million dollars. This figure was selected because of Jimmy Carter's terror... It was a figure which he felt represented the amount of the assassination plot that would justify the military coup... Because it was later found a third less...

The Secretary continued that he yesterday before noon today [illegible] an announcement about the trial which [illegible], but rather the private dinner, the private counsel of foreign policy to Henderson Lee... The great challenge to the United States is not how to respond to the first Pink bill crisis situation... The answer to that will be found in the context of the total Pinko foreign policy... Some events left a profound impact on world leaders... They all very interested in the United States position, and only in South Vietnam, but in [illegible] terrific reaction all across the globe.

There are two areas and services one must ask. First, were our statements correct and accurate in the past and will it serve [illegible] on the [illegible]. We are there to give support. Finally, the [illegible] must be ensured. And the answer is that we must [illegible] in his speech.

In the Secretary's view, the worst thing that could happen would be for the President to say that he is undertaking a [illegible] movement of [illegible] foreign policy... It would be dangerous to [illegible] and to [illegible] for our interests... The United States cannot be driven [illegible] by our [illegible] interests, it must continue to act with [illegible] and [illegible]... The problem is [illegible] to get [illegible] to [illegible] to [illegible]... It seems that the most [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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Secretary mentioned that the evacuation plan had been in effect since 1970 so that a lot of pre-planning and dry runs had been made. It was a very somber and emotional occasion.

Under the law the President had the right to evacuate, with military assistance, Americans who are threatened in a foreign country. Had the American military contingent been fired upon, they were prepared to return fire as necessary.

Vietnam is in a very precarious position. The force balance in the country is fairly equal at this time. However, if aid is not forthcoming, the force balance will become extremely favorable to the North Vietnamese. The American military advisers and foreign policy experts do not anticipate an assult on Saigon. The feeling is that the North Vietnamese would like to negotiate for Saigon. The cost in lives and machinery is too great.

The North Vietnamese have consistently maintained, since the beginning of the conflict, that it is a civil war being fought in the South and that the United States should have no role in it. The North Vietnamese, with there superior numbers, will attempt to destroy the Southern forces throughout the balance of the countryside with the exclusion of Saigon; so that the next two weeks are very, very important to the outcome of the battle being fought for control of Southern Vietnam.

The President Congress has shown no cooperation in a meaningful way during this period of time. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has suggested or given the President a $200 million emergency fund for Presidential discretion. In the President's opinion, that amount is as bad as getting nothing at all. The Administration's position is to stick to their guns and try to get the entire amount. There are contingency plans in case a lesser amount is appropriated.

There are three things that the President feels members of the Cabinet should stress in talking about Vietnam. First, it will be very bad if Congress does not cooperate in some way to alleviate the bloodshed. Second, the Administration should not talk about evacuation. And third, in reference to the amount of money being requested, a unified stance should be that the President is firm and does want the entire amount of money that he requested.

The President then thanked Henry and Jim for their diligent efforts and their brilliant performance during an extremely high pressure period. He indicated the gratefulness of the entire Administration and then added that history will prove the accuracy of our judgements.

Secretary Schlesinger The Secretary indicated that the evacuation of Saigon would be very difficult because of the Viet Cong infra-

Secretary mentioned that the negotiations also took place in Europe where there was a lot of pre-planning and they could not take them. It was a very complex and emotional issue.

Dubai has said the President has the right to ownership with Embassy employees. Although not all Embassies in a foreign country. But the American Embassy employees have first spot, they only propose to remain here as ministers.

Finland is in a very precarious position. The Finns believe in the concept of total peace at home then. Finland, of all the EFTA countries, the Finns believe will become more active as to the World Organization. The Russians withdrew soldiers and Finnish armed forces to 400 personnel as agreed to Helsinki. The feeling is that the more Finnish to would like to negotiate for Europe. The cost is rising and Parliament is very great.

The Swiss Government has unanimously decided, that the two strongly of the coalition, that it is a crisis and being fought in the Gulf and that the Swiss Embassy there has no duty to be. The Swiss Government, with three negative members, this attempt to control the movement between Switzerland the Embassy of the countries with the exception of Belgium so that the most are rich, this statement to the citizens of the Swiss has long fought for control of Western Europe.

The Finnish. Congress has shown no cooperation to a seemingly may during this period of time. The Swiss Foreign Secretary Stoltenberg has suggested to give the President a $700 million emergency fund for humanitarian assistance. It has promised to Jordan, but cannot be so bad as getting nothing at all. The Administration's position is to stick to their guns and try to get the United Nations. Every day contingency plans to make a united effort to assistance.

There are three things that the President feels members of the National should assist the National Guard Troops. First, it will be very bad if Congress does not support us and by 15 per cent the Standard. Second, the International Guard has an open commitment. And third, the reluctance to the waiver of Gramm Rudman, a serious problem should be that the President is sure and this was the major amount of money that is projected.

The President then mentioned Henry and Jim for their diligent efforts and the bi-partisan participation during an extremely high pressure period. He informed the government of the Prime Ministers and they would then travel to give the contents of the report back.

Secretary Baker. The Secretary instructed that the discussion of Budget would be very difficult because of the Gulf War issue.

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structure throughout the city. He said that in comparison to Phnom Penh it would be much more complicated. If the United States was forced into an evacuation, the complications of successfully removing Americans and friendly Vietnamese would be very trying and quite a test for the United States military.

Secretary Butz Mr. President, a question which will be asked eventually and on which some of us would like guidance, will the United States offer humanitarian aid to the Viet Cong?

The President No, the United States will not give humanitarian aid to the Viet Cong. We can only give that to our friends. It would complicate matters a great deal and we would be assisting them in their drive to overrun all of South Vietnam if they receive millions of dollars in aid which would quickly be turned into military armament.

Secretary Kissinger I agree, Mr. President. The United States cannot rush in with aid that may be wasted. In regard to Cambodia, the government should wait and see whether Sihanouk returns or not as the leader and exactly how the forces balance off in Cambodia before the United States talks any further about aid.

The President I have asked Jim Cannon to study Consumer Policy more closely after he gave us his report of two weeks ago. Before Jim speaks, I might say that it is a very important issue for this Administration and there are several things which the Administration can do. We are not in favor of an omnipotent administrator with the power to intervene in virtually every phase of business and government activity. One thing that we could do is to strengthen the Virginia Knauer operation. A second thing would be to make hers a very permanent and visible operation within the Administration. And a third, would be to increase the bureaucracy's ability to respond to the consumer, to establish within each department an agency that would be totally responsive to the consumer needs.

It appears that Congress, unless we come up with some major alternatives, will pass Senate Bill 200, which is pending before them at this time, perhaps as early as next month.

Jim, will you give us a further report.

James Cannon Each Cabinet officer had given him an analysis of what Senate Bill 200 would do to their particular operation

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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and within their agency. Generally it falls within four areas. First, it would interfere with the operation of the Government. Second, each department is now taking steps to assist the consumer. Third, each department is willing to do much more than they are currently doing. And fourth, virtually all people felt that regulatory reform is vitally needed to support the consumer much better.

For instance, Senate Bill 200 in the Agricultural Department alone, could be involved in some 700 individual actions and that is multiplied several times over as you go into HEW, HUD, and others. It would be an extremely difficult, cumbersome operation. All departments and agencies agreed that there would be terrific interruptions of the normal business cycle. That to interfere in that magnitude with Government operations would virtually bring the bureaucracy to a standstill. Mr. Cannon related a conversation he had with a bright, young attorney representing Ralph Nader's group wherein she stated that the Nader group felt that there must be an adversary relationship between the consumers and government agencies or their Government would simply not respond. Mr. Cannon said he thought that was unfortuate. The Government should not be perceived in that way by anyone outside the system.


James Lynn Also, Mr. President, the Economic Impact Statement is a vital part of the total consumer package. If consumers become aware of the fact that this President and this Administration are interested in providing them with both sides of a question when legislation is proposed, and can show them how the impact will effect each consumer, there is a greater chance that the Administration's position will be strong.

Secretary Weinberger The new consumer legislation would involve so many areas of health, education, and welfare. The one question he had was how does one determine what group of consumers will be represented. Obviously, the administrator would have to pick and choose among the groups of consumers and viewpoints that he would represent. It would force each department in the bureaucracy to be totally defensive.

Under Secretary of Treasury Gardner The basic weakness, he pointed out, is philosophy; that in a free society, we do not need an organization like this.

The President Virginia Knauer has done a good job, a constructive job, and I want to give her this opportunity to speak.

Virginia Knauer Mrs. Knauer thanked everyone in the Administration, particularly the President, for focusing attention on the consumer matter. She has met with the various Cabinet officers and staff



and private sector agencies. Secondly it will ensure that arrangements are made between the Government and the Bank of England, which is responsible for the day to day operation of the money markets, to ensure that the Government's borrowing requirement is met in the best way possible and that the monetary policy objectives are achieved. Thirdly it will provide a forum in which the Government can discuss with the Bank of England the timing and form of any changes in the arrangements governing the operation of the money markets.

Mr. Speaker, I am sure that all hon. Members will welcome the establishment of this Committee. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Bristol, South (Mr. Corbett) for his support for the proposal. I am grateful also to the hon. Member for Bristol, North-West (Mr. Jones) for his support for the proposal and for his suggestion that the Committee should be established on a statutory basis. I am not convinced that that is necessary. I think that the Committee will be able to operate effectively on the basis that I have described. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Bristol, North-West for his suggestion that the Committee should be established on a statutory basis. I am not convinced that that is necessary. I think that the Committee will be able to operate effectively on the basis that I have described.

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members in the White House and has received a great many suggestions and creative ideas on how the consumer issue might be approached. Mrs. Knauer indicated that her entire operation was given only a $1 million budget and on that amount of money, she cannot really focus public attention on consumerism. It is going to take a great deal more money, visibility, and the President's personal attention to be able to do that.

The President He mentioned that at the last Cabinet Meeting there was not sufficient time to call on Alan Greenspan for an economic report, therefore, he called on Mr. Greenspan.

Alan Greenspan He made a series of observations about the economy. He mentioned that all evidence suggests that the decline is on schedule and it is expected that it will bottom out about mid-year to the third quarter range. There continues to be erosion, but at a much slower rate than was previously expected. Industrial activity has slowed considerably and the indicaters of severe recession are now beginning to turn. The data indicates that it is mostly an inventory recession. Liquidation of inventory has had the largest single impact. The level of consumption has remained unchanged during the first quarter of 1975 and the rate of liquidation has increased (liquidation is now close to maximum).

There have been large gains in the battle against inflation, the annual rate of the January to February time frame is down to about 7 to 8%. Food prices declined again in March which is very encouraging. There are some elements of residual weakness and there is a danger in this atmosphere. First, housing starts are in trouble. There has been no pick up in starts, even though the tax rebate bill provided incentive with a tax credit. It has served mainly to liquidate existing homes, however, the housing industry is weak.

Auto sales, also, are encouraging, but yet nothing definite. The rebate on automobiles ceased the last day of March and we have seen a sharp decline in auto sales during the first ten days of April, although it now appears that they are beginning to come back.

Retail sales continue to be quite good. The capital goods area is a concern and the thought of the economic advisers is that capital goods would weaken this year, but it has not as yet. There appears to be a backlog of appropriations and orders that are very high and it looks very good. The expectation is that unemployment will remain quite high for the balance of 1975. Of course, all of the above assumes holding the line on the Federal deficit.

Secretary Butz Mr. Greenspan, is the major danger of a high deficit, high inflation and its implications for 1976, '77 as a political issue?



[illegible] the White House and has received a great deal support. [illegible] and positive lines on how the economic team might be approached. Mrs. Eagan indicated that the voting committee was given only a 5% chance [illegible] and on that basis of money, the leaders really [illegible] private investors or consumers. It is going to take a great deal more work, [illegible], and the President's personal attention to be able to do this.

The Economy. We mentioned that at the last Cabinet Meeting there was not enough time to have an open discussion for an economic report, therefore, it would be [illegible].

Plan Proposals. We made a review of discussions about the economy. We mentioned that all previous suggestions that one action or another would be [illegible] that it will [illegible] the White House Cabinet Room. There continues to be [illegible], but on a much smaller scale than the previous [illegible]. Substantial [illegible] has closed considerably and the indications of normal recession are now beginning to [illegible]. The only indication that it is worst [illegible] unemployment. Stockpiling of [illegible] has hit the [illegible] sharply. The level of unemployment has reached [illegible] during the first quarter of 1975 and the rate of [illegible] has increased [illegible] as more plan to [illegible].

There have been large gains in the battle against inflation, the annual rate of the January to February rate [illegible] to 6.9. Most price declines have been [illegible] to drop as [illegible]. There are some elements of continued weakness and there is a danger in this [illegible]. Firms, hoping [illegible] to increase, [illegible] to pick up the slack, [illegible] has not risen [illegible] increase also a [illegible]. It has moved [illegible] to [illegible] working hours, however, the [illegible] to rise.

[illegible] wish, [illegible] encouraging, but are [illegible]. The [illegible] on [illegible] raised the [illegible] to [illegible] when a [illegible] decided to [illegible] during the first [illegible] of April, although it now appears that that [illegible] to [illegible].

[illegible] makes problems [illegible]. The [illegible] area is a concern and the [illegible] of the economic [illegible] which would [illegible] this [illegible]. But it [illegible] to be a [illegible] of [illegible] and [illegible] that are [illegible] and it looks [illegible]. The [illegible] is that [illegible] will [illegible] quite high for the balance of [illegible]. We [illegible] are [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] on the Federal [illegible].

[illegible]. We [illegible], is the major danger of a [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] and the [illegible] [illegible]. It [illegible] [illegible].

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Mr. Greenspan High deficit means double digit inflation and that is a serious political problem.

The President called on Jim Lynn to discuss the budget.

James Lynn Mr. Lynn's comments were directed to the chart which he presented and he did mention some other items. He mentioned first that if Congress packed up and went home today, there would be an additional $12 billion added to the deficit just based on the legislation passed to date. The impact of the legislation will not only be felt in Fiscal Year 1975, but well beyond that. For instance, let's say that the deficit would be $60 billion in 1975; it would create $75 billion in 1976, and $89 billion in 1977. The committees have accepted a 5% ceiling for military. Whether that will hold or not is uncertain at this time. Mr. Lynn indicated that there are several funny things going on in the committee. For instance, Muskie, Chairman of the Budget Committee, lost his battle in the committee.

Mr. Lynn did give some broad advice for the members of the Cabinet and staff and that is whenever they are giving a speech or giving testimony, it is important to talk about the broad picture of budget problems; the problem of deficit spending and the impact that it has not only in this fiscal year, but in future years as well.

The President He wanted the Cabinet to know that vetos are expected and that this Administration must hold the line on a $60 billion deficit and we cannot exceed it.

Secretary Coleman Is it possible to shift money from one area where it is not being used to another where it can be?

The President Secretary Coleman has $9 billion in highway trust funds that is backed up and his interest is in whether or not he can move those dollars to another area. The President indicated that it is something that should be talked about between Secretary Coleman, Director Lynn and others who have a similar problem; but moving money from one area to another after it has been appropriated is difficult. The President then mentioned that he had met with almost all the Cabinet officers individually and appreciated their ideas. In particular he appreciated some of the ways they are dealing with the press and he cited Secretary Dunlop as an example of something new and different in press relations. He called on Secretary Dunlop to explain.

Secretary Dunlop He has established a meeting once a week with

Mr. Greenspan - High deficit cause stock right inflation and that's a serious economic problem.

Chairman called on Fed Open to discuss the budget.

Alan Greenspan - Mr. Boyd's remarks were directed to the short run to promotion and my old worries were other times. We understand there was an important problem in the short run, there would be an enormous big million jobs for the nation's work force in the legislation passed by Congress. The impact of the legislation will not begin to fully [illegible] but will begin then. For instance, there was just the outlays would be $50 billion in 1975, it would be $100 billion by 1976, and $50 billion in 1977. The legislation has accepted a $5 cutting [illegible] whether that will have an effect in reference to this time. Mr. Boyd indicated that there are several ways which could be to the economy. For the present, Chairman of the Budget Committee, look its notice to the Committee.

Mr. Eden did give some broad advice for the members of the Committee could not look to whether that are giving a speech or giving testimony. It is important to be [illegible] problems of budget problems, the problem of deficit spending and that impact that on how we ought to move [illegible], but to future years as well.

Chairman Burns - We should be delighted to have that notice and we commend and that administration which has the task of a $60 billion deficit and to reduce unemployment.

Governor Sheehan - Is it possible to shift money from one area where it is not being used to another where it can be?

Alan Greenspan - Governor Sheehan has $5 billion in highway trust funds that it cannot be put into because it is anxious to put the money before Congress to approve more. The President indicated that it is surprising that should be taking [illegible] Secretary Schmidt, Director Lynn and others who have a similar problem, but moving money from one area to another area is not [illegible] by authority. The President then mentioned that he had any with almost all the Federal officers individually and appointees there after. In particular he appreciated some of the ways that are dealing with the great need to avoid shortages during the [illegible] of unemployment and not [illegible] to avoid [illegible]. He called on Secretary Kreps to report.

Secretary Kreps - We have established a working task a task with

the press which is on the record. It is a seminar approach that allows the press to have a much better understanding of terminology, concepts, and ideas which are being used daily in the Labor Department. At each weekly session, he answers questions and tries to bring the press along in terms of understanding. From his previous experience in Washington, he found it to be very beneficial. He met with them for a year and a half and found that the articles they were writing were much more knowledgeable and precise. There was much less speculation about politics and more concern about basic concepts.

The President thanked him for his information.

The President mentioned that Bob Hartmann and Don Rumsfeld had met with the Southern State GOP chairmen. They requested that whenever one of the top people in Government is planning a visit to their area, they be notified. The President then asked the Cabinet to please do this.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 29, 1975

Notes of the Cabinet Meeting
April 29, 1975, 9:45 a.m.

The President convened the Cabinet at 9:50 a.m.

The President noted the difficulties of the last two weeks. He observed that although the evacuations thus far had been successful, we are not yet over the difficult period. Our objectives during this period, he observed, have been to prevent panic in South Vietnam which would endanger American evacuation, deter North Vietnamese activity, and stabilize the situation so that a successful evacuation could take place.

Secretary Kissinger described in detail the events leading up to the evacuation. He reported that at the moment 300-400 Americans remained at the Embassy. In the last two days 4650 people have been lifted out of Saigon and that approximately 45000 Vietnamese will ultimately be evacuated.

Secretary Schlesinger reported that only a small security force (700) remains at DAO (Defense Attache's Office) and that the priority has shifted to the evacuation of Embassy personnel .

The President stated that our original intention was to use C-130 aircraft for the evacuation, but that the shelling of the airport precluded that. Helicopters were substituted. Amb. Martin and Gen. Smith made a decision on site to include South Vietnamese with the American evacuees presumably in order to prevent panic.

Secretary Schlesinger indicated that some difficulties had been encountered. Only two helicopters at a time can be used for Embassy evacuation; there had been sniper fire; the weather had not been favorable; and there had been some North Vietnamese firing at evacuation aircraft. In one instance our aircraft returned the fire and observed secondary explosions.

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The President asked if there were any questions.

Secretary Morton asked about the status of other foreign nationals.

Secretary Kissinger responded that all Embassies except the French had departed.

The President noted that more Americans (100-200) than previously estimated appeared for evacuation. He indicated that the next two hours would be extremely delicate but that thus far the panic problem had been generally kept in hand.

Secretary Kissinger pointed out that we had to publicly fight for aid so long as a governmental structure remained in Saigon. Otherwise he was sure that a serious panic would have resulted at an early stage in the evacuation.

Secretary Schlesinger indicated that panic at Tan Son Nhut had prevented the use of C-130's.

Acting Secretary Tabor inquired about the total number of evacuees.

Secretary Kissinger indicated that about 4650 have been taken out in the last two days, of which 500-600 were Americans. He also noted that although the President had directed that South Vietnamese were to be evacuated when it appeared that C-130's would be available, in the present circumstances the President's only direct order was to get the Americans out. The decision was made on the ground to include South Vietnamese.

The President reiterated that a total of 43-45000 South Vietnamese will have been evacuated.

Secretary Morton asked where would the South Vietnamese go.

The President responsed that State was working on the problem, that three U. S. military bases had been set up here. He noted some Congressional objections. He indicated that we would have to motivate charitable organization to assist and asked the Cabinet officers for their help in doing so.

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Secretary Kissinger indicated that other countries had been approached to take some of the refugees but that about 90% of them will come to the U.S.

Mr. Rumsfeld observed that the White House, DOD and State had been conducting Congressional liaison; that there would be a bipartisan meeting today and a press briefing.

The President stated that Secretary Kissinger would give the briefing and requested that no one speak out until then. He stressed the importance of speaking with a single voice.

Secretary Morton asked if most of the refugees were white collar.

Secretary Kissinger indicated that it was difficult to say, but that certainly many were.

Secretary Morton indicated that perhaps a substantial number (5000) might be resettled in the Pacific Trust Territories where their political skills might be used.

Secretary Kissinger stated that that seemed like a good idea.

The President agreed and told Secretary Morton to get hold of Ambassador Brown and discuss it.

Secretary Morton responded that he could explore the issue quickly.

Secretary Coleman observed that since so much of the President's Joint Session address on Foreign Policy had beenaimed in large part toward ensuring stability during evacuation, would he now be ready to give another foreign policy speech.

The President indicated that there would be a follow-up at the appropriate time. He then adjourned the meeting at 10:20 a.m.

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MINUTES OF THE CABINET MEETING May 7, 1975
The Sequoia

The President convened the meeting at 8:22 p.m.

He introduced the Acting Secretaries of Interior and HEW, Messrs. Kent Frizzell and Stephen Kurzman, respectively.

The President then asked Jack Marsh to report on the activities to date of the 94th Congress. Mr. Marsh noted that the problems of a 2 to 1 Democratic majority and the emergence of the caucus compounded the usual difficulties of Executive/Congressional relations. These problems included the existence of a large, organized freshman Democratic class. Marsh noted that all of the above factors had had a significant impact on the leadership and on committee chairmen.

Mr. Marsh pointed out a secondary impact on the membership generally of Congress. Some members intimidate other members. He characterized the Congress as having a negative reaction to the President's program, while not being able to produce programs of its own. He further characterized it as being irresponsible in foreign and fiscal affairs. The Republicans, he noted, although their numbers are small are our Congressional base. We should not neglect that base. However, each of the Members now places a relatively high value on his own support; they want a role in policy. Marsh then turned to the subject of the veto. The purpose of the veto is not to put the Executive Branch into a negative posture. The veto should be used as a tool to modify policies, to achieve the policies of the Administration, to change policy and to develop public support. He urged the Cabinet members to step up their contacts on the Hill. Cabinet members should use various methods in order to maintain contact with the Congress. This includes using SubCabinet officers. He suggested the need to contact all members of Congress prior to the Memorial Day recess. This would include meetings with members of the SubCabinet. They should be informed they are being given a courtesy call. In discussions three points should be stressed, first, the status of departmental activities; secondly, a discussion of the President's energy program; and thirdly, the no new spending program policy. As an example, the activities in the consumer legislation area, which will be discussed later by Jim Cannon, had not been good and illustrated clearly a need for coordination to support the President's vetoes. He requested that a report be made to Max Friedersdorf's office on the extent to which Members had been contacted by Cabinet officers.

[redacted]

[redacted]

MINUTES OF THE CABINET MEETING May 5, 1971
The Cabinet

The President convened the meeting at 9:15 a.m.

He announced the acting Secretaries of Interior and HEW, Messrs. Kleindienst and Hughes to serve, respectively.

The President then called Bob Haldeman to report on the activities on Hill of the 19th Congress. [illegible] noted that the problems of a first Democratic majority and the assumption of the chairs commanded the usual distribution of Democratic/Congressional relations. These problems included the selection of a large, experienced Democratic staff. Haldeman noted that all of the above factors had had a significant impact on the leadership and on committee chairmanships.

[illegible] pointed out a secondary impact on the membership potential of Congress. Many members considered other members. He mentioned the Congress as having a negative reaction to the President's program, with not being able to produce programs on its own. He further characterized it as being irresponsible in foreign and fiscal affairs. The Republicans, he noted, although their numbers are small are not disorganized. It's problem not apparent there. However, most of the members have gained a relatively high index on the vote support, they need a vote to gain. This is due largely to the nature of the race. The purpose of the race is not to get the Democratic leader to negative positions. The race should be used as a tool to modify policies, to achieve the policies of the Administration, to change policy and to develop public support. He urged the Cabinet members to step up their contacts on the Hill. Cabinet members should [illegible] members in order to maintain contact with the Congress. This includes using [illegible] officers. He suggested the need to contact all members of Congress prior to the Memorial Day recess. This would include meetings with members of the [illegible]. They should be informed they are being given a briefing talk. In addition three years should be reserved, first, the review of departmental activities; secondly, a discussion of the President's energy programs and third, the [illegible] speaking program. As an example, the activities on the consumer legislative area, which will be discussed here by Don Kennedy that will have good and disturbed results. I want our contributors to support the President's actions. He requested that a report be made to him [illegible] efforts on the extent to which Cabinet officers had been contacted by Cabinet officers.

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The President then asked individual members of the Cabinet to present their views.

Secretary Schlesinger indicated that he felt some moderates and liberals on the Hill were becoming more responsible, perhaps as a reaction to the Vietnam collapse. He pointed out the Senate was becoming a more responsible body than it had been in the past, and that moderates and liberals on the House side were becoming more stable. Secretary Schlesinger indicated that although some were generally incorrigible on all military matters, others were concerned only with S.E. Asia. He felt that half of the freshmen class were willing to listen and that they were beginning to understand that the world was more complicated than they realized. He noted that the cuts in the Defense budget recommended by the new budget committees are quite severe. He also indicated that in discussions of S.E. Asia it appeared the tone was changing, the repercussions were severe and they were beginning to have an effect. There is somewhat less irresponsibility on this subject.

The President commented that the Senate and House committees action on the defense budget was somewhat disappointing, but more in appearance than in substance. His conversations with three Prime Ministers (Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain) demonstrated the importance of appearances. He felt the situation was better than in January, but we cannot yet be satisfied. Our posture on the defense budget must be to oppose reductions. Our capitulation will only open the floodgates to further reductions. He will continue to insist on a strong defense budget, and he asked all Cabinet members to support him in fighting for the figures in the President's budget.

Attorney General Levi reported that the main problem he is facing is incessant demands for information. For example, requests for raw FBI files. They have resisted these demands to date. Nevertheless, requests from Kastenmeier, Kennedy and Church have come in demanding national security and foreign surevillance information. He advised other Cabinet officers to be very careful in terms of how they respond to such requests for information. The Attorney General discussed the revision of the Federal Criminal Code. This was a chance, he argued, to reshape legislation in the criminal area. He expected to testify in a relatively short period of time on gun control, and he indicated his efforts to get the consumer advocacy bill referred to the Judiciary Committee.

The President recalled Levi's speech to the New York Bar Association laid out the relationship between personal and governmental privacy. The Cabinet Secretary will get copies of Levi's speech and distribute them to the Cabinet members.

The Premier then asked individual members of the Cabinet to present their views.

Deputy Premier believed that he had a very moderate and balanced set of proposals covering many fiscal areas, perhaps not a solution to the Treasury colleagues. He pointed out the Government was balancing a more conservative fiscal line at last than to the past, and that moderation was shown by the Government's more prudent approach to the economy. Treasury acknowledged the Government had already taken some potentially unpopular but necessary decisions, others were considered only with A.C.E. cuts. He felt that many of the Ministers would have difficulty in Auckland and Hamilton explaining an environment that the world was more complicated than "duty concessions". He noted that the cuts in the National budget announcements by the new budget commitments left little room. He also indicated that he disagreed with Mr. [illegible] and that many were beginning to have an effect. There is substantial new technology on this subject.

The Premier commented that the Deputy and Treasury projections arising on the Defence budget are somewhat disappointing, but there is opportunity that is necessary. His conversations with Prime Minister Muldoon yesterday, New Zealand and Great Britain's demonstrated the importance of maintaining the ANZUS alliance and further that in Germany, Defence cannot go to ministers. Our position on the defence budget would be an integral consideration. Our negotiations with Hong Kong the Prestigious to Northern Industries, he will continue to insist on a strong defence budget, and to submit all political assistance to support him in fighting for the figures in the Government's budget.

Attorney-General Lang reported that the main problem he is having is because Ministers are reluctant. For example, requests for new PAD time. They have received these decisions in time. Reconsiderations, proposing Duty Concessions. Recently and Ministers have come in demanding reduced, pressing and foreign exchange information. He advised other Cabinet colleagues to be very careful in terms of how they respond to such requests for information.

The Attorney-General discussed the proposal on the Protocol Statement Code. This was a decision for Cabinet to endorse legislation in this connection. He expected to receive in a relatively short period of time an agreement, and he indicated his efforts to get the necessary advances had returned to the Parliamentary Counsel.

The Premier invited Lang's speech to the New York Bar Association and [illegible] relationship between attorneys and government officials. The Cabinet Secretary will get copies of Lang's speech and distribute them to the Cabinet members.

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Secretary Butz reported that the farm bill veto had become a necessity. We have to hold the budget line, he argued.

The President stressed that we need to win this vote.

Secretary Dunlop indicated that as far as the Department of Labor was concerned, most of the action was in the future. He indicated that the Congressional committees were inordinately interested in oversight activities.

Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Gardner indicated the concerns the Treasury had about capital formation. Some impact was being had on the Congress, but he saw several problems ahead. Most important was the debt limit on which action was required before June 30th. In the area of revenue sharing it appeared that prospects looked good, but that there was a tendency to begin to tinker with the mechanisms.

Tax reform was a problem, and bank regulation, but the largest single problem in the future was the need to replenish international financial institution funds. He indicated that there was considerable pressure within this Congress to allocate credit.

Secretary Coleman felt there was a problem related to an open Administration. He was pleased with his involvement in Executive Branch decisions, but he pointed out that in testimony before Senator Moss' committee he was asked to discuss the positions taken by individuals in Executive Branch discussions about no fault insurance. The Secretary also asked for some degree of freedom in the conduct of negotiations with the Congress. He pointed out the need for expediting Administration decisions on issues that would be coming before the Congress.

The President indicated he hopes to expedite the process of Administration decisions. We should be ahead of any kind of power curve when it came to Congressional decisions. Flexibility was desirable and we should attempt to do it.

Under Secretary of Commerce Tabor indicated that there was a tremendous lack of understanding about the private enterprise system in the Congress, and that the Department's major concern would be to improve understanding.

The President observed that there will be a lot of drudgery involved in getting the Congress to pass Administration programs, but it is necessary to do that drudgery; we must scrounge for every vote; we must do the work necessary to get the votes.

Kent Frizzell of the Department of the Interior talked about oversight excesses generally, of which he gave several examples, and particularly of the strip mining legislation.

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Mr. Kurzman of HEW indicated serious problems with existing program rescissions. He indicated they appeared to have better luck in determining new spending programsrather than in cutting back on present programs.

The President agreed with Kurzman on the difficulty of reducing current program levels as opposed to stopping new efforts.

Ambassador Dent discussed the different role of the Special Trade Representative in his relationship to the President and the Congress.

Jim Lynn talked about the necessity of keeping up a sense of momentum. Congress, he observed, was extremely susceptible to constituent pressure. The Cabinet officers can have an impact on public opinion, and as a result when they get the opportunity the Cabinet officers ought to stress the Presidential themes and develop their own ways to present the Administration's message.

The President directed Jim Lynn to communicate to each of the Cabinet officers a report on employment cutbacks and inflation impact statements.

Alan Greenspan noted that the economic upturn may lead to a new set of Congressional spending initiatives. The Congress may push for much more rigid overall economic planning with a considerable stress on goals setting. He noted that the private sector is passive and immobile, and there is a need to confront the private sector with strong public sector debate.

Frank Zarb indicated that as far as the Congress was concerned the energy problem was a political one, not a policy one.

The President complimented Frank Zarb. He expects the Congress to fall flat by demonstrating an inability to come up with a strong program. He emphasized we must keep pushing for our program.

Russ Train commented on the difficulties with the clean air act, the process is slow, and he doubts we would be given any new flexibility to do anything about it.

The President said we know there is a problem, but nobody in the Congress has the courage to do anything about it. This is the least productive Congress he has ever seen.

The President brought up the refugee problem, and asked Secretary Schlesinger to outline the dimensions of the evacuees situation.

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Secretary Schlesinger stated there were approximately 113,000 refugees, about 10,000 of which are still at sea; 63,000 are in Guam, Wake and the Phillipines, 12,000 are already assimilated. There are problems in the area of public health. TB and infectious hepatitis are serious problems. He pointed out that there had been a higher than expected flow of refugees. The foreign response to date has been uneven; the Canadians, however, have agreed to take 5000. The resistance has been diminishing re funding of refugees.

The major responsibility he argued is ours.

The President then asked Jim Cannon to comment on the Consumer Advocacy legislation situation.

Mr. Cannon indicated that the response so far has been disappointing. The Cabinet as a group has not lobbied effectively against the bill. Some of the Cabinet officers have, in fact, been very effective in their actions, but each member must take the responsibility of seeing their committees.

The President again urged that contacts be made by the Cabinet officers with the members of the Congressional committees and their staffs.

The President then discussed briefly his intention to send a crime message to the Congress. The theme of his Yale University talk, he stated, should be the basis for the message, and the emphasis ought to be on ensuring domestic tranquility. He asked the Attorney General to comment.

Attorney General Levi said that we can build on the Yale talk, and that the emphasis should be on the victims. We can be severe without being vindictive. The Attorney General also pointed out the importance of revising the Federal Criminal Code, and discussed the gun control issue, which, he noted, would require decision.

The President indicated that the Attorney General's approach in particular to the gun control question was interesting.

The President noted that although we had a tough job ahead, he was not pessimistic.

The President adjourned the meeting at 10:10 p.m.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Notes of the Cabinet Meeting
June 4th, 1975, 2:00 p.m.

The President entered the Cabinet Room at 2:10 p.m.
The Press entered at 2:12 p.m.; departed at 2:15 p.m.

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The President opened the meeting and thanked the members of the Cabinet and staff for the warm welcome. He indicated that a major vote had just taken place and that the Administration sustained the veto on the Jobs Bill by a vote of 277 to 145. He mentioned that one week to ten days ago, the Administration could not have sustained the veto. The message the President gave to the Republicans was that if Republicans could not hold the line on this one, it would open the flood gate. The President was generous in his praise for everyone, specifically naming (for their testimony) Weinberger, Morton, and Zarb; and for the Congressional effort, Jack Marsh and Max Friedersdorf. The President added that he believed this was a significant victory, a major victory, and perhaps the most important vote for the Administration since he has been President.

The President then began his discussion of foreign policy, indicating that he left with hopes and returned with no regrets. That in discussing that which had transpired in Europe on the return flight, the feeling was that they were very satisfied; it was a successful trip and they made all of the headway they had hoped to make. The President believed the meeting with NATO was important for several reasons: 1) To strengthen the Alliance, 2) To indicate his personal interest in and maintainence of European relationships; and 3) Also, to serve notice that the Alliance needs to recognize Spain as a part of NATO for the defense of Europe. The United States has an arrangement with Spain, which adds to the total defense of Europe.

Historically, the European Community has not welcomed Spain because of its dictatorship and support of the German Empire during World War II.

The President's discussion with the Prime Minister of Portugal was cordial. The United States was very firm and blunt in its discussion with him. The United States indicated to the Prime Minister that it sees many deficiencies in its present Government. In fact, the President asked him to de-

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scribe his system of Government and it took the Prime Minister some twenty minutes just to tell the President how his Government makes decisions. It was suggested that the system was a bit chaotic. The President indicated that he believed there could not be a double standard, one for Spain and one for Portugal, in the United States' relationship with the two countries. Therefore, it was important that the United States maintains an interest in, and be candid with Portugal.

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In Spain the President's efforts concentrated on the military situation and the maintainence of the United States air bases there. It is important to Western Europe to have the Mediterranean area secure and United States bases in Spain add to that security. The President was warmly received in Spain and there were huge crowds on his motorcade route.

In Austria the President indicated he tumbled into Austria, but that he really felt that Betty had tripped him, then ran away and left him to get to his feet all by himself. He indicated that the meeting with Sadat was excellent and the personal rapport between the two leaders is very good. He did indicate to Sadat that the United States was continuing its reassessment of the Middle East and that the United States wants to explore all facts, options, and possibilities. The President feels there are three choices to be made: 1) Resume step-by-step diplomacy, 2) Develop a comprehensive settlement, which would raise serious problems with final frontiers, and 3) Specific bilateral agreements within the parameters of the comprehensive plan. The President indicated to Sadat that all of those would be taken into consideration during the reassessment.

In Rome the President discussed the entire underside or belly of NATO, the Mediterranean area, Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Spain, and all of the problems related to that. He believes the Italians are making good progress on the economic front and while it is not decisive yet, there is a feeling that the Italians are doing a good job. The President said he was very impressed with the people he met in the Government, specifically citing Leone and Moro as being very sharp. He was cordially received and the discussions were very fruitful.

The President mentioned that he had a very impressive audience with the Pope. He had been told the Pope was very sick, however, he appeared to be well, giving the President a good handshake and speaking in a very strong voice. He covered a wide range of topics in a long meeting. He was impressed with the Pope and with the reception at the Vatican.

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The President in summing up his trip to Europe, said the total trip signifies the forward movement and momentum of American foreign policy. In spite of the problems with Vietnam and all of Southeast Asia, the United States will stand firmly by its Allies; it will maintain its commitments, and American foreign policy will be strong and bold in future years.

The President then asked Henry if he cared to make any comments.

Secretary Kissinger said that when the United States first proposed a NATO Meeting, the Allies were not enthusiastic about it. It came at a very difficult time for the United States and no one in NATO was particularly excited about having a meeting.

There was a discussion as to whether or not the United States should take new and creative measures, even some gimmickry in getting this group together. The final decision was made by the President, when he said he wanted to have a straight forward meeting with NATO with no ploy or gimmicks. Secretary Kissinger's belief was that the major point the President made at NATO is that the U. S. is back in business. The United States knew what it was doing, had a firm commitment, and showed clear direction in its discussion with other countries.

An example of the kind of impression left was best summed up by Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada. Trudeau told others, at one of the closing sessions, that the meeting was so good and so beneficial, that it should be institutionalized. He indicated that NATO should cover the entire agenda of issues before world countries as opposed to just defense. Since Canada has been a rather reluctant partner in NATO from time to time, it is interesting that he should be so enthusiastic.

The Secretary noted that the framework was created at Brussels for a good discussion with regard to Turkey and Greece. The real cog seems to be who will put forth the first proposition, since it will then seem that that party is making the concession. So the policy seems to be at a point where one country or the other will put forth a major proposal.

The Secretary said that the only political party in Portugal is the military. The others for all intents and purposes were dead. His basic question about Portugal is why do they stay in NATO, and there seems to be two answers: 1) Because the public is not ready to accept the fact that they might pull out, and 2) Perhaps they are staying in to serve the Communist purpose.



The President is sending up his help to Europe, and the Allied High Command are pressed personally and insistently at American foreign policy. In spite of the position with Poland and all of Eastern Asia, the United States still stand firmly by the Atlantic Pact and its security measures, and American foreign policy will be strong and firm in future years.

The President then asked Henry if he cared to make any remarks.

Secretary Stimson said that when the United States first entered the World War, the Allies were not pressed quite that hard. It was at a very critical time for the United States and we had to make the particular sacrifice which came as a surprise.

There was a discussion as to whether or not the United States should take its own interim measures, even over objections of getting their group together. The final decision was left to the President, that he need be ready to take a position immediately with India as a part of Asiatic. Secretary Acheson's belief was that the safest path for Americans might be to wait for Mr. Nehru to make a decision. The United States took part in the Korea, but a five vote basis, and also as other decisions as the Americans are under consideration.

An analysis of the cost of operations here was then viewed as by Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada. Trudeau said Canada's one of the closing countries, that the United has no part and no knowledge, that we should be businesslike. He said Japan says Japan should cover the various needs of Japan to have world relations as opposed to just Europe. Prime Minister has been a United Nations partner on both fronts and he thinks it is interesting that he should be in Washington.

The Secretary said that the President had invited Mr Reynolds for a good discussion with regard to Korea and Korea. The fact the press is on who will get back the first opportunity. There is this long term that they pay to making the association. So the point seems to be in a print where one country or the other has got more a said present.

The Secretary said that the only external party is Portugal Korea necessary. Has given for all bases negotiations there back. The basic question that Portugal is now working away to Asia, and there seems to be some concern. It should the point to not take the lesson the Navy has very short pull out, and it Europe they are saying to be sure the Canadian person.

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The big problem in Spain, of course, is how influential can the United States be in keeping Spain from going like Portugal when Franco dies. Therefore, the President met with Franco, as well as, Juan Carlos and Arias to be certain the United States was clearly identified with the transitional power and the succession of Franco.

In the Middle East Secretary Kissinger believes that the spirit of cooperation from the Arabs, specifically Sadat, is outstanding and excellent. Sadat is willing to give things a chance to work out and is willing to wait several more months for things to happen.

The President then asked if there were any questions.

Secretary Morton How much did you discuss energy?

The President The Italians raised the problem of energy since they have no alternate sources; they have no oil; they are very interested in nuclear development and, therefore, the United States will offer them some assistance in the nuclear area.

The President went on to say that Schmitt was concerned about the total economic recovery in the United States. Schmitt is considered the outstanding economic spokesman in NATO and his belief was that the United States economy is recovering too slowly.

The President did say that OMB Director Lynn and Alan Greenspan had scheduled their press conference at precisely the right time. The information which was transmitted and the new figures which were turned out by those two at the press conference, were good and very helpful in the discussion.

Phil Buchen Was there any mention of the Congressional view of the Alliance?

The President replied that there really wasn't much discussion about it. NATO has taken a particularly keen interest in the recent discussion between the Congress and the Defense Department and was aware of the strong backing the Defense budget is getting.

Secretary Butz asked the President if there had been any mention of the Swiss cheese issue.

The President indicated no, that they had not met with the Swiss and had not talked about cheese; although, the Secretary has a reputation for hard bargaining with the Europeans.

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Secretary Dent then asked if the Common Market outlook had been optimistic or pessimistic?

The President indicated that the feeling is generally optimistic, but that if another oil embargo where to hit in the short term, it could be very, very difficult for the European Community.

It was stated also that all of the NATO members and leaders are aware of the political volatility of the economy and its significance in the elections which will be coming up in several of the countries and they are all concerned about it.

Secretary Kissinger said he believed there was a feeling that the recovery is going well in the United States, although, perhaps slowly, but still going well.

The President then asked Jack Marsh if there were any other comments about Congressional affairs.

Marsh declined.

Max Friedersdorf did say the Strip Mining Bill could be on the floor next week. His belief is that there are enough votes to sustain the veto on the Strip Mining Bill.

Frank Zarb stated it is important not to go asleep on the Strip Mining Bill because of the victory on the Jobs Bill. The Administration could go to sleep and not do its homework. So keep pressing for the veto on the Strip Mining Legislation.

Secretary Coleman indicated that the Railroad Legislation is moving and there will be more to report back on that.

Secretary Carla Hills noted that the Housing Compromise is in the Democratic Caucus now and she believes that the veto can be sustained. The House could get that Bill out as early as this week.

Secretary Simon indicated that he would be returning this week to Europe for monetary reform discussions.

Secretary Weinberger said that Social Security meetings have been held up, and that there is no new tax from the Administration. The Child Care Center Bill will be coming up for a vote soon.

Frank Zarb mentioned that the House Leadership had admonished the committee chairmen to get an energy bill on the floor at all costs. Therefore, the legislation which might be forthcoming, may not be well thought out or well conceived and may not be in the best interest of the country. The Democrats have been slapped on the wrist by the President relative to their failure to get an energy bill out and now they are very sensitive about it.

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Secretary Butz mentioned that 71.3% of all the people in Puerto Rico are on food stamps at the present time. He feels welfare reform is urgently needed and he hopes that the President will take a leadership role in structuring it. While it is a politically sensitive issue, it is important that the Administration moves boldly and imaginatively in this area.

Cabinet Meeting ended at 3:10 p.m.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MINUTES OF THE CABINET MEETING WEDNESDAY, JUNE 25, 1975

The President convened the meeting at 2:10 p.m. He congratulated Secretary Hills for her work in gathering votes to sustain the veto of the Housing Bill. He indicated that all the members of the Cabinet did a good job, and he particularly complimented Jack Marsh and Max Friedersdorf for their efforts.

The President noted that this was the first Cabinet Meeting for Secretary Hathaway, and he welcomed him. He also noted that it was John Scali's last Cabinet Meeting, and he indicated that there would be time at the end of the meeting for Ambassador Scali to make any remarks he felt appropriate.

The President then introduced Doug Bennett, the new Director of the White House Personnel Office, to the Members of the Cabinet and indicated that Doug would soon be around to see them in order to explain the functions of his office.

The President noted that there had been a number of reports recently of confusion and inconsistency in the operations of different bureaucracies. He was particularly concerned with some articles he had read discussing the contract compliance functions of HEW and the Labor Department and the impact of fund cutoffs in this area. He stressed the need to enforce governmental regulations in the right way. Some people in the bureaucracy, he noted, do not know how to deal with the public. They lack concern or consideration for the positions which individuals find themselves in when they confront a governmental bureaucracy. He then asked Jim Cannon for comments.

Jim Cannon noted a report in the previous Saturday's paper which stated that a hospital had been subjected to two conflicting interpretations of regulations, one by HEW, the other by OSHA. OSHA, it appears, required that plastic liners be used in all wastebaskets; HEW inspectors, on the other hand, demanded that such liners be removed because they constituted a potential fire hazard. A second problem involved the cutoff of funds for heart research to a university in the Washington area because the university had not met numerical goals in the equal opportunity area.

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Secretary Weinberger indicated that he thinks that his Department has solved the short-range problem of fund cut-offs. There are only two approved affirmative action plans. However, HEW has developed a short form approach which will continue funds in the short run to universities and institutions which have not yet produced approved plans. This approach would have the universities indicate that they were moving toward compliance and would reach compliance within a short period of time. Secretary Weinberger pointed out, however, that there was a danger of court involvement in such an approach because the courts tend to intervene whenever HEW plans become too flexible. The Secretary indicated that the major problem in his mind was the Department of Labor's regulations, which he indicated were too rigid. There was no way, in his opinion, in which a university could comply. Changes were needed, and they had to be done in 60 days. The current situation, he stressed, is absurd.

On the specific issue of the wastebasket liners, Secretary Weinberger indicated that the problem was that the hospital had used the wrong kind of liners in its baskets rather than one agency requiring liners and the other rejecting them.

Secretary Dunlop indicated that as far as he could tell, OSHA has no regulations on plastic liners, but said that he will pursue the specifics of this case. In the area of affirmative action he stressed that there were problems of perception, and that these were serious ones. For example, it was necessary to raise questions about the status of the statute versus the Executive Order. He asked, how can we get out of the absurdity of regulations without it being perceived as a public retreat from the commitment to equal employment opportunity? A second problem was how to coordinate the activities of the EEOC with the Departments and Agencies. Third, the universities are not as distinct as Secretary Weinberger would think. The rules for affirmative action probably make as little sense in the construction industry as they do in a university.

Secretary Coleman indicated that there is a reason for a distinction between the private and public sector in terms of equal employment. Government standards, he argued, should be higher.

The President then called on Attorney General Levi to brief the Cabinet on the crime message, which the Attorney General did. The President indicated that thus far he had been pleased with the reaction to the crime message.

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The President then turned to the third item on the agenda, a discussion of the legislative clearance responsibility of OMB. He asked why it took so long. Jim Lynn began the discussion by referring to Circular A-19. The clearance function, he noted, covered bills originating in the Executive Branch, those sent down from the Hill, plus the testimony of government officials before the Congress. The problem he faced was the late submission of material to OMB. The agencies, he claimed, were using up much of the time that should have been available to the Cabinet review of agency responses. He urged them to assure that there is sufficient time within their own departments for them to review material. There is also a need, he said, for quick response to submissions of other agencies. The President, he noted, has only ten days in which to decide whether or not to sign an enrolled bill Secretary Schlesinger suggested that perhaps a 48 hour suspense rule, that is, one which if an agency did not reply within 48 hours, its views would be taken as supportive, might be applied. Lynn indicated that they tried to do this now, but it is not a desirable way to go.

The President then went on to a discussion of the Vietnamese refugee situation. He indicated that initially it had been handled through the White House and the State Department, but now it was being transferred to HEW. He called on Secretary Weinberger to give a status report of the refugee situation. The Secretary gave the report and complimented the Departments of Defense, State and Justice for their efforts. The biggest problem now is to get more volunteer agencies and to get them more active in helping to resettle the Vietnamese refugees.

The President called then on Secretary Coleman for his views on the railroad situation. Secretary Coleman's discussion divided the railroad situation into two parts; the problems of the Northeast and Midwest, and the rest of the country.

At the end of the meeting the President called on Attorney General Levi, who reintroduced some of the discussion on affirmative action in education. The Attorney General claimed that any distinction between goals and quotas is a dishonest one and that it is corrupting. Secretary Weinberger in agreement called for a fundamental revision of our approach. Secretary Kissinger supported the Attorney General's views. The Attorney General called for further Cabinet discussions on the issue, and the President agreed.

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The President then called upon Ambassador Scali for his final remarks. In those remarks the Ambassador thanked the President for the opportunity to serve and indicated the importance of continuing our interest in the UN.

The President adjourned the meeting at 3:20 p.m.

The President then turned to the third item on the agenda, a discussion of the legislative strategy requirements of 1965. He asked who is now on duty. Jim Lang reports that he proceeds by referring to the index of bills. Mike Manatos, for example, reviews bills originating in the Executive Branch. Jones also does this, but they, plus the frequency of government officials before the Congress. The problem is that now the task embarrasses or concerns no one. The agencies, for example, were asked to review all the laws that should have been produced by the Eighty-Eighth Congress in session. We urged them to ensure that there is sufficient time within their own departments for them to consult properly. There is also a need, he said, for quick response to interventions of other agencies. For the moment, he added, they have to decide whether or not to sign an amended bill increasing Railroad Retirement payments or let the bill suspense date. But in any event, if we oppose the bill we must notify the White House by noon, and should it be signed, the White House is obliged to sign promptly. Lang indicated that they would be the ones, but it is not a mechanical way to go.

The President then went on to a discussion of the Wilderness Society situation. He indicated that letters had been handed through the White House and the Interior Department, and that a new policy statement is ready. He asked Mr. Udall to give a status report at the meeting tomorrow. The Secretary gave the report and emphasized the importance of Interior, State and Parks for their views. The Senator preferred not to get more controversy upon us but to get more votes in helping to override the Pennsylvania veto.

The President called down on Secretary Celebrezze for his views on the Medicaid situation. Secretary Celebrezze discussed briefly the proposed effective date for parts of the problems of the Northeast and Midwest, and the rest of the country.

At the end of the meeting the President called on Attorney General Katz, who commented some of the discussion on Medicaid which he attended. The Attorney General stressed that the distinction between goods and services is minimized and that it is confusing. Secretary Celebrezze in agreement noted that Medicaid problems of the Northeast. Secretary Fulbright supported the Attorney General's views. The Attorney General noted the Archer Cabinet's precedence on the issue, and the Secretary agreed.

The President then called upon Ambassador Bush for his final remarks. In these remarks the Ambassador thanked the President for the opportunity to serve and indicated the importance of continuing our interest in the UN.

The President adjourned the meeting at 4:00 p.m.

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Cabinet Minutes - 8/27/75

The President entered the room at 11:06 a.m.

The press entered at 11:07 a.m.

At 11:09 a.m. the President opened the meeting indicating there was much business to be done.

The President first called on Director of the Budget Lynn to talk about the 1977 budget.

Director Lynn discussed the need to prepare the budget as early as possible and that recommendations from Cabinet officers should be to him soon. He stated further that there probably will not be an extension on deadlines for the budget this year as in past years. Senator Muskie had indicated in a letter to Director Lynn that the extensions will not be granted and that the deadline must be maintained. Therefore, the budget must be in on the 19th of October and Cabinet officers should have their proposals in by the 30th of September up to the 19th of October.

The second area he discussed was appropriation bills. He mentioned the Education Bill and the fact that it is coming up for an override very soon. He asked the Cabinet to read the President's veto message. He thought that it was very, very good and well written. He also stressed the need to get to the bills and amend the bills per the Administration's desires before they are passed. The Education Bill has grown beyond reasonable bounds and perhaps it did so because Administration people were slow in getting to it. He also stated his strong desire to have both the Secretary and Under Secretary work with the Congress to get Administration priorities passed.

If all bills are passed that are currently contemplated, the deficit for 1977 would be in the 70 to 75 billion dollar area. As a last cautionary note, he mentioned that unless the Cabinet is more active in the Congress, many authorization bills will become appropriation bills and that will mean that the present deficit will continue to soar unabated.

The President then called on Jack Marsh to discuss a legislative review and a look ahead.

Legislative Review

(1) He reviewed the Congress. Economics and energy still

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The President entered the room at 12:00 a.m.

The prayer delivered at 12:07 a.m.

At 12:08 a.m. the President opened the meeting instructing those who were standing to be seated.

The President then called on Secretary of the Senate Lynn [illegible] who called the roll:

[illegible] [illegible] proposed the need for prayer [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

tend to be the focal points for debate in the Congress. If the Congress and the Administration have done any one thing well this year, it is to make energy a national issue.

(2) Foreign Policy and Defense. Congress is not isolationist or anti-defense. Congress is concerned about strong national defense and has voted in accordance with that feeling.

(3) Spending. Marsh's feeling is that large deficits have now become an important issue with most Americans and they are watching more closely the spending habits of the Administration and the Congress.

(4) Congress. The Congress' inability to discuss major issues is now an issue in and of itself. There are many jurisdictional disputes; there is fragmentation, factionalism, and there are problems in the Caucus. Therefore, the public has increased awareness of the inefficiency and lack of productivity in the Congress. That is now an issue.

(5) Cooperation. Marsh stated that there had been some areas of cooperation, particularly in defense and that he could not finish his summary without mentioning that citizenship for Robert E. Lee was granted and was an area of cooperation.

(6) Freshman Class. The Freshman Class is a bit more realistic now than they were eight months ago. While they are still voting as a block, there appear to be some cracks in that block. They are not quite as idealistic as they were when they arrived in the Congress. However, there is a growing dissatisfaction in their home districts because the block may appear to have been a disruptive force in the Congress. That ended Mr. Marsh's review. Then he took a look ahead.

Look Ahead

In his look ahead, Marsh feels that the following topics are important:

1) Economy and Energy will continue to be the number one problem.

2) Appropriations.

3) Assertiveness. Mr. Marsh made a comment here as to the intrusion into the Executive Branch functions by the Congress.

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4) Consumer Advocacy.

5) Investigative Hearings. Mr. Marsh's comment here is that a new direction and new tact is being taken by the Congress. Investigative hearings will need to be followed very closely to determine its long term impact on the Congress and the Executive Branch. End of the look ahead.

Administration Policy

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1) Financial Responsibility.

2) No New Spending.

3) Sixty Billion Dollar Ceiling.

4) Communications and Openness. In this regard, Mr. Marsh stated that the policy of no recriminations for past votes has been important in the development of good relationships between the President and the Congress. The example he used was that of Senator Mansfield, who worked very, very hard to stop the success of the Administration on the Diego Garcia Base, and then came back two days later to assist the Administration on Turkish aid.

5) Administration Initiative.

6) A Floating Coalition.

In summary Mr. Marsh stated the basic policy in those six areas will remain the same.

To Be Done

(1) Take soundings on the Hill. During the first week of September, talk to Jurisdictional Committees, talk to the Authorization Committees and talk to key contacts and close friends on the Hill to find out what the Senators and Congressmen have found in returning to their constituents and how that might change their approach to the end of this legislative session.

(2) Opinion Makers. Meet, know, and touch base with the key opinion makers on the Hill, even though they may not be people who you know at this time or have involvement with on a regular basis. There are people in the Congress who, on almost any issue, will shape and form blocks of votes and you must know them.

(3) Don't do it all yourself. Get your key Sub-Cabinet people to work regularly with members of Congress before the bills get to the floor and get into committees. Review programs with them so they know precisely how you are thinking. Be certain Sub-Cabinet people know the broad issues and goals of this Administration so they are better informed when they do talk with people on the Hill. End of the Marsh presentation.

The President then called on Frank Zarb to discuss energy. Mr. Zarb stated his feeling that the major event coming up is the attempt to override the President's veto on Decontrol. All members of the Cabinet should be prepared to assist in that effort. The opposition has attempted to say that the Administration's program increases prices and helps oil companies, in other words, maintains the status quo. However, the Administration must make the point that the outflow of dollars and jobs to OPEC countries is an overriding concern. The OPEC increase in cost will force oil prices up.

The President then interjected that the Administration has been very flexible in trying to compromise with the Congress. He further stated that the veto will come first in the Senate. The Administration currently has thirty votes. The President feels that there is a need for thirty-five. He cited Percy, Pearson, Johnston, and Bentsen as possible votes. He asked the Cabinet to please use all of their influence in sustaining this veto.

Secretary Morton then mentioned it was his feeling, in talking with many people, that their growing concern was that the Administration will not offer solutions to specific energy problems, but rather allows decontrols to pass on without any effort. It is important for the country and the Congress to know that the Administration will offer very specific energy solutions for unique problems.

Zarb then cautioned the Cabinet against anyone other than the President talking about compromise. To talk about compromise now, weakens the position of sustaining the veto. However, the Cabinet should mention specific legislation areas that the Administration is pushing.

1 - Farmers and Propane.
2 - Independent Refineries.
3 - Airline Jet Fuel.

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All of the above will be given specific consideration for assistance.

The President then turned to Phil Buchen to ask him to dis-

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cuss the intelligence investigation.


Mr. Buchen stated that Otis Pike in the House and Frank Church in the Senate are heading the two committees which have jurisdictional control over this area. The committees have worked principally in the area of assassinations and there is a report which is due ten days after the session reopens.

1 - The Church Committee. The CIA investigation by Senator Church's Committee has dealt primarily with covert activities vs. intelligence gathering. It is anticipated that they will continue down this line of work.

2 - The Pike Committee. The Pike Committee has spent most of its time with Defense Department interests, the NSA and Intelligence Community and budget related areas. It is anticipated they may shift interest once they have made their report.

Mr. Buchen has reviewed all possible legislation before the House and reviewed it lightly with the Cabinet. He stated that the Administration will be taking initiatives in the intelligence area.

The President called on General Scowcroft to discuss Turkish aid.



Secretary Mathews then raised the point that he believes there is a discrepancy between the Congressional point of view and the constituency point of view. In his work with governors, he finds that while the Congress is reflecting one particular constituency viewpoint or what is perceived to be their viewpoint, the governors are expressing a much different viewpoint and he cited a recent discussion with Jerry Brown, Governor of California.

Jim Lynn then answered Mathews' observation by stating that one of the ways the Administration can make a strong case

for the initiatives it is giving Congress, is to hold public hearings before announcing any policy, thus generating public support for the Administration's policy before it goes to the Congress.

The Cabinet Meeting ended at 12:24 p.m.

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Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting
September 17, 1975

The President entered the Cabinet Room at 11:03 a.m.
The press arrived at 11:04 a.m.
The press departed at 11:06 a.m.

The President opened the meeting with greetings and then mentioned several legislative items on which he wants action (Note Attachment at Tab A).

-Reauthorize Child Nutrition Programs
-Expand Crop Insurance Program and Eliminate the Costly Disaster Payment Program
-Executive Agency Regulatory Reform
-Foster Development and Production of Naval Petroleum Reserves
-Transfer PHS Hospitals to Communities
-Unfreeze Supplementary Medicare Insurance Premiums
-Enact Budget Reduction Legislation
-Consumer Assistance --
The President mentioned that last Spring he had directed individual agency consumer representation plans to be developed and submitted to Virginia Knauer by early October. He stressed that the reports need to be in by early October so Mrs. Knauer can present an overall plan to the Congress and demonstrate to the nation that the Administration is moving on consumer protection. This action will also assist the Administration in beating the Consumer Agency Bill which is pending, and which is going to directly involve each and every Cabinet officer. The President said the bill, if passed, would create serious problems and each Cabinet member would be sorry that he had been selected for his position.

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The President then talked about the science and technology Bicentennial display at Cape Canaveral. The President is placing high priority on it and wants it to be successful. He has asked Cabinet officers and agencies to assist monetarily with personnel. Jack Marsh has the lead and is working closely with NASA and other groups to ensure there is an energy and technology exposition which will look to the future. Therefore, the Bicentennial will not be just a look at the Nation's history and tradition, but also will project the Country's future.

The President called on Secretary John Dunlop to discuss the movement in the grain situation.

Secretary Dunlop stated Meany's chief concerns were the uncertain and erratic sales to foreign markets, and the American labor supply. Principally, the cause is price instability; therefore, when Meany came to the White House, he did not present a list of demands; he was not strong in any way, but wanted the President to develop an overall plan. The President had suspended sales after 10.3 million tons had been sold. There has been a strong feeling that there was a need to talk with the Soviets, to better forecast the year ahead crop, and to negotiate freight rates for American ships.

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The first goal was to reach an interim agreement. The President made an announcement on September 9th, that shipping would be continued under an agreement which was reached. The Assistant Secretary of State Charles Robinson was sent to the Soviet Union to begin the negotiations with Foreign Minister Patolichev on a long term grain agreement. Robinson returned Tuesday night and will be reporting to Secretary Kissinger on Wednesday.

The President then called on Secretary Butz for a response.

Secretary Butz did not want the Cabinet or the Administration to be led into thinking that George Meany was solely concerned about protecting the American consumer. The Secretary mentioned that even if we shipped the maximum capacity out of U. S. ports, which would be 100 million tons annually, there would be record crops and a surplus. There is going to be 19% more corn, 17% more wheat, and all other crops are up substantially. Even though the maximum capacity could be moved out of U. S. ports, there will still be surplus this year. If the surplus gets too large however, the farmer will be very unhappy and upset over not selling more grain abroad. So there is a very fine line between the amount of surplus and that which is to be sold abroad. Secretary Butz did say that it is a highly emotional issue.

Secretary Morton then said that Maritime has a handshake agreement on a 16 dollar rate for shipping. That is up from the $9.50 rate currently charged. The new rate will bring 30 ships out of layup and the agreement calls for 1/3 of all exports to be carried on U. S. ships.

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Secretary Butz said the next crop forecast comes out on October 10, 11 and it appears the September/October forecast will be up substantially. Mr. Butz stressed once again that Meany is not the friend of the White House, the Republicans, or the American consumer and that we should not be patting Meany on the back, while slapping our friends, the American farmer, in the face.

The President's attention then turned to busing and he asked Attorney General Levi to give the Cabinet a report.

The Attorney General said busing was moving ahead; the attendance in the schools, both by teachers and students, has gone up measurably and in his judgement the U. S. marshals have done an outstanding job. He does anticipate difficulty in Dallas by mid-year, the approximate date being January 5th, when busing is to start. He further stated that he believes there are problems with the Esch Amendment. He thinks the list of priorities which are established in the amendment may not be realistic. It includes a large capital outlay for new schools. The Attorney General feels that many groups which originally supported busing, now have some doubts.

Secretary Mathews added to the discussion by stating that HEW was providing ESA money in Louisville ($1.2 million). In Boston, HEW has contributed $3.9 million, $2.6 million of that being this year. There are supplemental grants available between $1.5 and $1.9 million; however, HEW cannot pay for the police cost of enforcing the busing.

Secretary Coleman also got into the discussion by asking the President to please listen to another point of view. He stated emphatically that where communities had anticipated school busing as a necessary process, the communities established task forces to work on the problem, and have done very well. He cited Pasadena, California, as a good example. School busing has worked without violence; quality education has not suffered, and the community has embraced the concept. There is a feeling by many, that Federal judges are now involved in the management of schools; however, Secretary Coleman said the Federal judge in Boston stepped in only after three years of begging and pleading with the community to take care of the problem themselves. Only then did the Federal judge feel compelled to set down the program

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for busing. History will show, believes Secretary Coleman, that the Federal judges acted with great restraint, judgement, and wisdom in assisting the court ordered busing.

Attorney General Levi then said, we don't disagree.

The President then called on Richard Dunham to discuss the New York problem.

Mr. Dunham said New York City has moved off dead center by going to the State Legislature and it has in effect handed the problem to the Federal system. New York City's view is that as a City they have done all they can and it is now a Federal problem. In Dunham's view extensive short term borrowing will be necessary to get the City back on its feet.

The President then called on Alan Greenspan for an economic report relative to New York City.

Mr. Greenspan feels there is no immediate impact, erosion, or failure that will be felt on the big banks. However, there are some smaller banks which will need specific action and perhaps legislation to assist them. The psychological reaction is far greater than the actual response by institutions. He did state that there are two serious problems: First, Will there be market disruption limited in time and impact? To which he responded that he believes there will. And Second, The larger problem, if major disruptions do occur, What will the institutional reaction be? He believes that it can be handled within the confines of the institutions as now established with no assistance from the Federal government.

Jim Cannon did interject that the New York Congressional Delegation has no plan and is not preparing a plan for the assistance of New York City; in fact, the New York Congressional Delegation is very divided on how it should be handled. Therefore, he does not believe there is Congressional support to assist New York City, unless and until, the New York Congressional Delegation gets together, unanimously, on a plan.

Vice President Rockefeller then talked about the problem. He does not see a solution that will be reached in the next three months and all agreements will expire on December 31st, 1975. He believes the political impact is far more serious than anyone thinks. The impact in New York City and

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State when there is no money to pay anyone, firemen, policemen, sanitation workers, could be very severe. He wanted to impress upon everyone the need to work toward a possible solution should that arise. He suggested to the President that a quiet task force be put together to study the impact if the worst happens.

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He further stated that Congress should give the President authority to act so he could assist in transferring approximately 1/3 of their floating debt to long term debt by advancing medicaid payments. This should be done only if they get their house in order, and if they sincerely attempt to develop a plan which will allow for appropriate Federal involvement. Three point four billion dollars goes to New York City each year in Federal aid, so the Federal government has quite a lever from which to work. The Vice President thinks the President should only intercede if the Congress gives him that authority.

Mr. Dunham then added that a new budget by Mayor Beame is being developed and will be submitted in early October. When that is submitted, everyone will be able to see how sincere Beame and his people are in attempting to solve the problem or whether they are merely trying to put the burden on the back of the Federal government.

The Under Secretary of the Treasury Steven Gardner said that the only possible solution is to stretch out the short term debt to long term debt and that in the final analysis the courts will have to settle this problem.

Alan Greenspan then closed this discussion by saying the burden and impact of a bankrupt New York City will fall directly on the bond holders.

The President then called on the Vice President for discussion of Domestic Council forums.

The Vice President believes the country is in a social/political/economic dilemma and this group seeking domestic ideas will become very important. They will cover a wide geographic area over a five or six week period, in an attempt to assist the Executive Branch in the development of domestic programs.

The Vice President then reviewed the handout which he distributed. The Vice President believes this program of forums will allow the President to present an alternative

path for the country. It will present some very interesting choices to the country and it will allow the President is his State of the Union, to dramatically offer an alternative to a country which is not making hard, tough decisions. In the Vice President's judgement, the President's State of the Union speech could be an historic occasion in the Bicentennial year. (Note Attachment at Tab B.)

Director Lynn said his office is preparing a series of charts showing budgets, deficits, beneficiaries, and producers in program areas which crosscut departments. During the Domestic Council forums, it is possible to have these charts across the room, and it will dramatically illustrate the course this country is going. The evidence is so substantial that it would lead virtually anyone to believe that a restructuring of the Federal system, a regrouping on budget deficits and financing is necessary.

The President called on Alan Greenspan to give a quick wrap-up on the economy.

Mr. Greenspan made three points: First, there is increased output in the third quarter. Real GNP on an annualized basis, is 9+%. Second, inflation should come down over the next three to six months. And Third, if the budget deficit increases significantly, it will cause very severe problems.

The President then called on Frank Zarb to review the energy picture.

Frank Zarb said that there was a handout before every Cabinet officer and staff member (Note Attachment at Tab C). The hard issue Zarb said, was whether or not we have a national energy program which will diminish a need on foreign imports. The essence of that argument is the creation of American jobs and the decreased outflow of jobs and dollars to the OPEC countries. In his opinion the rate of imports has turned down very slightly over the last few months. The larger problem still remains, Congressional inaction.

The President then interrupted Zarb and said that the Senate will probably not grant an extension and the Administration will have to go along with no controls.

The meeting was closed at 1:00 p.m.

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Cabinet Meeting, October 8th, 1975
The President arrived at 11:45 a.m.
The press arrived at 11:46 a.m.
The press departed at 11:48 a.m.

The President opened the meeting by greeting the Cabinet. He then stressed the need for continued momentum for the Tax Incentive Package proposed this week. He emphasized the importance of maintaining a posture of vetoing any tax extension if Congress refuses to put a ceiling on spending. The two proposals must be tied hand-in-hand or the President will veto. He praised OMB Director Lynn, Secretary Simon, and the work of the Economic Policy Board in preparing the package on which he addressed the American people.

The President believes that every tax payer understands the change in the family tax exemption, as each businessman knows of the corporate tax reduction. These two changes will bring the message home for many people. He urged the Cabinet to study, do their homework, and be prepared for a tough fight on the Hill, one that could drag on for several months.

Director Lynn stated that the new ceiling for all departments and agencies will be sent to them in the next few days. He indicated the desire to take care of the new ceiling within each agency or department. Exactly how that is achieved is not nearly as important as the fact that it be done. Therefore, the opportunity to use imagination and creative thought in application of budget ceiling is significant.

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He feels the interest group reaction to the proposal will be very strong. The President clearly understands the role of interest groups and the proposals he is making; so, do not bow to the pressure of those groups, but rather deal with them effectively within your own agencies. There is a general impression that some people think the Congress cannot cope with tax reduction and a spending ceiling. However, the President says it can be done.

The President used the 1965 example of a President Johnson proposal where Wilbur Mills, after studying it carefully, conceded the two coupled together could be achieved by the Congress.

Director Lynn feels it is irresponsible to continue to address a ceiling on spending without the Congress totaling their budget figures. They continue to approach the budget

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problem on a piece meal basis rather than totaling all of their figures and they have continually added to the 1976-77 budget figure that way.

Secretary Simon said Al Ullman when first appraised of the President's idea rejected it. However, he indicated to Simon that the more he sees of it, the more he likes it.

Alan Greenspan said that many people, both within and without the Congress, feel a need for more stimulation of the economy. Greenspan agrees but feels strongly that it should be done by tax reduction, not increased spending.

Director Lynn said one of the big problems with the Congress is that they are not showing the process as to how they arrive at certain figures. They are merely showing the end result. It is important the Cabinet stress this in hearings and probe the Congress on exactly how they arrived at their figures, what procedure they used.

Don Rumsfeld strongly stated his opinion about becoming reactionary to what the Congress may or may not do with the President's proposal. He feels it is essential for the Cabinet and the Administration to sell the President's program, the two proposals tied hand-in-hand. To sit around and speculate as to what the Congress might or might not do, what it can or cannot do, weakens the President's overall program. The basic issue is whether or not the American people will have a choice on how and where the growth takes place within the Federal budget. The President is attempting to shift the traditional argument away from the government making the decisions and more toward the citizen.

Vice President Rockefeller said he agreed with Rumsfeld and indicated the Domestic Council forums will address this very question. He hopes to be able to report back to the President with favorable news.

The President said the Appalachian governors, after a discussion of the spending ceiling, agree with him. There is a general consensus that the growth of the government must be cut back.

Frizzell said it's his opinion that the concept is very good, but it is little understood by the American people. The need to package it in terms that will be easily understood is essential. His idea is to use two phrases: The President is putting a lid on taxes and a lid on spending.

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Secretary Schlesinger said there are other attendent problems with the President's program. The Defense Department has personnel and bases which they are prepared to close down and relocate if the Congress would merely approve it, but getting that to happen is very, very difficult. The feeling that the government could fire 10% of all the people and have increased efficiency is felt by many.

Vice President Rockefeller stated there is a Civil Service report coming out and it will strike at the very problem to which the Secretary is speaking and it should substantiate the President's position.

The President then turned his attention to Regulatory Reform and mentioned the legislation on railroads went to the Hill yesterday and the CAB Airline Proposal Package will be sent to the Hill today.

Secretary Coleman told the Cabinet and the President that he feels that it is very important for each agency and department to review its own statutes. In looking at regulatory reform, many agencies have allowed their statutory power to get out of control without adequate review. Therefore, in his department they are reviewing all legislation that is now pending as to how it fits with other previously passed statutes. They have found some amazing laws that are on the books that do not now apply.

The President asked Secretary Coleman if he is keeping any log of the changes which he is recommending?

The Secretary indicated that he is.

Secretary Butz said there are 80,000 employees in the Agriculture Department and 23,000 have a police function of some kind. Therefore, the Secretary has established three committees to review all police functions for updating, including all statutes which have been passed.

Secretary Dunlop, in his opinion, finds it necessary to differentiate between social regulation and economic regulation. It is important that Cabinet members watch their terminology as they speak to these two matters. Economic regulation is represented by tariffs, entrance and exit in the market place, rates, etc. Social regulation is health and employee benefits, minimum wage, and others. One half of all the employees at Labor are involved in regulation or police action.

The Secretary stated further that in his opinion when confronting crisis between two polarized groups, he has found it successful to sit down and talk with the two groups and get himself in-

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volved in negotiations of differences. This can avoid legal problems and can assist in arriving at solutions at a very early date, thus eliminating the need for additional legislation.

The President then talked about his trip to Knoxville. The feeling he got there is that too many people think the government is their foe. When they think about dealing with the government, they have a negative opinion. A Harris Poll recently taken regarding institutions was very telling. The Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Military have all slipped substantially in approval by citizens. The President wants to embark on a serious effort to change the attitude about government, to change the peoples perception of government.

Rod Hills then talked on regulatory reform and reviewed the 4 points the President set forth at the Regulatory Reform Summit Meeting held several months ago. He reviewed briefly the legislation that is in line with reform views of the President. Hills felt that by this time next year, there will be a significant reform movement, not only within the government, but within the country as well.

Secretary Coleman asked the Cabinet's advice about the Concorde Problem which he is facing. They have requested clearance for two flights daily into Dulles Airport and four flights daily into New York City. There are three specific problems: 1) noise, 2) the ozone layering, and 3) foreign policy. The discussion turned back to the SST defeat in the House and Senate some time ago.

The President feels that it was one of the more serious wrong decisions that the Congress has made, but at that time, the environmentalists were much stronger than they are now. So the Concorde problem poses difficulties both domestically and in foreign policy terms.

Secretary Coleman asked the Cabinet members to give him any ideas they may have on it.

The President then asked General Scowcroft to comment.

General Scowcroft said the foreign policy side is whether or not we are going to allow a foreign country to market superior technology in the United States. Had the United States continued with the development of the SST, we would have maintained air superiority. We are now being replaced in this particular market by the Concorde; therefore, the problem is one of lack of entry to the U. S. market. If the decision is made not to disallow their entry, it will have

[illegible]

The President [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]

Secretary Coleman [illegible]

The President [illegible]

Secretary Coleman [illegible]

The President [illegible]

General Scowcroft [illegible]

serious foreign policy implications.

Secretary Schlesinger, just as an aside, mentioned that the fastest rate of growth in any branch of government is in the Legislative Branch.

The Cabinet Meeting closed at 12:55 p.m.

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FO 3-2

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

JAN 14 1975

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROY L. ASH

SUBJECT: Additional 1975 Foreign Aid Needs for South Vietnam and Cambodia

In response to Dr. Kissinger's request, the Departments of State and Defense have submitted their proposals for additional funds for Indochina and amendments to the recently enacted Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. This memorandum seeks your decisions on those proposals so that necessary legislation and budget supplementals can be prepared and transmitted to the Congress as soon as possible. An early decision is also needed so that the 1976 Budget can reflect your decisions.

South Vietnam

Defense recommends a $300 million supplemental for 1975 military assistance for South Vietnam. State is silent on the amount of military assistance, but opposes, with the concurrence of AID, any request for additional economic assistance at this time on the grounds that chances of success are slim and that such a request might detract from the effort of seeking additional military assistance funds. State believes a request for increased military assistance to South Vietnam should be submitted by the end of January while DOD counsels awaiting more concrete evidence of the need for additional assistance.

	$ millions			
	1974 Actual	1975 Budget	1975 Est.	1976 Budget
Military Assistance	1018	1450	700	1293
Proposed Supplemental	-	-	300	-
Total	1018	1450	1000	1293

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
MR 91-16, #28 NSC ltr. 8/20/92
By KBH, NARA, Date 9/25/92

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Ambassador Martin has proposed an increased request of $700 million for military assistance and $100 million for economic assistance. Of the $700 million military assistance $400 million would have to be authorized before being appropriated. The $100 million in economic aid would also require prior authorization. Ambassador Martin argues that the larger program is necessary in order to prove the validity of the original budget requests.

Analysis. A $300 million increase has the advantage of being within the $1000 million already authorized and is assured of support from Senator Stennis. This amount would maintain ground ammunition stocks above the stockage objective at year's end even allowing for a 30% increase in consumption during the dry season. Should the North Vietnamese attack with the same intensity as during the 1972 offensive, no more funds would be required to defeat the attack, but some additional funding would be needed to bring ground ammunition stocks back up to the stockage objective afterwards. If no massive offensive develops, no funds beyond $1000 million will be needed, and Defense does not believe more can be justified at this time.

I recommend that you approve a $300 million military assistance supplemental for South Vietnam for immediate submission to the Congress. NSC concurs.

Decision:

Approve $300 million military assistance supplemental AGREE

Cambodia

The Cambodia military assistance situation is as follows:

- The Foreign Assistance Act has limited Cambodia to only $200 million of the $600 million total MAP authorization. Under the Continuing Resolution, that amount has already been obligated.

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- Ammunition in country or in the pipeline will meet consumption requirements for only 30-45 days.

- Drawdown of $75 million in defense stocks authorized by Presidential Determination will cover estimated requirements for an additional 50-60 days.

The Defense Department estimates that, unless funding beyond the $275 million now available is obtained, ammunition deliveries will have to cease in late February, and the Khmer Armed Forces will be out of ammunition at current consumption rates by late March or early April. Accordingly, Defense recommends that relief be obtained by early March at the latest.

Defense estimates total 1975 requirements to range from $488 to $606 million, of which $450 to $572 million require budget authority.

The several options recommended by Defense, State and NSC are presented in the table below along with the 1974 actual level, 1975 budget request, and current Foreign Assistance Act authorization.

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$ millions

	1974	1975					
	Actual	Budget Request	Congr Auth	Option A-1	Option A-2	Option B	Option C
MAP funds authorized	162	390	200	200	200	200	200
MAP budget amendment	-	-	-	-	175	222	297
Drawdown authorized	250	-	75	75	75	75	75
Additional drawdown	-	-	-	175	-	-	-
Total[1/]	412	390	275	450	450	497	572
Worldwide MAP Total	695	985	675	850	850	897	972

1/ Excludes certain items that count toward Cambodia ceiling but do not require expenditure of additional appropriated funds or drawdown authority.

Option A. This option reflects the $450 million total military assistance level recommended by State and corresponds to the "austere" level Defense believes necessary to fund ammunition consumption for the remainder of this fiscal year at the same rates as during the 1974 dry season.

The $450 million level could be met by two means: (a) Under Option A-1, an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act would be sought to increase the currently authorized worldwide drawdown authority of $150 million by $100 million and to eliminate the $75 limitation on Cambodia. The entire resulting $250 million drawdown would be used for Cambodia. (b) Alternatively, under Option A-2, an additional $175 million in regular MAP funds would be sought. This would require an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, eliminating or raising the ceilings on aid to Cambodia and increasing the total MAP appropriation ceiling by $175 million. A budget amendment for that amount would be sought.

State prefers Option A-1 while Defense prefers A-2. Option A-1 has the advantage of not requiring appropriations action and, if successful, additional ammunition could be provided earlier than under Option A-2. However, Option A-1 could be criticized as backdoor financing, especially since the drawdown authority is designed to meet unforeseen emergencies. We believe the choice may depend on the preferences of friendly senators and representatives whose sponsorship will be critical.

Option B. This option providing a total of $497 million would require an additional MAP authorization of $222 million and a budget amendment of that amount.

Option C. This option providing a total of $572 million would require an additional MAP authorization of $297 million and a budget amendment of that amount.

Analysis. Option A corresponds closely, if inflation is considered, with 1974 levels and is based on 1974 dry season ammunition consumption experience. Moreover,

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improved fire discipline by the Khmer forces should make the same level of ammunition supply go somewhat farther this year. Option A is a defensible request that represents the minimum level considered prudent by Defense.

Option B at an increased cost of $47 million over Option A is a lower risk option. It would permit a 10% increase ($26 million) in ammunition expenditure over the 1974 dry season rate supported by Option A. This additional 10% is only about half that recommended by Ambassador Dean based on ammunition expenditures in the current fighting. Option B would also provide $21 million for replacement of limited and very critical equipment lost in combat, to include artillery pieces, M113 armored personnel carriers, landing craft (LCM), patrol craft (PBR) necessary for the Mekong supply route, and helicopter gunships to escort Mekong convoys. Because the higher level of Option B could not be provided by increased drawdown authority alone ($222 million would be required), it would be necessary to seek an increased MAP authorization and appropriation.

Option C would permit ammunition to be consumed at the highest rate ever achieved in any one month during the 1974 dry season during each of the last six months of fiscal year 1975. This would represent a 24% increase over actual 1974 consumption for the January-July period, and would permit limited replacement of equipment attrition and allow increased funding of operating and maintenance costs. Option C could prove necessary at some future date if ammunition expenditures remain at peak levels and interdiction of the Mekong requires a resort to expensive air delivery of ammunition. However, it would be difficult at this time to make the case for a 24% increase over 1974 ammunition consumption levels.

Recommendation. I recommend that you approve Option A with the choice between seeking additional drawdown authority (Option A-1) and seeking additional MAP authorization and appropriations (Option A-2) to be determined on the basis of congressional consultations to be conducted by State as soon as possible this week. State concurs.

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Defense supports Option A as a minimum but would prefer Option B.

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NSC strongly recommends Option B.

Decision:

Option A ($450 million total program) _____

Option B ($497 million total program) GRF.

Option C ($572 million total program) _____

Cambodia ceilings. Under all military assistance options it will be necessary to seek relief from the Cambodia ceilings in order to permit full utilization of an estimated $34 million in excess defense items and permit inclusion of certain overhead costs that must be counted within the military assistance ceiling ($200 million) and the overall country ceiling ($377 million) even though they do not require expenditure of additional appropriated funds or drawdown authority. Relief from the $177 million combined ceiling on economic and P.L. 480 assistance will also be necessary. An $88 million minimum requirement for economic assistance leaves only $89 million for P.L. 480 commodities, compared to the $139 million required.

Recommendation. I recommend that you approve inclusion of a request to remove the Cambodia ceilings in the legislative package for South Vietnam and Cambodia. State and NSC concur.

Decision:

Approve request to remove Cambodia ceilings GRF

Chile and Turkey

The Department of State recommends also that legislative relief be sought from the prohibition on military assistance to Chile and the suspension of assistance to Turkey after February 5, 1975, in conjunction with proposing amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act to permit increased assistance to Cambodia. While this has no budget implications, to

raise once again these controversial issues could jeopardize early favorable action on additional military assistance to Cambodia. NSC does not feel we should address the Chile and Turkey issues in conjunction with the requirements for Cambodia.

Decision:

Request relief on Chile and Turkey -

a. In conjunction with Cambodia package _____

b. Separately from Cambodia package NRF

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

(F)

April 23, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF M.L.F. JRF

SUBJECT: Congressman John Rhodes

Congressman Rhodes has sent along a confidential memorandum from one of his former employees containing an eyewitness assessment and appraisal of the situation in Viet Nam.

The Minority Leader requested I bring it to your personal attention at the earliest possible moment.

From the desk of


JOHN J. RHODES

Max -

I would appreciate it if you would get this to The President at the earliest possible moment.

Thanks.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515



1st District, Arizona

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
2310 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

ALMA A. ALKIRE
RICHARD ROBERTS

DISTRICT OFFICE:
5040 Federal Building
Phoenix, Arizona 85025

ROBERT J. SCANLAN

Office of the Minority Leader

United States House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

H-232, The Capitol
Washington, D.C. 20515

JOHN J. WILLIAMS
DENNIS J. TAYLOR
J. BRIAN SMITH
CLARA POSEY

April 22, 1975

Mr. Max L. Friedersdorf
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Max:

The enclosed memorandum was dictated by J. Patrick Donohoe, a former employee of mine several years ago. Pat is completely reliable, and I thought his appraisal of the situation in Vietnam is so valuable that the President should have it immediately.

I bring it to your attention that Pat has reported as a private individual and not as a member of the State Department. He only said it to me because he knew me, and felt strongly that someone should have this information. I agree with him.

Yours sincerely,

JJR:C

Enclosure

TO JJR ---- CONFIDENTIAL

Patrick Donohoe
4/22
from Hong Kong (3:20 a.m. Hong Kong time) 2:20 p.m. D.C. time

The following is written in a personal capacity a few hours after leaving Saigon. This represents distillation of my thoughts on South Vietnam respectfully submitted for your consideration. Like everyone, I am most concerned about evacuation of American citizens and foreign nationals from South Vietnam. he military situation and the South Vietnamese domestic mood makes completely successful evacuation of American citizens unlikely. The effort is made more complex with massive evacuation of South Vietnamese linked with the evacuation of American citizens. The com bined evacuation proposal weakens the South Vietnamese resolve further and indirectly admits total defeat likely.

Any list of evacuees, no matter how comprehensive and compassionate, will be selective. Those who are omitted will react, and react violently. The exodus of refugees from Danang and Nha Trang illustrates the point clearly. Believe the U.S. has dual objectives in evacuation that should be carefully separated. It is imperative that both the North and South Vietnamese know that the United States attached hgihest priority to orderly evacuation of American citizens and foreign nationals. Evacuation of South Vietnamese should be effected afterwards. It is politically impracticable in the United States to propose sufficient military presence to assure compete evacuation. Even if it were possible to secure Saigon with U.S. troops, the North Vietnamese can encircle the city, increase sapper activities, and create havoc. This can be done without the North Vietnamese using main force units against U.S. troops

or Saigon itself. However, I believe the North Vietnamese will probably strongly resist any attempt of unilateral use of U.S. forces to provide security for a successful evacuation. A possible solution would be for Saigon to be declared an open city, with order maintained by a multi-national U.N. task force for the purposes of evacuation. Negotiations for the evacuation of South Vietnamese after the orderly withdrawal of American citizens places the onus of humanitarian evacuation squarely upon the North Vietnamese. As the situation stands, the North Vietnamese can destroy at will civil order in Saigon, thereby making successful and complete evacuation of American citizens and foreign nationals impossible. The South Vietnamese disarray will be used by the North Vietnamese as the eeason why the evacuation failed. I firmly believe we must shift a portion of the responsibility on North Vietnam for the success of a two-step evacuation.

If the above proposal has merit, action must be started within the next few days.

Best wishes,

/s/ J Patrick Donohoe

OTESS from Pat following conversation --
Notes from Pat in conversation following above dictation

He stresses that he is writing this strictly as a private citizen -- and not in his official position (or he won't be long with the State Dept.)

He stresses that action must be taken immediately, or we could lose a lot of good Americans still in Vietnam. He just Left last evening and very distressed about situation, and lack of action in Washington.

He will be at Hotel Miramar in Hong Kong (Tel # HK 3-681111 until Sat. (Best way to reach him in Hong Kong would be to call the Washington office of American Express and have them telex message to Mr. Michael Shelley, American Express, Hong Kong, for delivery to Pat.

Sat., he arrives Manila and will be there for 4 Or 5 days - with Patti and 2 child
telephone Manila Embassy 877659, for Mrs. Wiliam Askins
Then goes to Maui for 2 weeks

APPROVED
MAY 23 1975

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

MAY 23 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Enrolled Bill H.R. 6755 - Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975
Sponsor - Rep. Rodino (D) New Jersey

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Last Day for Action

June 3, 1975 - Tuesday

Purpose

Authorizes appropriations of not to exceed $455 million for assistance to refugees from Cambodia or Vietnam and requires certain reports to the Congress.

Agency Recommendations

Office of Management and Budget	Approval
Department of State	Approval (Informally)
Department of Health, Education and Welfare	Approval (Informally)
Agency for International Development	Approval (Informally)
National Security Council	Approval (Informally)
Department of Defense	Approval (Informally)
Department of Justice	Approval (Informally)

Discussion

The enrolled bill authorizes a ceiling of $455 million on the amount which may be appropriated for assistance to refugees from Cambodia and Vietnam in lieu of your request for appropriations authorization of "such sums as may be necessary" for such purposes. The amount in the bill is $52 million less than the Administration's estimate of the $507 million that would be required but $50 million above the $405 million contained in the separate, enrolled appropriations bill which is before you for action.

As requested, H.R. 6755 provides that authorization of appropriations for refugee assistance within the United States, such as welfare and related assistance, shall remain available until September 30, 1977, while authorization for other activities, such as transportation of refugees to the United States, would expire on June 30, 1976. This reflects the expectation that, by the end of fiscal year 1976, the refugees will be resettled but that there will be a continuing need for a period of time for welfare and related assistance.

It should be noted that the $405 million provided in the appropriations bill for Vietnam and Cambodia refugee assistance would be available only through June 30, 1976. Depending upon the unfolding requirements for welfare and related assistance programs, it may be necessary to seek additional appropriations beyond June 30, 1976, or to seek an extension of availability of funds already appropriated.

H.R. 6755 also contains certain, unrequested, reporting requirements, which, although burdensome, are not highly objectionable, including:

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- a requirement that the President consult with and keep the Judiciary and Appropriations Committees of both Houses and the Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations Committees fully and currently informed of the use of funds and the exercise of functions authorized in the bill

- a requirement for a report to the above committees by the President within 30 days of enactment, and at 90 day intervals thereafter until December 31, 1977, on the status of refugees including a plan for their resettlement in the U.S., or in the case of those so requesting, their resettlement in a third country or return to their homeland, and initiatives made to the office of U.N. High Commissioner for refugees.

Such report would also have to describe steps taken by the President to retrieve, for deposit in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts, funds previously authorized and appropriated for assistance to South Vietnam and Combodia but not expended, exclusive of Indochina Postwar Reconstruction funds used for the movement and maintenance of refugees prior to the date of enactment of this bill.

James M. Frey

Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures

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4-3

ROBERT L. LEGGETT, M.C.
4TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

MEMBER OF
COMMITTEES ON:
ARMED SERVICES
MERCHANT MARINE AND
FISHERIES

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
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202/225-5716

OWEN CHAFFEE
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVE:
JAMES COAKLEY
1322 TENNESSEE STREET
VALLEJO

SACRAMENTO OFFICE:
VIRGINIA HARPER
650 CAPITOL MALL

April 1, 1975

Honorable Gerald R. Ford
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to bring to your attention a matter of extreme significance.

Recent news reports have carried accounts of private American ships and aircraft, under U.S. Government contract, carrying Republic of Vietnam troops with weapons from overrun areas to areas still held by the Saigon government. Such activities constitute redeployment of troops, which is a basic combat support service and constitutes violation of legal prohibitions against participation in hostilities in Indochina.

It is my view that the present Congress would consider such activities, if continued, to constitute an impeachable offense.

I hope this question will not arise.

The humanity and heroism displayed by Americans attempting to rescue women and children from the overrun areas has been admirable in the extreme. Unfortunately, their efforts have been sullied by the insistence of Republic of Vietnam troops that they be rescued ahead of the women and children. If it is not possible, short of sending in American armed forces in addition to the usual

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embassy and consulate guards, to insure that no troops and no weapons will be carried, compliance with the law requires that American participation in the rescue effort be terminated. In any case, there seems to be no reason why it was necessary for a World Airways 727 to fly to Danang while a fleet of VNAF C-130s sat idle at Tansonnhut.

I urge you to give this matter your closest attention.

Very sincerely,

ROBERT L. LEGGETT
Member of Congress

RLL:bjh

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4-18

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

April 17, 1975

President Gerald R. Ford
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Many Members of Congress are extremely disturbed over the apparent lack of urgency in the evacuation of American nationals from Vietnam.

It is our intention only to do what is necessary to get the Administration to see to it that Ambassador Martin expedite the orderly removal of American nationals from Vietnam.

In the absence of any clear indication from you that you are taking firm action to insure that Ambassador Martin does expedite the orderly evacuation of American nationals from Vietnam, we intend to circulate the attached Resolution for signature tomorrow morning and to take action to bring it to the House floor for debate and vote.

We sincerely hope that you will take the steps that are appropriate to expedite the evacuation of American nationals from Vietnam.

Sincerely,

John L. Burton

Berkley Bedell

Timothy E. Wirth

Robert J. Cornell


Steven L. Neal

William J. Hughes


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Herbert E. Harris, II


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
John W. Jenrette, Jr.



Norman Y. Mineta




Patricia Schroeder




Les Aspin




Edward Mezvinsky



Edward W. Pattison




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
Bella S. Abzug




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
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
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
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
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Tom Harkin




James Weaver




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
Mark W. Hannaford



Gladys Noon Spellman




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
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
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
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
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
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
Andrew Maguire




Shirley Chisholm




Henry J. Nowak




Jerry M. Patterson




Allan T. Howe




George E. Miller



Henry A. Waxman



Michael T. Blouin



William M. Brodhead

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94th Congress
1st Session

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas the safety of American nationals in Vietnam is of great concern to the American people,

Whereas it is currently still possible to evacuate those American nationals from Vietnam without the involvement of American combat forces,

Whereas reports from Vietnam indicate that Ambassador Graham Martin has not, and is still not, taking decisive action to expedite the evacuation of American nationals from Vietnam while it is still possible to do so without the involvement of American combat forces,

Whereas Ambassador Martin is accountable to the President of the United States,

Whereas the President of the United States is ultimately responsible for the safe evacuation of American nationals from Vietnam,

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that --

The President should take immediate action to order Ambassador Martin to expedite the orderly evacuation of American nationals from Vietnam, and see that such prompt, orderly evacuation is accomplished.

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2327

Staff urgent

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 12, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: RON NESSEN RAN

The three American television networks have asked me to obtain the following assurances before they undertake their own evacuation of their Vietnamese employees in Saigon:

1. What would the American reaction be if a planeload of Vietnamese employees of the networks showed up by charter plane at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines without proper visas or passports?

2. Will the United States Government give some official assurances to Bird Air or other charter lines that they will not be penalized in future dealings with the American government if they airlift, on contract, the Vietnamese employees of the networks without proper exit visas?

3. Will the United States government intervene with the government of the Philippines to arrange transportation to Clark Air Force Base in case Vietnamese employees of the networks show up at Manila or another port in the Philippines by charter ship?

The networks have talked about some of these items with Phil Habib. But the networks would now like a firm answer on each point before proceeding with their plans.

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MEMORANDUM 2327

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
April 14, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: W. R. SMYSER

SUBJECT: Special Privileges for Vietnamese Employees of U.S. Networks

I think it would be highly improper to give a positive answer to Ron Nessen on any of the three questions that he has posed.

As you know, we are having great difficulties on the Hill and in Manila because of the undocumented Vietnamese who have shown up there. For us to encourage this sort of thing seems highly questionable.

It would be even more questionable to do so at a time when even the relatives of Americans cannot leave Vietnam. They are much more in jeopardy than the employees of our networks.

I recommend, therefore, that you tell Mr. Nessen that we cannot circumvent U.S. laws and regulations for the benefit of these network employees. You may wish to tell him this orally; if not, I have attached a memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you either sign the attached memorandum to Mr. Nessen (Tab A), or inform him orally that we cannot meet the requests of the networks with regard to special privileges for their Vietnamese employees.

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BB

MEMORANDUM

EXECUTIVE
ND18/CO165
PR16 2327
ND18-2/CO165-1
PR16-1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 21, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR RON NESSEN

FROM: Brent Scowcroft BS

With reference to your memorandum of April 12, there is no way we can make exceptions to U.S. laws and regulations for the employees of the U.S. networks, and we should not overtly encourage them to violate Vietnamese laws and regulations.

I suggest the networks contact the evacuation center at the State Department which is dealing with many similar problems. State will do the best it can with the networks' request.

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Dispatched fm WB 4/21/75 (KM)

EXECUTIVE

ND18/CO165
CO165-2
ND1
ND15
ND18
FE4-1
ND18-2/CO165-2
FG34
FG38
ND8

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 30, 1975

Dear Mr. President: James O. Eastland

On April 4, 1975, I reported that U.S. naval vessels had been ordered to participate in an international humanitarian relief effort to transport refugees and U.S. nationals to safety from Danang and other seaports in South Vietnam. This effort was undertaken in response to urgent appeals from the Government of South Vietnam and in recognition of the large-scale violations by the North Vietnamese of the Agreement Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam.

In the days and weeks that followed, the massive North Vietnamese attacks continued. As the forces of the Government of South Vietnam were pushed further back toward Saigon, we began a progressive withdrawal of U.S. citizens and their dependents in South Vietnam, together with foreign nationals whose lives were in jeopardy. Albert, Carl

On April 28, the defensive lines to the northwest and south of Saigon were breached. Tan Son Nhut Airfield and Saigon came under increased rocket attack and for the first time received artillery fire. NVA forces were approaching within mortar and anti-aircraft missile range. The situation at Tan Son Nhut Airfield deteriorated to the extent that it became unusable. Crowd control on the airfield was breaking down and the collapse of the Government forces within Saigon appeared imminent. The situation presented a direct and imminent threat to the remaining U.S. citizens and their dependents in and around Saigon.

On the recommendation of the American Ambassador there, I ordered U.S. military forces to proceed by means of rotary wing aircraft with an emergency final evacuation out of consideration for the safety of U.S. citizens.

In accordance with my desire to keep the Congress fully informed on this matter, and taking note of the provision of section 4 of the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), I wish to report to you that at about 1:00 A.M. EDT, April 29, 1975, U.S. forces entered South Vietnam airspace.

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Copy not seen or handled by Records Office.
Delivered by a Mr Walthius of the Congressional Liaison Office: 4/30/75

[redacted]

April 28, 1975

Dear Mr. President,

On April 6, 1975, I reported that U.S. naval vessels had been ordered to participate in an intercontinental hemisphere relief effort to transport refugees and U.S. personnel to safety from Danang and other seaports in South Vietnam. This effort was undertaken in response to urgent appeals from the Government of South Vietnam and in compliance with the humanitarian provisions of the Agreement Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam.

In the days and weeks that followed, the massive North Vietnamese invasion continued. In the face of the overwhelming military power from the North, the Government of South Vietnam has been forced to make a progressive withdrawal of U.S. citizens and their dependents in South Vietnam, together with foreign nationals whose lives were in jeopardy.

On April 26, the defensive lines to the northeast and south of Saigon were breached. The two main airfields and seaport were subjected to rocket attack and the Saigon area received artillery fire. The forces were surrounding Saigon and encircling the city. The situation at the two main airfields deteriorated to the point that it became impossible to [illegible] aircraft and helicopters were damaged and the evacuees of the Government Service became apparent [illegible]. The situation presented a direct and immediate threat to the remaining U.S. personnel and their dependents and allied nationals.

In the circumstances of the massive helicopter flight, I ordered U.S. military forces to proceed by means of military ship [illegible] to accomplish final evacuation [illegible] of remaining U.S. citizens.

In accordance with my duties to keep the Congress fully informed on this matter, and being mindful of the provisions of section 4 of the War Powers Resolution [illegible], I wish to report to you that on April 29, 1975, U.S. [illegible] began [illegible].

[illegible]

A force of 70 evacuation helicopters and 865 Marines evacuated about 1400 U.S. citizens, together with approximately 5500 third country nationals and South Vietnamese, from landing zones in the vicinity of the U.S. Embassy, Saigon, and the Defense Attache Office at Tan Son Nhut Airfield. The last elements of the ground security force departed Saigon at 7:46 P.M. EDT April 29, 1975. Two crew members of a Navy search and rescue helicopter are missing at sea. There are no other known U.S. casualties from this operation, although two U.S. Marines on regular duty in the compound of the Defense Attache Office at Tan Son Nhut Airfield had been killed on the afternoon (EDT) of April 28, 1975, by rocket attacks into a refugee staging area. U.S. fighter aircraft provided protective air cover for this operation, and for the withdrawal by water of a few Americans from Can Tho, and in one instance suppressed North Vietnamese anti-aircraft artillery firing upon evacuation helicopters as they departed. The ground security forces on occasion returned fire during the course of the evacuation operation.

The operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the President's Constitutional executive power and his authority as Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Armed Forces.

The United States Armed Forces performed a very difficult mission most successfully. Their exemplary courage and discipline are deserving of the nation's highest gratitude.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

The Honorable James O. Eastland
President Pro Tempore of the Senate
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

70C Naval vessels used in Refugee Relief in Vietnam

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 30, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PHIL BUCHEN P.W.B.

Enclosed for your signature are letters to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House dealing with the start and accomplishment of the final emergency evacuation from South Vietnam. This notice form has been cleared by State, Defense, NSC, Counsel's Office, and Congressional Relations. It is similar to the communications you sent in connection with Operation Eagle Pull.

There is a deadline for delivering these communications which is 48 hours from the start of the mission. Congressional Relations plans to deliver these letters after you have signed them today, April 30.

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EXECUTIVE
ND18-2/CO1 (Indochina)
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN....
FG6-16
PR5-2
R53

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JUN 20 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES T. LYNN

SUBJECT: Status Report on the Indochina Refugee Resettlement Program - June 20

Per your request, the first of the weekly Vietnam Refugee status reports is attached. If you have any comments or want any additional information, please let me know.

Attachment

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JUN 24 1975
CENTRAL FILES

June 20, 1975

STATUS REPORT ON THE INDOCHINA REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM - JUNE 20

REFUGEE STATUS (as of June 19)

Total Refugees Entered US System		129,387*
Total Released		37,564
U.S.	33,622	
3rd Countries	3,942	
Repatriated	-0-	
Avg. Daily Releases:		
Week ending 6/19:	749	
Week ending 6/12:	796	
In-Camp Population		91,707
Guam	23,693	
Subic Bay	2,155	
Wake Island	6,520	
Other Asian Bases	315	
Eglin AFB	4,518	
Fort Chaffee	22,232	
Camp Pendleton	17,799	
Indiantown Gap	14,475	

PROBLEMS RESOLVED AND MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS

1. Typhoon Threat to Guam Refugee Population

In early June, the Task Force accelerated the outflow of refugees from Guam. Before the end of June there will be 10,500 refugees remaining on Guam and all will be housed in barracks and other permanent facilities.

2. Federal Agency Processing of Security Clearances

The major initial bottleneck in processing was security clearances for refugees. Today, 34,000 refugees in stateside centers have full security clearances but do not have sponsors.

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* 116 in transit.

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3. Public Assistance and Education

The most critical issues in reassuring private sponsors and gaining the assistance and support of State and local governments for the resettlement program have been the questions of Federal Government support for public assistance and education. Progress has been made in dealing with these issues.

HEW has published regulations for the provision of 100% reimbursement to States for welfare, medical assistance, and social services to Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees who require such assistance after they have been resettled in American communities.

In addition, HEW has announced that Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees wishing to enroll in postsecondary institutions this fall will be eligible for financial assistance under the Basic Educational Opportunity Grant and Guaranteed Student Loan programs. HEW will provide to school districts that receive refugee children exceeding 100 students or 1% of the school district's enrollment a one-time financial assistance grant. This grant will vary between $200 and $300 per student, depending on local cost of instruction per pupil and the number of refugee children enrolled in the school district.

4. Third Country Resettlement

Third country resettlement efforts have been stepped up. Last week, Belgium agreed to permit the entry of relatives of Belgian citizens, to allow some 2,000 Vietnamese already in the country to remain, and to establish a resettlement program for a small number of other refugees. More importantly, France has agreed to admit up to 15,000 refugees through December 1 as sponsors are found.

To date, about 4,000 refugees at U.S. reception centers have been released to third countries and approximately 2,500 refugees in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand are being processed for resettlement in third countries.

5. Management Plan

A first draft of the Task Force's Management Plan has been discussed with OMB. OMB will assist the Task Force in finalizing the Management Plan and determining personnel requirements.

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6. GAO Report

On June 16, the General Accounting Office issued its initial report to Congress on the refugee program. It is a fair and generally positive report which highlights some of the processing delays and concern for the typhoon season on Guam.

7. Presidential Report to Congress

The report required by the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, to be submitted on Monday, June 23, has been prepared and is being reviewed by White House staff.

PROBLEMS PENDING

1. Refugees in East Asia

Almost 9,000 Vietnamese and 7,000 Cambodians who fled by their own means and without American assistance to neighboring countries in East Asia after the fall of the Saigon and Phnom Penh regimes are stranded and may in some cases be subject to forcible repatriation to their native countries. Very few will be able to find new homes in these countries and in several instances (Thailand in particular), the refugees are living in difficult conditions. Many wish to come to the United States; some desire to be resettled in Europe and elsewhere. To date, the U.S. has only permitted its former employees and refugees with relatives in the United States to enter the U.S. refugee system. Senators Mansfield and Scott wrote the Attorney General and the Secretary of State on June 17, asking that parole be extended to permit those refugees who cannot find homes elsewhere to come to the United States. We estimate that as many as 6,000 Vietnamese and 3,000 Cambodians will wish to come to the United States. If we accepted them, their total would be significantly below the ceiling of 150,000 which the Attorney General approved. In response to the joint leadership letter, the Task Force is discussing the question with the Department of Justice but no recommendation has yet been made.

2. Repatriation

With the consent of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Task Force has begun to consolidate

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into one stateside center those refugees applying for repatriation. For potential repatriates on Guam and Wake, the Task Force planned a consolidation on Wake. Negative reactions by the repatriates influenced the Task Force not to make the move but, rather, to consolidate them within fixed facilities on Guam. The repatriates are developing some aggressive leadership and we expect them to be making additional demands. The Task Force contemplates possible demonstrations or other acts of disorder if the authorities in Saigon are slow in permitting returns.* The UNHCR has issued several statements recently about favorable progress with authorities in Saigon. Next week, a UNHCR representative will take over 500 completed repatriation applications to Saigon.

To date, 2,079 Vietnamese and Cambodians have expressed a desire to return to their countries.

3. Voluntary Agencies

The voluntary resettlement agencies continue to move more slowly than originally contemplated in identifying and verifying sponsors and processing refugees out of the reception centers. Furthermore, their current projection of 65,000 total placements for individuals falls far short of the number of sponsored placements needed.

For these reasons, negotiations are currently underway with State and local governments, the United Way, AFL-CIO, and other organizations to expedite sponsor solicitation and resettlement.

4. Response to Direct Offers of Assistance

Since the organization of the Task Force, some twenty thousand offers of sponsorship and general assistance from the public have been received. While letters of appreciation (asking for patience) have been sent to these individuals, the Task Force is only just beginning to develop a plan for utilizing this resource. So far, this effort consists of gaining voluntary agency agreements to handle a selected number of these offers, and the completion of a data bank on refugees (family size, job skills, etc.) and a locator system to facilitate matching refugees to potential sponsors.

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* A peaceful demonstration occurred today (June 20) at Fort Chaffee. Details are not yet available.

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The major problem in this project has been, and will be, finding an effective way to channel these offers of assistance into our overall refugee resettlement program. Too much time has elapsed in responding to this generous response from the public and much more lost time will seriously hurt the sponsorship program.

5. Phaseout of Resettlement Centers

In the overall planning for phasing out the refugee reception centers, the Inter-Agency Task Force and the Department of Defense have agreed that two factors - cost effectiveness and cold weather - are the fundamental criteria for determining a phaseout date for the Eglin, Pendleton, and Indiantown Gap facilities. The Eglin facility must be phased out by the end of July because of local political concerns and poor camp conditions. Due to lack of winterized facilities, Pendleton and Indiantown Gap must be phased out by the end of September. Therefore, the Task Force must face the issue of whether or not the Fort Chaffee facility is capable of accommodating the remaining refugees in the system as of October 1. In order to resolve this problem, the IATF will monitor the outflow process on a week-to-week basis.

Should the weekly averages remain at the present level, there will be no need for maintaining more than one center into the fall months, with that center phasing out by the end of November. Should the weekly averages go below present figures, the IATF must expand remaining facilities or open another winterized facility.

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JUN 21 1975

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN....

INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE FOR INDOCHINA
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

C. F.

ND18-2/CO1/Indochina

July 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Mr. James T. Lynn, Director, Office of Management and Budget

FROM: Julia Vadala Taft, Director, Interagency Task Force

SUBJECT: Status Report on the Indochina Refugee Resettlement Program

Attached is the status report on the Indochina Refugee Resettlement Program through July 10, 1975.

Attachment:

As stated.

cc: Dr. Marrs
Mr. Eisenhower
Mr. Semerad
Mr. Cannon
Mr. Oaxaca
Mr. Puritano
Mr. Barri
Mr. Blaydon

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STATUS REPORT ON THE INDOCHINA REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM - JULY 10

REFUGEE STATUS (as of July 10)

Total Refugees Entered US System		130,866
Total Released		52,464
US	47,634	
Third Countries	4,830	
Repatriated	0	
Avg. Daily Releases:		
Week ending 7/10:	687	
Week ending 7/3:	687	
Week ending 6/26:	755	
Week ending 6/19:	749	
Week ending 6/12:	796	
Total in US System		78,402
Total in the Pacific	15,968	
Guam	8,588	
Subic Bay	0	
Wake Island	6,844	
Other Asian Bases	536	
Total US	62,117	
Eglin	4,973	
Fort Chaffee	23,333	
Camp Pendleton	17,978	
Indiantown Gap	15,833	
In Transit	317	

PROBLEMS RESOLVED AND MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS

CLOSING OF SUBIC BAY CENTER

The last refugees left the processing center at Subic Bay in the Philippines July 6. Subic Bay is thus the first of the Pacific centers to close. There remains a total of 15,968 refugees in the U.S. system in the Pacific, at the following locations: Guam 8588, Wake Island 6844, Clark AFB 91, Hickam AFB 109, and Thailand 336.

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REPATRIATES TO GUAM

The majority of the refugees who have asked to be repatriated have now left Camp Pendleton for Guam and those remaining at Pendelton are leaving as military flights are available. Despite fears of demonstrations or possibly more serious disruptions by a small group of agitators who had been criticizing the U.S. for allegedly hindering their return to Vietnam, the flights have proceeded without incident.

VOLUNTARY AGENCIES OPTIMISTIC

The voluntary resettlement agencies have again revised upward their estimates of their own resettlement capabilities. A poll of agency representatives has revealed that the agencies now feel they can resettle 104,000 refugees before the end of the year. Their last estimate, made in late June, was 92,000, an upward revision of a previous estimate of 65,000. The voluntary agencies, therefore, are more confident of their ability to move quickly in resettling refugees than at any time since resettlement began. Voluntary agency ability to meet goals remains to be proved. We continue, therefore, to supplement their efforts by negotiating resettlement contracts with state and local governments (see below) and by trying to interest non-governmental entities in the resettlement task.

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

The Task Force continues to encourage state and local governments to assume responsibility for refugees. We will send an information package to all state governments as soon as the President signs the letter to Governors requesting their support. Cities and counties will receive similar packets explaining ways in which they can help in resettlement. Having concluded contracts with the State of Washington and with Indianapolis the Task Force is in the final stages of negotiations with the State of Maine. Cincinnati has expressed an interest in resettling some 5,000 refugees, and we are studying their proposal.

VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND OTHER PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS AGREE TO COOPERATE

Interagency Task Force officials met July 5 in New York with representatives of the nine voluntary agencies involved in refugee resettlement and with representatives of some five additional non-governmental organizations (NGO's), including United Way and the YMCA. The NGO's expressed their willingness to assist the resettlement agencies in mobilizing community resources to help

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the Indochina refugees, and they agreed to meet with the agencies this week to find ways of coordinating their efforts.

PRINTED MATERIALS FOR REFUGEES

The Task Force has printed and is presently distributing a dual language orientation handbook for Vietnamese refugees. The handbook describes life in America from several facets -- social, economic, governmental -- and is designed for use by refugee and sponsor together.

Also presently in distribution is a 1,500 word Vietnamese-English phrase book, printed by the Red Cross and English-Vietnamese dictionaries.

PROBLEMS PENDING

REPATRIATION EFFORT AT STANDSTILL

There has been no movement in the UNHCR effort to send repatriates home. The authorities in Saigon have not yet been willing to receive repatriates, though the UNHCR has forwarded to Saigon the applications of some 600 Vietnamese who have requested repatriation. In a trial effort last week, the UNHCR made specific repatriation travel arrangements for a group of 44 Vietnamese to fly from Thailand to Saigon, but the PRG refused to allow entry without the return of the tugboat on which the repatriates were located. The U.S. Government has contested the return of the tugboat since it may be American property. The U.S. has refused to allow the tugboat to leave Thailand pending a determination of U.S. legal claims to the asset. The Thais, on the other hand, refused to allow the refugees to land in Thailand. As of this writing, both tugboat and repatriates -- who were under orders to wait off the Thai coast -- are missing. There has been no contact with the boat since early in the week of July 7.

As for Cambodian repatriates, some 340 Khmer Army personnel went home from Thailand in late May and early June as a result of local arrangements without UNHCR involvement. About 100 of them were reliably reported to have been executed. The Royal Thai Government thereupon ceased its efforts to arrange further repatriation of Khmers.

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MEDIA CRITICISM OF ALLEGEDLY HIGH SPONSORSHIP BREAKDOWN RATE

The Washington Post of July 9 carried an article quoting a critic of the refugee resettlement program alleging that the breakdown rate in refugee sponsorship matches is alarmingly high. We believe that the overall breakdown rate is low and that, where breakdowns have taken place, they have occurred primarily among Vietnamese families of American citizens who now find that they are unable to care for their Vietnamese relatives. In most of these cases, refugees exited the U.S. refugee system directly into the hands of their American relative (which they were legally entitled to do) without ever having been handled by a voluntary agency.

Regarding their own resettlement programs, the voluntary agencies have each told us that they are having no particularly serious breakdown problems. All say the breakdown rate is low. The Red Cross has told us that, since the beginning of the resettlement program, only five families have applied for more than one week of emergency assistance.

Although we have no reason to believe that the breakdown rate is higher than for previous refugee programs, we will continue to monitor closely the sponsorship breakdown situation since lasting and effective sponsorship matches are at the heart of the resettlement effort.

GENERAL QUANG

Lieutenant General Dan van Quang, President Thieu's former Special Assistant for Military and Security Affairs who recently entered Canada, has been issued a deportation order by the Canadian authorities. Quang, who the Canadian Immigration Minister is quoted as saying was "guilty of nefarious activities in the drug trade," was asked to leave Canada as soon as he can arrange for admission to another country. Publicly stated U.S. policy on Quang is that we will examine his application if he requests entry here. The U.S. Consulate General in Montreal today received a letter from Quang requesting that he and his family "be authorized to settle in the USA."

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EXECUTIVE
ND 18-2/CO11/Indochina
ST 51-2

The Governor of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

August 1, 1975

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of July 11, 1975, concerning assistance efforts in the resettlement of Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees seeking new homes in the United States.

At the present time, some eleven refugee families have been settled in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and I wish to assure you that they are receiving all of the assistance and benefits to which they are entitled. The several Commonwealth agencies responsible for the provision of the appropriate services have moved to provide this aid in an efficient and rapid manner and will continue to do so when the situation requires it.

For the foreseeable future, however, the Commonwealth will be unable to play a leading role in this important resettlement effort. As you know, we are facing severe economic difficulties with exceptionally high unemployment rates and a diminished number of new job openings available which obviously have far reaching social and economic implications for the population already residing in the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, all families and individuals who may desire to act as sponsors for the Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees who remain to be resettled will be encouraged to do so. Additionally, we shall continue to examine other possibilities for our participation in this humanitarian effort.

Sincerely,

Rafael Hernández-Colón
Governor

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THE STATE OF OHIO
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
STATE HOUSE, COLUMBUS 43215

JAMES A. RHODES
GOVERNOR

James Falk

July 23, 1975

President Gerald R. Ford
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I received your letter of July 11, 1975, requesting the assistance of the State of Ohio in the resettlement of Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees.

We are currently exploring the ways in which agencies of state government in Ohio can offer assistance.

I can assure you that sponsoring families and individuals will have the support of state agencies and private organizations in their efforts to assist refugees seeking homes in this state.

Very respectfully,

James A. Rhodes

JAMES A. RHODES
Governor

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ROBERT W. STRAUB
GOVERNOR

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
STATE CAPITOL
SALEM 97310

July 21, 1975

Jerry
Jack

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In response to your letter of July 11, 1975, concerning the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistant Act of 1975: Please be assured that I will direct and encourage state agency and private organization support of sponsoring families and individuals in the State of Oregon.

I have serious concerns, however, that these displaced persons will not find gainful employment in Oregon. Oregon's rate of unemployment is substantially higher than the national rate.

Additionally, Mr. President, two recent actions by federal agencies have seriously compounded this problem in Oregon.

The inexplicable decision by the Secretary of Labor to reduce Oregon's allocation of Comprehensive Employment and Training Act funds for fiscal 1976 threatens to cripple Oregon's vigorous CETA efforts.

To illustrate the impact of the misallocation, Mr. President, I must inform you that Oregon will have to lay off two-thirds of our CETA work force. This will be accomplished by laying off 8 to 10 percent of the remaining workers each month through the balance of this fiscal year.

That will aggravate a critical unemployment situation. And we will be forced to spend at least $1.6 million of CETA funds on unemployment insurance costs -- money that would be far better spent on jobs.

I would remind you, as I have reminded the Secretary of Labor, that it was at his urging that Oregon redoubled its efforts to provide CETA jobs in February, March, and

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April of this year. Just nine days after my inauguration, I signed an Executive Order revitalizing the Governor's Manpower Services Council, to implement manpower planning and services in Oregon, in accordance with the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973. This so improved our CETA program that other states seek our counsel in developing their CETA programs.

I find it odd, Mr. President, that DOL encouraged our deep commitments to this worthy program and now seems determined to leave us high and dry.

I urge you, as I have urged the Secretary of Labor, to re-examine this decision.

My second point is this: There are an estimated 15,000 to 28,000 illegal aliens in Oregon. Many of them are drawing wages and salaries.

The Oregon District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Services knows where these aliens are. He has neither the personnel nor budget to control them.

Here in Salem, one check at a mushroom factory resulted in the arrest and deportation of 100 illegal aliens; 17 were arrested and deported after a check at two restaurants in Portland; 80 illegal aliens were arrested at and deported from orchards near Hood River and 70 more were arrested at and deported from farm labor jobs in the Medford area.

The Oregon District Director has informed my staff that with a very modest increase in his budget -- enough to hire and provide support services for 10 additional personnel -- he could reduce the number of illegal aliens in Oregon's work force by at least 15,000 persons.

I'd like to put 15,000 unemployed Oregonians in those jobs, Mr. President. That would reduce our unemployment rate by 1.5 percentage points -- or to about the national average.

But the Oregon District Director's budget has been cut by 60 percent during the next three months. Instead of reducing the number of illegal aliens holding jobs in Oregon, their number will increase during a period of low enforcement and high demand for farm labor.

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I fail to see how that makes any sense.

Mr. President, Oregonians are generous and hospitable people. We are anxious to help Indochinese refugees in any way we can. Your assistance in resolving the two problems described above will go a long way in helping us provide meaningful employment not only for those displaced persons but for our own citizens as well.

Very respectfully yours,

Governor

RWS:s

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STATE OF ALABAMA

GOVERNOR'S OFFICE

MONTGOMERY 36104

GEORGE C. WALLACE
GOVERNOR

July 31, 1975

James Falk

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

My dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of July 11, 1975 concerning the Refugee Resettlement Program.

I am, of course, concerned with the plight of these people who, through necessity, have been uprooted from their homes. Over four hundred Vietnamese have been placed in Alabama under this program to the present time. We will continue to work with organizations and individuals in an effort to place as many refugees as we can.

Your efforts in bringing this program to my attention are appreciated.

Very respectfully yours,

George C Wallace

George C. Wallace
Governor

GCW:jdw

EXECUTIVE

ND 18-2/CO 1 (Indochina)
ST 18

State of Louisiana
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Baton Rouge

EDWIN EDWARDS
GOVERNOR

September 13, 1975

Honorable Gerald Ford
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Mr. President:

filed Same

This is in reply to your letter dated July 11, 1975, regarding the Indochina Refugee Resettlement Program and to advise you of the progress being made in Louisiana in resettling Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees.

Approximately 2,400 Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees have been resettled in Louisiana through the efforts of voluntary resettlement agencies. If the present trend continues, we estimate that 5,000 to 6,000 Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees will have been resettled in Louisiana by the end of 1975.

Unfortunately, the State of Louisiana will be unable to participate as a resettlement agency; however, all appropriate State agencies and State resources will be used in coordinating supportive activities in assisting voluntary resettlement agencies in the total resettlement effort.

All the voluntary resettlement agencies in the State have done and are continuing to do a remarkable job in the processing and resettling of refugees in Louisiana. We believe that it would be a duplication of efforts and services if the State elected to become a resettlement agency. The State can provide a more useful service by directing and coordinating appropriate State resources, including manpower if necessary, in assisting the voluntary resettlement agencies. I have, therefore, delegated the responsibility of liaison and program activities to the Louisiana Health and Human Resources Administration, Division of Family Services, reporting directly to Mr. Dan Borne', my Chief Executive Assistant. Mr. Borne' will direct and coordinate all the State Government activities in working with and assisting the voluntary resettlement agencies.

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Please be assured of the deep concern of Louisianians in this humanitarian endeavor. When I can be of further assistance, please advise.

Sincerely,

EDWIN EDWARDS

EE:bdh
c: Mr. John S. D. Eisenhower, Chairman
President's Advisory Committee on Refugees
Washington, D. C. 20506

Mrs. Julia Vadala Taft, Director
Interagency Task Force
Washington, D. C. 20506

Mr. Stuart Clarke, Regional Director
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Regional Office
1114 Commerce Street
Dallas, Texas 75202

Mr. Floyd D. Brandon, Commissioner
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Regional Office
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Mr. Jerry Stephens
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Regional Office
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SUITE 210, 201 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.E. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002 (202) 544-4250

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February 6, 1975

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

We, the undersigned Members of Congress for Peace through Law, write to you on a matter of very great concern -- the extent and direction of the continuing U.S. involvement in Indochina.

What particularly disturbs us is the clear implication in remarks made by the Secretary of State and the Vice President and by yourself in a recent news conference that this only partly resolved issue -- one of the most divisive in the nation's history -- is being re-opened for debate. We had thought that the American military withdrawal, the Peace Agreements negotiated by the Administration and the clearly and repeatedly expressed Congressional mandate to gradually eliminate the American role in Indochina had settled the matter. Apparently, that is not the case.

We remain resolute in our conviction, supported by the legislation passed in the 93rd Congress, that continuing American military and economic involvement in Indochina will not bring that unhappy region closer to a lasting peace. While continuing high levels of American assistance may perhaps prolong the life of the incumbent South Vietnamese and Cambodian governments, we can see no humanitarian or national interest that justifies the cost of this assistance to our country. Although the phased withdrawal of American support will not in itself bring peace to the region, it is equally clear that its continuation will not do so either.

Another prolonged disagreement over events in Vietnam and our policy there may well lead to acrimonious accusations over who "lost" Indochina, reminiscent of the China debate over two decades ago. The result of that earlier experience was to freeze U.S. options in Asia for a quarter of a century. We must at all costs avoid a repetition of such a struggle which would set the Congress against the Executive.

It is especially unfortunate that the internal debate over Indochina should resume at a time when we are confronted by so many pressing domestic and international problems. These problems do not have easy solutions. They require an extraordinary degree of accord between our two branches of government and among the industrialized and developing nations.

This is not the time for another divisive debate that can only impede the development of the cooperation so necessary in dealing with the complex problems of global inflation, domestic recession, and growing shortages of necessary raw materials. Instead, we need to work together.

We believe the time is now at hand when our government must make a decision, too long postponed at a tragically high cost to both the people of Indochina and to our own citizens as to how we will extricate ourselves from the situation in Southeast Asia once and for all.

We write to ask you and your most senior advisers to accept this expression of our views in a spirit of conciliation. We should get on with the important work ahead of us. Innovative leadership both from you and the Congress will be needed more than ever.

Accordingly, we are prepared for a serious, unemotional dialogue on the immediate problem of ending our involvement in Indochina responsibly and honorably. We are not prepared for it to continue indefinitely.

Sincerely,

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(List of signatories follows on next page)

SENATE

Dick Clark
James Abourezk
Alan Cranston
Philip A. Hart
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William D. Hathaway
Mark O. Hatfield
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John V. Tunney
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cc: The Secretary of State

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Senator Nunn's Report on Vietnam

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Senator Sam Nunn has just issued a report on his recent trip to South Vietnam. His assessment of the situation there basically supports our requests for supplemental assistance. A copy of the report is at Tab A.

The key points of his report are as follows:

-- By their own admission the North Vietnamese have made it clear they have no intention of working to revive the 1973 Peace Accords, but are determined instead to press for the total defeat of the South by any means at their disposal.

-- There has been a continued flow of Soviet and Chinese military aid to the North, including such highly technical items as anti-aircraft artillery weaponry.

-- American organization, tactics and sophisticated equipment made the Vietnamese dependent on the United States for the day to day items -- even food -- to operate their armed forces.

-- The situation in South Vietnam today is one where the South Vietnamese have large amounts of sophisticated American equipment but are running out of ammunition, gasoline and daily supplies; the North Vietnamese have large stockpiles of ammunition, gasoline and day to day supplies which can be replenished with their improved transportation system.

-- Without continued assistance from the United States as to these crucial items failure will inevitably result. With this assistance, failure could still result through inadequate motivation and dedication on the part of the South Vietnamese. Failure in this eventuality would not be caused by American default.

-- American policy in Southeast Asia will, to some degree, affect our credibility throughout the rest of the world. Neither those subscribing to the Domino theory nor those who believe it ludicrous are making more than a calculated guess. One thing is certain -- if South Vietnam falls because they have run out of ammunition, we will all find out the effect on the American position throughout the world.

-- In answering the question about the future course of U.S. aid to South Vietnam there are four basic choices:

1. Cut off all aid to South Vietnam.

2. Provide massive open-ended U.S. financial assistance.

3. Continue the current practice of looking at aid to Vietnam anew each year.

4. The final option -- which I (Nunn) favor and I pose for your consideration -- is, after about a two year transition period, provide South Vietnam a level of aid based on the estimated level of aid received by North Vietnam from China and the Soviet Union.

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AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS

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815 SIXTEENTH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

(202) 637-5000

April 18, 1975

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Mr. William Seidman
Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Seidman:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I have sent today to members of the following Congressional committees:

Senate Armed Services
Senate Foreign Relations
House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittees on Defense of the Senate and
House Appropriations Committee
House Armed Services Committee

I thought you might want to bring this letter and enclosures to the attention of the President.

Sincerely,

George Meany

President

Enclosures

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

GEORGE MEANY
PRESIDENT

LANE KIRKLAND
SECRETARY-TREASURER

JOSEPH D. KEENAN
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April 18, 1975

TO: Selected Members of Congress

On January 10, in a letter to President Ford and Congressional leaders, I took issue with those who contended that the refusal to extend further American aid to South Vietnam would bring an end to the fighting and the killing. I said that while the fighting might stop, the killing would not.

In the last several days, cables from South Vietnam to our State Department relay shocking accounts of systematic Communist terrorism against civilian populations. I have attached, and strongly urge you to read, summaries of these reports. I am also attaching excerpts from the "ten-point policy toward the newly liberated areas" issued by the "Revolutionary Administration" in South Vietnam.

These grim developments, reviewed in the light of North Vietnam's long history of using systematic terrorism to consolidate its power, suggest that the bloodbath many of us have feared would follow a Communist takeover of the South has in fact begun. The reports we have undoubtedly reveal only the tip of the iceberg.

Yet, the facts about how the Communists are treating the people they have conquered are not being well publicized. Very well publicized, on the other hand, have been statements by North Vietnam's Mme. Binh promising "respect for democratic liberties" in the newly "liberated" areas.

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New reports of atrocities pour in by the hour. They underscore the very real personal danger that tens--if not hundreds--of thousands of Vietnamese face at this moment. I refer not only to government officials (down to the hamlet and village level), military personnel and the like, but to trade union leaders and independent political and religious figures. Moreover, should Hanoi seek to duplicate its forced agricultural collectivization program in the South, countless more will be liquidated.

Even Hanoi's General Giap, looking back on the Communist dictatorship in North Vietnam, wrote, in 1956:

> "...We made too many deviations and executed too many honest people.... Torture came to be regarded as a normal practice during party reorganization."

After the Tet offensive of 1968, when 5700 civilians in the city of Hue were murdered by Communist terror squads, Douglas Pike--one of the country's leading experts on Vietnam--was moved to speculate on what would happen if the Communists took over South Vietnam:

> "A curtain of ignorance would descend. There would begin a night of long knives.... All political opposition, actual or potential, would be systematically eliminated.... But little of this would be known abroad. The Communists in Vietnam would create a silence. The world would call it peace."

The "curtain of ignorance" has already descended over Cambodia. Will it now descend over South Vietnam?


For many years to come Americans will debate whether we should have got involved in Vietnam in the first place or whether we should have withdrawn as we did. But in this tragic hour I believe these questions must be put aside in the interest of concentrating on the most important issue now before us: <u>saving the hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese who face certain destruction because they stood by our side.</u> We have a moral obligation here that cannot be denied. If we do not stand by these desperate people, how can we ever claim to conduct a credible foreign policy?

Even if the Congress has decided--wrongly in our view--to write off the country of South Vietnam, it simply cannot and must not abandon the masses of human beings who will pay with their lives for their loyalty to us. If the doctrine of "detente"

retains any meaning, then let it now be put to the test. Let us make it clear to the Soviet Union and China that we expect their cooperation in restraining Hanoi, and that detente will never survive the slaughter of our friends in South Vietnam.

I urge your support for whatever steps are necessary, including the use of American troops, to facilitate the evacuation of our entrapped allies. Bold and forthright action by the United States, right now, in behalf of our own moral principles, would send a message to our allies and "potential adversaries" throughout the world and perhaps restore some of that sense of hope in America's role in the world that has been so badly damaged in recent months.

Sincerely,



President

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Enclosures

P.S. I have just learned that Peter Nguyen Huy Trai, the Bishop of Ban Me Thuot, and two priests have been tried by a "People's Court" and executed. In addition, Paul Nguyen Van Hoa, the Bishop of Phan Thiet, and four priests have also been executed. This, I fear, is just the beginning.

Hanoi's "10-Point Policy"

The "Revolutionary Administration" in South Vietnam has broadcast, via "Liberation Radio," a "10-point policy toward the newly liberated areas." Among the 10-points are the following:

"Abolish all the reactionary political parties and factions and all other political organizations which were lackeys of the U.S. imperialists and the puppet administration."

* * *

"Strictly forbid all activities creating divisiveness, hatred, and suspicion among the people and among the various nationalities."

* * *

"Everyone in the liberated areas...must maintain public order and security and support the revolution. The People's Revolutionary Administration will resolutely and promptly smash all enemy schemes and acts of sabotage and counterattacks;...it will severely punish those who oppose the Revolutionary Administration, sabotage public order and security...and encroach or sabotage property managed by the Revolutionary Administration."

* * *

"All reactionary, depraved and brain-poisoning organizations and activities of the U.S. imperialists and the puppet administration are banned."

* * *

"Those who resist the revolution will be seriously punished."

("Seriously punished" is the euphemism employed by the "People's Courts" for execution.)

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Communist Terror

The following incidents have been reported to the U.S. Embassy in Saigon and are based on eye-witness accounts:

* Approximately 100,000 people trying to cross a river near the Phu Bon border were set upon by North Vietnamese troops who poured mortar and recoilless rifle fire into the crowd. According to witnesses, all of the 100,000 were either killed or captured. A nun reports that when the convoy passed near the downstream of Dong Cam Dam, soldiers told her the water behind the dam was choked with bodies.

* Near Pleiku City, a priest, Father Cong, was killed on the spot when he walked out in front of a group of his parishioners to talk to Vietcong who barred their way.

* In Bon Me Thuot, several thousand people were assembled by North Vietnamese troops and told to sit down. Local "PRG" cadre walked through the crowd and removed 300 people known to be GVN employees and police. The cadre delivered a harangue accusing the 300 of being American lackeys and spies, and enemies of the people. The 300 were then all shot and killed. The families of the 300 were led out of town. A monk who witnessed the scene reports that he saw mortar explosions in the midst of the people. As the families ran they were shot at.

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* An officer on the SS TransColorado reports "...women, children, even a nun, were found to have had their hands and feet blown off or mutilated by the advancing North Vietnamese forces."

* On the outskirts of Danang, local VC forces have carried out brutal executions. GVN policemen were beheaded, and groups of soldiers were tied together and killed with grenades.

* On March 14, a mixed RVNAF-Civilian group of five or six thousand people trying to get to the coast were set upon by enemy soldiers, who began driving 15 trucks at high speed through the crowd, the drivers apparently trying to kill as many people as they could. 50-60 were thus killed.

* In the highlands, South Vietnamese soldiers captured from a convoy between Phu Tuc and Son Hea were taken to Phu Sen for detention. Rather than leave the necessary number of guards with the soldiers, the NVA shot them through the feet so they could not run away. The number of soldiers was put at "over 200."

(more)

* March 28-30, the enemy set up a mortar position near the Trinh Minh The Bridge and shelled people massed on the quay, hoping for evacuation. About 50 people were killed, many more wounded.

* The Truong hamlet, near Ban Me Therot, peopled entirely by 1954 refugees from the North was attacked by 6 or 7 tanks. After furiously resisting, the hamlet ran out of ammunition and all but a handful of the surviving population took refuge in the local church. Additional enemy tanks rolled in and shelled the church to rubble, killing all inside.

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* * *

Addendum

Since the above list was compiled, from U.S. Embassy cables, we have received the following accounts from the CVT, South Vietnam's confederation of labor. The accounts are rough because they were reported by telephone from Saigon on April 18, 1975.

As in the case of every other Communist takeover in every other country, the free trade union movement is an early and specially-targeted victim:

* In Quang Tin, they rounded up all of the police force. Some were shot out of hand. With others, they drove nails through their heels, wired them together and led them off to the jungle. That was the last seen of them. Some of the military were also treated in the same way.

* In Danang, CVT officers were arrested, required to turn over all of their records. The CVT members of the transportation workers (lambretta drivers, etc.) were pressed into driving supplies to the front. This report was received from a CVT man who escaped and was barely coherent.

* At Ban Me Thuot, one of the CVT people escaped from there. The population of the town was assembled and divided into different categories. All of the leading citizens were taken away and have not been seen since. The males between 16 and 22 were drafted into the military forces and sent directly into combat. Each family was re-designated and put into a peoples' union to mobilize a labor force and were subject to "peoples' justice." The former union officials were put on a non-subsistence ration.

(more)

* In Binh Long, the plantation workers' representative was shot and others were arrested.

* In Binh Duong, the president of the CVT local was arrested and one of the CVT cadre was shot.

* In Quang Ngai, the president of the CVT provincial council was arrested.

* In Quang Tin, the secretary general of the CVT provincial council was arrested, together with all other members of the council. They have not been seen since the fall of Danang.

* In Pleiku, both of the CVT provincial representatives were arrested.

* In Kontum, the provincial council was captured and has not been seen or heard of since.

* In Hue, the president of the provincial council was arrested, and the CVT has no details of what has happened.

* In Dalat, the same situation prevails.

* In Nahtrang, the president of the railway workers' union, who is also the vice president of the CVT council and leader of the workers' party, was sought out and arrested and the CVT has no further word of his whereabouts or fate.

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MEMORANDUM

7505 C. F. VIA FM C0165-1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

INFORMATION
November 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES

SUBJECT: U.S. Reciprocal Steps Towards North Vietnam

State proposed to the Secretary November 8 some modest steps whereby we could lessen our public hostility toward Vietnam, and reciprocate for the recent release of the nine American prisoners. State suggested five options and Assistant Secretary Habib recommended the first two. Ken Quinn's November 11 memo to me (Tab A) summarizes the options.

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MICROFILM DATA
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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
MR93-50, #02; NSC ltr 11/27/95
By LH NARA, Date 1/16/97
DEC 17 1975
CENTRAL FILES

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

November 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THOMAS J. BARNES

FROM: KENNETH M. QUINN

SUBJECT: U.S. Reciprocal Steps Towards North Vietnam

As I informed you yesterday, Jim Rosenthal would not provide us a copy of the memorandum which Habib has sent to the Secretary recommending certain positive steps we could take towards North Vietnam to reciprocate for their release of nine American prisoners. He did allow me to take notes.

The five options which Habib outlined for the Secretary are as follows:

-- Expand the type of private assets the U.S. Government will license for shipment to North Vietnam. Presently we are only allowing strictly "humanitarian" items such as food and drugs to be shipped by private citizens and organizations in the U.S. Under this option this category would be expanded to include some "economic" items.

-- Enlarge the categories within which we will approve the waiver of passport restrictions on travel to North Vietnam.

-- The U.S. to take the initiative to move forward on the issue of protecting powers for ourselves and the PRG. The PRG has designated the Algerians as their protecting power in the U.S. We have asked the French to look after our assets in Saigon. Neither has been given permission to carry out this task. Within this option we would propose to the PRG, through the French, that we move ahead to resolve this problem on a reciprocal basis.

-- Removing bunker restrictions placed on third country ships which call in Vietnam. Currently ships which visit Vietnam cannot bunker in the U.S. if they have called in Vietnam or Cambodia either 180 days prior to their visit or if they will visit Vietnam 120 days after bunkering in the U.S.

-- Remove the controls on the transportation of USG finance cargo from U.S. ports by vessels which called in North Vietnamese ports after January 25, 1966. NSAM 340 recorded the President's decision that no vessel which had called in North Vietnam after the above date would be allowed to move a

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SECRET

MR 93-50, #33; NSC ltr 11/27/95
By ut NARA, Date 1/16/97

USG finance cargo from a U.S. port. This affects a great deal of cargo which is financed under USAID and PL-480 contracts.

Habib has recommended to the Secretary that he agree to the first two options. So far, I have no word that the Secretary has focused on this problem.

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EXECUTIVE (3)
CO165-1
ND8
CO1-3
FG32

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 19, 1976

Dear Pete:

Thank you for your letter of December 17 in which you were joined by a number of your colleagues in urging that the United States establish normal diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Last December in Hawaii, I stated that in our relations with Indochina the healing effects of time would be required. I indicated that our policies toward the new regimes there would be determined by their attitudes toward us and particularly toward their neighbors. Restraint and a constructive approach to international problems on their behalf will not go unnoticed. Thus, we will continue to observe North Vietnamese actions. We are prepared to reciprocate gestures of goodwill -- particularly the return of the remains of Americans killed or missing in action, or the receipt of information about them. We have, for example, permitted the shipment of additional private humanitarian assistance to Vietnam in response to the return by Vietnam of the remains of three of our pilots.

Obtaining the fullest possible accounting of those American servicemen still listed as missing or in other status in Southeast Asia is one of the important determinants of our relations with Vietnam. Therefore, progress in our relations will depend heavily on the North Vietnamese living up to their obligation regarding our missing men, as well as on other indications of a readiness to enter a constructive relationship. However, let me reiterate our attitude that if these new regimes deal constructively with our concerns, a gradual improvement of relations between us would be possible.

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GRF: NSC: JEB:
Green Copies used for name file

Copy

I share your desire to place behind us the history of antagonism and conflict in Indochina that has affected both our international relations and our domestic affairs. I am confident that we share the goals of a peaceful, stable and constructive relationship with all countries, including those of Indochina.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

The Honorable Fortney H. Stark, Jr.
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

MEMORANDUM

27

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

Tabs I & A retyped 2/8

February 5, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES

SUBJECT: Reply to a Letter to the President from Fifteen Members of Congress

Fifteen members of the Congress have written to the President urging that we establish normal diplomatic relations with North Vietnam (Tab B).

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President transmitting a suggested reply (Tab A) to this letter. Our letter takes a tougher stand than that which the State Department working level would prefer. We think toughness is necessary for the following reasons:

-- Most of the signers of the letter have been harsh critics of the Administration's Indochina policy.

-- The National League of Families recently endorsed a strong bargaining position on MIA's (Tab C).

-- The House MIA Select Committee has been forthcoming in its discussions with North Vietnamese leaders and may have encouraged their expectations of receiving aid from us.

This letter would signal that we fully expect the North Vietnamese to account for all our men before they receive any major concessions from us.

Les Janka, Max Friedersdorf and Ted Marrs concur.

Robert Orben's office has cleared the text of the proposed letter.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

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Pro Recognition Republic of Vietnam

12-20

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

December 17, 1975

President Gerald R. Ford
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to urge that you announce recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and establish normal diplomatic relations, including the exchange of diplomatic representatives, with that government.

MF

Since the takeover of South Vietnam last spring, we have understood the reasons for and the motivations behind the "wait and see" attitude toward future relations with Vietnam. We believe now, however, that significant changes have taken place which merit recognition and normalization of relations.

One important change, of course, is the decision by the north and south to unite as one Vietnam. In addition, we note that the Vietnamese have taken initiatives which indicate an interest in relations: these include the release of nine missionaries who had been held since last March, their acceptance of a ship of some 1600 refugees who left Guam to return to Vietnam, and business representations to at least one U.S. corporation. Recent reports indicate that Premier Pham Van Dong might even be interested in visiting the United States.

We have also noted that the three basic tenets our government usually requires for recognition have been met by the government of Vietnam. These include effective control over the territory and the population, organized governmental administration of that territory, and a capacity to act effectively to conduct foreign relations and fulfill international obligations.

Our Vietnam policy for many years has been an embarrassment. We think it's time for a change. Recognition would enable the U.S. to play a legitimate economic, cultural and political role in an area of the world ever growing in significance; it would permit Vietnamese-Americans a chance to renew ties with their loved ones still in Vietnam; it would enable us to make further gains in resolving the problems of missing

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

November 11, 1975

President Gerald R. Ford
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to urge that you announce completion of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and establish normal diplomatic relations, including the exchange of diplomatic representatives, with that government.

Since the takeover of South Vietnam last spring, we have welcomed the chance for and the opportunities behind the "peace and food" initiative toward future relations with Vietnam by Hanoi. However, there significant changes have taken place which warrant reexamination and reevaluation of relations.

One important change, of course, is the decision by the North and South to unite as one Vietnam. In addition, we note that the Vietnamese have taken assistance with humanitarian problems in relations. These include the release of the Americans who had been held since last March, their acceptance of a total of some 1,010 refugees who left Saigon to remain in Vietnam, and increased cooperation on the issue of MIA's' accounting. Recent reports indicate that Premier Pham Van Dong might soon be interested in visiting the United States.

We have also noted that the Hanoi government has made a number of conciliatory statements about relations with the United States. These include efforts to control and limit the excesses of the new government, and the necessity for reconstruction of their country, and a desire to be on friendly terms with foreign countries and to fulfill international obligations.

The Vietnamese people have been through an extraordinary ordeal in a very short period. Recognition would enable the U.S. to play a beneficial economic, cultural and political role in the area of the world most pressing in humanitarian need. It would permit Vietnamese-American citizens a chance to reunite with their loved ones still in Vietnam. It would enable us to take further steps in resolving the problems of missing

Americans in Vietnam; it would offer the Vietnamese people an alternative to total dependence on either the Soviet Union or China; it would offer commercial opportunities for American businesses. Perhaps most important it would prevent us from isolating ourselves against Vietnam as we did for so many years with China and Cuba without gaining any benefits.

In light of all these considerations, we believe the time has come for the United States to take the initiative to extend formal recognition, as about 90 other nations have already done. We hope you will take action in this regard without delay.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

Fortney H. Stark, Jr.

Robert W. Kastenmeier

Don Edwards

George E. Brown, Jr.

Bella S. Abzug

Michael Harrington

Stephen J. Solarz

Robert F. Drinan

Edward W. Pattison

Frederick W. Richmond

Ronald V. Dellums

Elizabeth Holtzman

Norman Y. Mineta

Benjamin S. Rosenthal

Jerry M. Patterson



4636

C. F.

CO 165-2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 (C)
NSC Ltr. 4/12/89 NR 88-15, #2
By KBH Date 5/17/89

October 24, 1974

Dear Mr. President:

I very much appreciated meeting with Foreign Minister Bac and receiving from him your letter of September 19.

American policy toward Vietnam remains unchanged under this Administration. We continue strongly to support your government's efforts to defend and to promote the independence and well-being of the South Vietnamese people. We also remain confident in the courage, determination and skill of the South Vietnamese people and armed forces.

I fully understand and share your concern about the current situation in the Republic of Vietnam, particularly the growing Communist military threat which you now face. I am also well aware of the critical necessity of American military and economic aid for your country. I give you my firm assurance that this Administration will continue to make every effort to provide the assistance you need.

Although I would welcome the opportunity to meet with you to discuss ways and means to achieve a genuine and lasting peace in South Vietnam, prior commitments preclude such a meeting at this time. But I hope that such a meeting can be arranged in the future.

I agree with you that it is essential that my government clearly indicate its support for your government

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and for the full implementation of the Paris Agreements. I believe my public statement of October 9, my meeting with Foreign Minister Bac and Deputy Defense Secretary Clement's visit to Saigon all clearly demonstrate that we are standing firm in our commitments to you. We have also conveyed to other powers having an interest in Vietnam that we continue to support your government and that we favor a complete implementation of the Paris Agreements. I shall take advantage of other occasions to show my support for your government and for the peace that we achieved together.

Our countries have been through many difficult times together. It appears likely that we shall face other difficulties in the future. I am confident, however, that these problems can be overcome if we work together to meet them with strength and determination.

With best wishes for you and for the valiant people of the Republic of Vietnam.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

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His Excellency
Nguyen Van Thieu
President of the Republic
of Vietnam
Saigon

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1024746880

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.

4636

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

October 22, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER HK

SUBJECT: Suggested Reply to a Letter to You from South Vietnam President Thieu

President Thieu has written you (Tab B) requesting a meeting with you to restate our common goals and discuss ways to achieve peace in Indochina. The letter also asks that the United States "once again unmistakably demonstrate" its support for a serious implementation of the Paris Agreement and for the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. The letter was personally presented to you by South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Bac during your October 5 meeting.

The letter is an obvious request for a public demonstration of our continued support for President Thieu's government, most likely occasioned by recent political unrest in Saigon.

I do not believe the time is right for a meeting, nor is one necessary. A suggested reply from you indicating this is at Tab A. Your reply states that your schedule is too full to permit a meeting and expresses hope that one can be arranged for the future. To soften this blow to Thieu, the remainder of your letter is extremely supportive and includes a reference to your October 9 statement which calls for adequate aid to South Vietnam.

Paul Theis has seen the draft letter and approves.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

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CO165-1
Dispatched by
S/S-RM
4/15/75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE FOR: JON HOWE
TAIPEI

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

VIA:

REF: Taipei 241

The following are talking points which the Vice President may use in his April 16 meeting with Tran Van Lam, President of the Vietnamese Senate:

-- I want to reassure you that President Ford and his Administration are working very hard to get the additional military and economic aid that your country needs.

-- The President views this aid request as a most urgent matter and for this reason asked the Congress to act on it by April 19.

-- It is important that you and your government understand that the Congress may not meet this deadline; and a final vote may come after April 19.

-- Therefore, if the Congress does not act before April 19, this does not necessarily mean that the Congress has refused to grant any aid.

-- We have all been very impressed by the ARVN's valiant stand at Xuan Loc (SWAN LOCK). This victory has come at the right time. It has demonstrated to the Congress and the American public that your soldiers do have the will to stand and fight.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
KR 5-3-85

Sanitized version of document Let 12/84

FYI: You should know that we have several reports that Tran Van Lam's discouragement about future U.S. assistance when he returned to Vietnam after an earlier visit to the United States contributed heavily to Thieu's decision to pull back his forces into more defensible positions. End FYI.

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4-17

JACK BROOKS
9TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

COUNTIES:
CHAMBERS
GALVESTON
HARRIS (N.E. SECTOR)
JEFFERSON

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

COMMITTEES:
JUDICIARY
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
CHAIRMAN
JOINT COMMITTEE ON
CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS
CHAIRMAN

April 17, 1975

The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

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Dear Mr. President:

This is an urgent appeal to you to act at once to remove all American citizens from South Vietnam. There can no longer be any doubt that further delay in evacuating them jeopardizes their lives. With enemy troops virtually on the outskirts of Saigon and with the two major airports available for evacuation flights already threatened, immediate action is imperative.

I have been deeply disturbed by the testimony of administration witnesses this week before several congressional committees, including my Legislation and National Security Subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee. From the evidence made available to us, it appears that none of the present actions in South Vietnam are directed at removing all U. S. personnel.

In view of the indecisiveness of the U. S. Ambassador to Vietnam and the State Department in the face of this mounting threat to American lives, I was all the more disturbed to learn this morning that you responded to a question at a convention of newspaper editors by stating the tragic events in South Vietnam would not have occurred if the military aid you requested had been provided. I supported $150 billion in appropriations for assistance to Vietnam, as you did, and I honestly question whether additional military funds can save the unfortunately demoralized ARVN.

Last week, I listened with approval when, in your address to Congress, you called for national unity on this painful issue. You said then, repeating earlier similar assurances, that you would not engage in recriminations or attempt to assess blame. Your statement yesterday, coupled with Vice President Nelson Rockefeller's statement that events in Indochina "had the makings" of a political issue in 1976, carries dangerous implications of divisiveness within our country.

There will be a time for the American people to make their judgment on the role of the United States in Indochina. But now the immediate need is for action to speed the departure of all U. S. personnel remaining in South Vietnam. I know you take most seriously your constitutional duty to protect American citizens. Surely, each day's delay in evacuating those remaining in South Vietnam threatens not only their lives, but increases the probability that large numbers of American troops will have to be reintroduced into South Vietnam to protect them. That eventuality must not be allowed to happen.

With every good wish and confidence that, together, this country can move forward to meet this crisis and the other problems confronting us, I am

Sincerely,

Jack Brooks

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FROM: JACK BROOKS, M.C.
NINTH DISTRICT, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN....

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

250

C. F.
CO165-2

INFORMATION
January 19, 1976

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: State Department Report on Life in South Vietnam

Our Embassy in Bangkok has prepared an airgram on "Life in South Vietnam" (Tab A) which reports the observations of three non-Vietnamese who recently left Saigon -- a Korean, a Cambodian, and a New Zealander. They all speak Vietnamese fluently, had lived in Vietnam a long time, and had numerous contacts there. They departed between November 19 and December 5.

The key points which these three observers made to our Embassy officers in Bangkok are as follows:

-- The mood in Saigon is one of despair, suspicion, and hardship. Many people have fallen into bitter self-recrimination for not having done something in time to prevent the Communist victory.

-- The NVA are living interspersed among the civilian population. There are frequent nighttime block or precinct meetings that often turn into denunciation sessions, making each person suspicious of his neighbor. These meetings also have a people's court aspect in which a show of hands of those attending determines the punishment for a person accused of past or present misdeeds. The offender is then led away to an unknown destination.

-- Unemployment remains high, with no prospects for change in sight.

-- Prices are rising daily in Saigon, despite official, fixed prices that even the state stores do not respect. Cigarettes are ten times more expensive than on April 30. A person is limited to fifteen kilos of rice per month and to beef twice a month.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
MR93-50, #24; NSC Ltr. 11/27/95
By LET NARA, Date 11/16/97

CONFIDENTIAL

JAN 26 1976
CENTRAL FILES

-- There continues to be a migration into the countryside. People who have gone to farm in the new economic areas are discouraged by the government requirement that they turn over 50 percent of their rice production to the authorities.

-- The NVA in Saigon always seem to have money; they buy Seiko watches, radios, cameras, U.S. Army shoes, bicycles and Samsonite luggage.

-- Corruption is as bad now as under the GVN. One of the most popular forms is black marketeering. NVA soldiers purchase large quantities of items such as soap, sugar, and cigarettes and resell them on the black market. Another popular form of corruption is under-the-table transactions to facilitate bureaucratic processing or a favorable decision. Finally, there are the shake-downs to avoid arrest or re-education.

-- Resistance continues in several areas. In the central highlands resistance forces recently cut Highway 20 to Dalat, the principal source of vegetables for the Saigon area. Closer to Saigon, many people say the Communists have only daytime control of certain areas north of the city, and there are reports of elements who make forays along the coast. In the Mekong Delta, the Hoa Hao Buddhists continue to resist in provinces near the Cambodian border.

-- Travel within South Vietnam remains difficult, Saigonese are free to leave the city only to travel to a new economic area or their home villages.

-- All schools are now in the hands of the government. The new authorities use class time at some high schools to form the students into self-defense units. Some especially "revolutionary" students carry AK-47's and pistols with them at all times in school.

-- A high-ranking NVA official is inhabiting the Ambassador's residence.

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AIRGRAM

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TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Dec 30 9 39 AM 1975

INFO: AMCONGEN HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

FROM: AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

DATE: DECEMBER 16, 1975

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, VS
SUBJECT: LIFE IN SOUTH VIET-NAM

REF:

55

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SUMMARY

Saigon is becoming more depressing as prices rise, unemployment remains high, and only NVA troops seem to have any money, which they are often obtaining through corruption. There is continued discussion of resistance. One source believes that reunification will occur on April 29, 1976. END SUMMARY.

INTRODUCTION

This is the latest in a series of occasional reports on life in South Viet-Nam, based upon debriefings of persons who have recently left there. This report is based primarily on recent conversations with ...., All ..... are fluent Vietnamese-speakers.

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CLASSIFICATION

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	PHONE NO.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
POL:CHTwilling/dmb	12/15/75	502	POL:TFCowon

CLEARANCES:

DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (9)

NR 93-51, #25, State ltr. 9/10/93

By KBH, NARA, Date 10/29/93

FORM DS-323
1-77

AIRGRAM

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THE MOOD AND CONTROL

All characterize the mood in Saigon as one of despair, suspicion, and hardship. ..... noted that there was an air of tense waiting and psychological defeat between the time the Americans left and the first communist tanks rolled in, then celebration and joy that peace was at hand during the first two or three days of liberation, followed by dejection by the end of that week, based upon the rapid realization that this was essentially a Northern conquest of the South. He said that the mood of many people evolved from war fatigue shortly after the take-over actually to liking to hear the occasional sound of gunfire, which encourages them to think that the resistance is making headway. He added that many people have fallen into a bitter mood of self-recrimination for not having done something in time to prevent the communist victory.

..... describes communist control over the population as "fantastic". The NVA are living interpersed among the civilian population. There are often nightly block or precinct meetings, frequently turning into denunciation sessions, making each person suspicious of his neighbor. ..... said these meetings also have a people's court aspect, in which a person accused of past or present misdeeds is judged for punishment by a show of hands of those attending. He said

he has never heard of anyone witnessing an immediate execution but, rather, the offender is led away to an unknown destination. The source added that there is always a certain number of people in any particular area trying to ingratiate themselves with local authorities by taking on a surveillance and reporting role on the activities of the remainder of the population. These people are especially resented. A continuing process is the current census taking. If the census-taker is not convinced that a person has worthwhile employment, there is a follow-up visit by other officials a week later to oblige that person to go to work in a new economic area.

Humiliation and harrassment appear to be employed as a means of control. The security chief of a precinct is often the illiterate seller of fish or the holder of some similar position, who suddenly receives a position of authority which he uses to take out his natural resentment over the educated or affluent, who can only respond with downcast eyes. There is usually once a week a neighborhood clean-up campaign to sweep the streets. Everyone must participate, and the organizers are usually these same illiterate, poor types who are suddenly in control of the lives of their former superiors. One does not dare to decline to participate. ..... said that occasionally people are awakened by loudspeakers at night to be informed to participate in something in the morning, and again there is no choice. This occurred most recently on the occasion of the reunification meetings. One morning people were awakened at 2:00 A.M. and instructed that each family must be represented at a demonstration beginning at 5:00 A.M. Students and others had to line the road from Tan Son Nhut into town and wait long hours for the arrival of the Northern delegations for the reunification meetings. There was no choice.

.... observed how strict the controls are just to change residence from one location to another inside Saigon. Before and after the move, police check everything in the house from tables to chopsticks, making certain that everything is there. .....added that a Saigon homeowner is permitted to sell his house only if he is leaving the city to live in a new economic area or in his home village.

Varying degrees of re-education constitute another form of control. ..... was impressed when he left with just how

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

widespread throughout the community re-education was becoming, to the point that almost anyone now is eligible to be sent away for two weeks. Despite the propaganda, ... said he knew of no one sent away for a longer period of re-education who has yet returned. ..... said he knew of some, but they were unable to obtain work once they returned.

Finally, economic realities serve as a very important control over the population of Saigon, keeping people either at a survival level or forcing them to leave the city for good to farm. Unemployment remains very high, with no prospects for change in sight. This combined with controls over how much money a person or family can hold outside the bank, forces people to continue to sell their possessions to the NVA who always seem to have money, according to all the sources. As ..... said, no one knows what will happen once there are no longer any possessions to sell. Incidentally, ... noted that those trying to survive on little money often eat in an inexpensive, government-operated restaurant inside the government-controlled Hotel Continental.

THE ECONOMY

Everyone agreed that prices are rising daily in Saigon, despite official, fixed prices that even the state stores do not--and claim they cannot--respect. Cigarettes are ten times more expensive than on April 30. Important commodities like soap, cigarettes, sugar, and monosodium glutimate are all rationed, ...reported. ..... added that one person is limited to fifteen kilos of rice per month and to beef twice a month. Toilet paper is scarce. There is a limited quantity of poor quality matches for sale. Industries producing these items just have no stocks built up, ... Gasoline is scarce, and most gas stations--except several government-controlled ones--are closed. A liter of gasoline costs one new dong (500 old piasters). Only Soviet flour is available. There is general agreement that medicines are in short supply, with pharmacies open but with little to sell. .....arrived in Bangkok with a serious case of ringworm. He said everyone has it in Saigon, which Saigonese claim the NVA brought into the city, and it is not possible to purchase any medicine to halt its spread.

Although tea rooms, ice cream parlors, and other stores could remain open much later at night, they generally close at 9:00 P.M. in downtown Saigon for lack of business, according to ..... Bars, night clubs, Maxim's restaurant: all have been turned into dwellings for the NVA. Rumors continue that a switch in currency will soon be made to the North Vietnamese dong.

As a result of the high cost of living and general lack of money, there continues to be a migration into the countryside. .....said that friends of his who have gone to farm in the delta in new economic areas or at home are discouraged in their new role by the fact that the government requires that they turn over 50% of their rice production to the authorities. Those who are in the new economic areas there liken them to Diem's strategic hamlets of the early 1960's; although the fences are missing around the settlements, there is only one road leading out, which is constantly guarded. One must request permission in order to go outside to the market or to work. He said it is theoretically possible to escape, but an escape into often thick jungle is not everyone's cup of tea. All sources agreed that many Saigonese are going to the new economic areas to live.

..... noted that, on December 3, full-scale operations were resumed on the Saigon-Qui Nhon portion of the railroad. He said that labor for the repair work was provided by villagers living along the route and by ex-ARVN performing forced labor.

All sources commented on the large quantity and diversity of goods shipped to the North. .....mentioned tires and rice. ..... mentioned the machines to paint lines on roads, for whose operation South Vietnamese Public Works employees, with whom he had close ties, were also sent.

NORTH VIETNAMESE IN THE SOUTH

Everyone referred to the large North Vietnamese presence. . said that North Vietnamese civilians assigned to work in Saigon are bringing down their families to live, as well. He noted that the South Vietnamese do not like their new government, particularly because it depends for survival on the NVA.

..... had probably the most interesting observations about the NVA. He often engaged them in conversation and began re-

ceiving social visits from them at home. .....listened to their amazement over the wealth of the South and complaints about Southern hostility to them. Indeed, two of them had not liked life in the North, anyhow, and became so embittered in the South--convinced that what they were doing was wrong--that they deserted. These two friendships opened the doors to ..... to observe the life of NVA deserters in Saigon. A third deserter whom he met, with whom the first two were hiding in a house, finally gave up and turned himself in to the authorities. Others were discovered and imprisoned. ..... said the practice was to return them to the North for re-education. A communist cadre told ..... in August that 700 NVA had already been returned to the North because they had contracted gonorrhea.

..... visited the Embassy ten days ago partly on account of his two friends. He said that when he left Saigon they agreed that the two, joined by five young South Vietnamese whom ..... had helped raise, would hike from Danang through southern Laos to Khemmarat, Thailand, where he would meet them. (He has had no news of them since he departed Saigon.) Although ..... hopes the new ..... government will become more liberal in its refugee policy and admit the Vietnames when and if they reach Thailand, he came by to ask if the U.S. would take them in case his country does not. We explained that with the end of the U.S. program, their chance of admission without either U.S. relatives or ties would not be good.

.... observed that the NVA in Saigon always seem to have money; they love especially to buy Seiko watches. Others pick up radios, cameras, U.S. Army shoes. They are keeping the economy of Saigon going. ..... said many NVA purchase bicycles while in Saigon, which they then ship home. Another very popular item is Samsonite luggage. He sold his own Samsonite for 100 dong (50,000 old piasters).

... also mentioned that the principal office of the NVA intelligence branch is at the Kim Do hotel, located next to the Tax Building.

CORRUPTION

Any discussion of the NVA leads naturally into one of corruption. ..... said that corruption has become as bad now as what he

saw during his eight years under the GVN. (In fact, ... deserter friends told him it is just as serious a problem in the North.) ..... observed that one of the most popular forms is black marketeering, which is also as active as it was previously. The strict rationing system which applies to purchases by Southern civilians of basic commodities provides the system its impetus. NVA, unaffected by any limitations, purchase large quantities of such items as soap, sugar, and cigarettes and resell them on the black market for a profit, which is even larger if they succeeded in stealing it in the first place.

Another popular form of corruption is that of under-the-table transactions to facilitate bureaucratic processing or a favorable decision, a practice which our sources agreed exists in every office. This is a good way, for example, obtain documents authorizing domestic travel. In addition, we have heard allegations that otherwise ineligible Vietnamese have been gaining access to the French evacuation flights ever since they began. Finally, there are the shake-downs for such reasons as to avoid arrest or re-education.

RESISTANCE

Hard fact is very difficult to come by on the subject of resistance. ..... had been told that the Ban Me Thuot area was a particularly difficult one for the communists to control and mentioned a rumor that the city had been retaken by resistance elements. .... had heard of the problems in Ban Me Thuot and occasional talk about Chau Doc. He said it is common knowledge that the communists have only daytime control of the An Loc area. .... added that there are reports of elements based in the Ba Ria mountains who make forays into the Vung Tau region.

..... said that when he left Saigon, Highway 20 from Dalat was cut and there were few vegetables available for purchase. From his Khmer Krom and other friends in the Mekong delta, he knew that the Hoa Hao were not defeated and continued to resist in Chau Doc and An Giang. Tay Ninh remains a particular problem area for the communists. Finally, the Xuan Loc region is still difficult to control. ..... neighbor who lived behind him in Saigon travelled from Xuan Loc to Saigon in early November. He reported seeing actual fighting occurring off the road just south of Xuan Loc. He also said he saw brand new

American C-rations in Xuan Loc, which people claimed the U.S. had airdropped recently. .....has relatives in the staunchly Catholic village of Ho Nai in Long Khanh province and has heard from them reports of both active and passive resistance by that population. (Most of the residents of the village are from North Viet-Nam and came south in 1954-55.)

AMERICAN INTERESTS

.....took an active interest in Americans and, based on his observations, estimated that Americans--all of whom are now in Saigon--number fifty to sixty. He believed personally that Americans would soon be permitted to leave the country. ..... had heard that some Americans are imprisoned in Saigon's Chi Hoa prison, but he did not know who they are. ..... agreed that there are forty or fifty Americans in Saigon, of whom two whose names he did not know--a businessman and a voluntary agency employee--are in prison.

..... took an interest in and had extensive knowledge of American properties. We believe his observations on them merit reporting. Although our Embassy is closed, he is convinced that there are watchmen living inside it, for if one looks hard, he sees clothes hanging out to dry. A high-ranking NVA official is inhabiting the Ambassador's residence, and the road passing it, previously closed, has been re-opened. The large warehouse in New Port containing liftvans of Embassy employees' effects waiting for shipment by Bekins back to the U.S. was broken into; everything that was not stolen was smashed, and nothing remains intact. (New Port has been taken over by the military.) The Embassy commissary is now used by the water department as a repairshop to fix pumps and generators, which are then shipped to the North. A sign in USAID #1 identifies it as the labor department, and military are living inside. USAID #2 serves as troop quarters. Pentagon East reportedly has collapsed, except for its power plant.

We asked ..... if he knew of any former Vietnamese employees of either the USG or private U.S. firms who surfaced after the take-over as communists. He replied in the negative.

....said his identity .....was well-known, but he had no problems because of that fact. The same was true of ..... Asked

[redacted] American C-47s[redacted] to Tuan Lee, which would extend the U.S. [redacted] [illegible] [redacted] has withdrawn to the Chinese border village of Ba Nua to long thank patrols and has been [illegible] [redacted] reports of both sides [illegible] positive preference for that [illegible]. [redacted] of the residents of the village are from Meo's Hill tribe and [illegible] [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] was an active interest in Khorkova and, based on his own [illegible], estimated that approximately of them are now in Bulgaria—about fifty to sixty. He believed personally that Khorkova would [illegible] [redacted] [illegible] [redacted] but thought that some Bulgarians are imprisoned in Bulgaria's Old Bay prisons, but he did not know who they are. [redacted] agreed that there are [illegible] of [illegible] Khorkovans in Bulgaria, of whom two-thirds appear to be old and [illegible] Khorkovans and a relatively [illegible] [redacted] appointment in prison.

[redacted] [illegible] [redacted] said he thought he did not [illegible] [redacted] [illegible] [redacted] [illegible] [redacted]

about his fellow workers, ...reported that the communists are using the Vietnamese..... employees on various projects. Some have been enlisted to operate the power plant at Pentagon East. Others are operating the repair facility located at the .... main office. One was sent to Hanoi to place in working condition truck cranes brought up from the South. A team of .... personnel are also in the North to repair the automatic transmissions on the large number of American and other automobiles taken there.

REUNIFICATION

A PLAF General whose name .... could not recall visited his next door neighbor after the conclusion of the reunification meetings, just before .... departed. He announced that everything had gone well and formal reunification would occur on April 29, 1976, (perhaps at the stroke of midnight?). He told the people present that forty-three governments would then come forward to give aid in the fields of construction, medical assistance, and agriculture.

MOVEMENT OF POPULATION

..... observed in early November that he personally knows people from a number of Southern families who have long lived in the North who now returned to the South. He knew of no cases of a reverse flow.

Travel within the South remains difficult. Saigonese are free to leave the city only to travel to a new economic area or their home villages. ..... reported that persons from the delta selling their produce and merchants from such areas as Danang southward receive permits to travel into Saigon, but it is much more difficult for a Saigon merchant to obtain a travel permit.

EDUCATION

.... observed that, with all schools now in the hands of the government, the emphasis appears to be primarily on teaching revolutionary songs. University students have had to attend sessions during both the daytime and evenings to learn about the teachings of Uncle Ho. However, he said the universities have now finally commenced teaching more serious subjects.

..... said his contact was with high school youths. A feature

of high school education which particularly struck him was the use of school time to form the students into self-defense units. In addition, some especially "revolutionary" students in each class have been issued guns (AK-47s and revolvers) which they carry with them at all times in school.

Finally, ...watched the new educational scene with interest. He said that numerous textbooks which teach mathematics, science, and history in "revolutionary" terms, are now in use in the South. (..... heard in early November from a close friend in Saigon that there was a severe shortage of these books, meaning often that there would be only one available for four to five students, who were also having to spend much of their time in non-educational activities.) He also reported that students from "revolutionary families" are favored for admission into Saigon University.

HUE vs. DANANG

To demonstrate his view that much depends on local rule to explain the harshness or ease of life in any particular area, ...noted that he visited both Hue and Danang several months ago. Danang was a relaxed city, with people strolling through the streets. Authorities talked mostly of the need to rebuild and develop the area. Hue, in contrast, had a different air, one of strictness. One saw no one strolling for pleasure; people came and went because they had to, and that was all. ... Authorities were still talking mostly about ideology, which considered to be only a first phase after take-over. When he asked why there was such a difference, ... was told that Hue authorities had to be much stricter because their security problems were greater.

WHITEHOUSE

EXECUTIVE
FG 413
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.
ND18-2/CO165-2
PR5-2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 2, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN S. D. EISENHOWER JSDE

SUBJECT: Presidential Advisory Committee on Refugees Visit to Ft. Chaffee, Arkansas, May 20, 1975.

The Advisory Committee visited Ft. Chaffee, Arkansas, to observe first hand the accommodations and the processing systems established at that relocation center, which is currently handling approximately 24,000 Vietnamese refugees.

The Committee was accompanied by Ambassador L. Dean Brown and other representatives of the Interagency Task Force.

All were impressed by the close cooperation between the local Interagency Task Force officials and the supporting Army contingent. In addition, the voluntary assistance of the surrounding Arkansas community was very much in evidence, due largely, in our opinion, to strenuous public relations efforts on the part of the civilian coordinator, Mr. Donald MacDonald.

This refugee resettlement center has defined its tasks as three-fold: (a) to receive and process the Vietnamese refugees, (b) to run a small city, population 24,000, and (c) to facilitate the careful placement of refugees throughout the United States.

Since the beginning of May, 25,814 people have arrived, mostly from South Vietnam. All have undergone initial processing, and 18,500 have completed processing to the point where they can leave as soon as sponsors are found. Approximately 2,500 have come and gone. Commitments for over 6,000 additional placements have been made.

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JUN 18 1975
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The Advisory Committee observed refugees going through the various administrative stages which include preliminary processing, medical evaluation, immigration and naturalization screening, social security registration, social rehabilitation services, security clearance from INS, and the departure services provided by HEW. We were advised that these administrative activities are proceeding in an efficient, well-organized manner. The security clearance delays experienced at first are now being diminished as the computerized refugee records become more available.

Through the cooperation of the Task Force and Army personnel the administration of this "city" encompasses all the usual aspects of community management. The refugees participate actively. To maintain local government, each of the 236 barracks have elected a representative to a council, which has in turn elected a Vietnamese "mayor." The mayor meets with the council each evening, and a subcommittee structure has been formed to work closely with the voluntary agencies.

The Education Committee has been allocated sixteen buildings for schools. Presently over 200 classes are being conducted each day, enrolling 7,000 children. This school system is being run by the Southern Baptist Conference and includes Vietnamese and American teachers. It ranks as the sixth largest school system in the State of Arkansas.

The morale and participation of refugee volunteers is exceptional, some of whom are Vietnamese-Americans, United States residents for as long as sixteen years.

A newspaper in the Vietnamese language is circulated daily, and a local civilian radio station is providing a fifteen minute daily broadcast in Vietnamese. Subject matter encompasses news of the world, stressing those items of particular importance to the people in the center.

No major crime problem has occurred; even small misdemeanors requiring action have been rare.

Although the reception of refugees and the administration of the "city" are proceeding in admirable fashion, the ultimate task, that of placement, is only beginning. This

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function is a primary responsibility of ten major American voluntary agencies (VOLAGs), which historically have facilitated resettlement of millions of displaced persons. (See attached list.) These voluntary agencies are under preliminary contract with the Federal Government.

The voluntary agencies are in operation. They stress that the primary criteria for placement in an American community are the impact on that community, the quality of the individual sponsors, and the availability of jobs. The Employment Service of the Department of Labor will provide ten specialists to work with the VOLAGs in an effort to avoid placement of individuals in communities with extraordinarily high unemployment rates. Further, they will endeavor to correlate the skills of the refugees with the local situation. Careful screening of sponsors, through the network of community volunteer agencies, is a critical activity.

The Advisory Committee asked the local officials how we could best assist in this effort. The consensus was that we could (a) help to educate the civic clubs throughout the United States regarding the requirements for sponsorship and (b) identify the local participating voluntary agencies for channeling the legitimate requests for sponsorship. It was also suggested that the Advisory Committee become well acquainted with the roles and problems of the volunteer agencies. (A useful meeting of the VOLAG representatives with Committee and White House Staff has already been held and future meetings scheduled.)

Although resettlement is primarily a local function, the Committee must make every possible effort to help shorten the time of encampment for the refugees. No delay in their assimilation into the American community can be tolerated.

Those refugees who wish to return to Vietnam are beginning to come forward, and all have been assured that return is indeed possible in accord with existing international procedures. The one hundred refugees who are interested in returning to Vietnam from Fort Chaffee are predominantly men wishing to rejoin their families.

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After reviewing this refugee resettlement center we believe that the proper mechanisms have been set in motion and there is accumulating evidence that progress is taking place. Within a remarkably short time the personal welfare of the refugees is being well attended to. Their natural anxieties are being abated as they learn that we do indeed have a place for them in our society and that all concerned are working in their best long term interest. Their confidence is being enhanced by their own participation in the administrative and governing processes.

Under your leadership the efforts of this Committee, of the Interagency Task Force, and of the voluntary agencies will hopefully dispel public misconceptions and apprehensions regarding acceptance of refugees in our society. We will also be addressing some of the longer term problems with a view to determining preventive measures.

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THE MAJOR RESETTLEMENT AGENCIES

U. S. Catholic Conference
Migration and Refugee Services
1312 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
202-659-6631

American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees
1709 Broadway, Room 1316
New York, N.Y. 10019
212-265-1919

Church World Service
Immigration and Refugee Program
475 Riverside Drive
New York, New York 10027
212-870-2061

Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service
315 Park Avenue South
New York, New York 10010
212-677-3950

United HIAS Service, Inc.
200 Park Avenue South
New York, New York 10003
212-674-6800

Tolstoy Foundation, Inc.
250 West 57th Street
New York, New York 10019
212-247-2922

LDS Social Services
Agency for Church of Latter-Day Saints
50 East North Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
801-531-3001

International Rescue Committee
386 Park Avenue South
New York, New York 10016
212-247-2922

American Council for Nationalities Service
20 West 40th Street
New York, New York 10018
212-279-2715

Traveler's Aid-International Social Services
345 East 46th Street
New York, New York 10017
212-687-5958

In addition, the Red Cross and Travelers Aid International provide assistance.

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gate

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN....

EXECUTIVE
FG 413

THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REFUGEES

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20506

AMBASSADOR JOHN EISENHOWER
CHAIRMAN

MAYOR JOSEPH ALIOTO
ARCHBISHOP JOSEPH BERNARDIN
MR. ASHBY BOYLE
DR. W. STERLING CARY
MR. JOHN DENVER
MRS. GAETANA ENDERS
GOVERNOR DANIEL EVANS
MAYOR MAURICE FERRE
MR. MINOR GEORGE
MR. EDGAR KAISEN
MR. PHILIP KLUTZNICK
MR. WILLIAM J. KUHFUSS
MR. GEORGE MEANY
MR. CLARKE REED
DR. MALCOLM TODD
ELDER A. THEODORE TUTTLE

MR. ROGER D. SEMERAD
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
(202) 456-7034

August 18, 1975

AR 7

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN S. D. EISENHOWER JSDE

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF INTERIM REPORT

This is to transmit the Interim Report of The President's Advisory Committee on Refugees.

Significant progress has been made in the resettlement of the refugees of the long and tragic war in Indochina. The critical problem of public acceptance has been resolved. Throughout our country there have been numerous examples of warmth and generosity toward this latest group of refugees.

Yet in the face of this apparent success a note of caution is in order. The timely completion of the resettlement effort will depend to a great extent upon continued priority emphasis within government and a greater flexibility in dealing with the particular problems of the refugees still to be resettled.

Attachment

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THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REFUGEES

INTERIM REPORT

TO

THE PRESIDENT

August 15, 1975

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THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REFUGEES

INTERIM REPORT/EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In accordance with the expressed wishes of President Ford and consistent with the Committee Charter, The President's Advisory Committee on Refugees has undertaken activities in a great number of areas. To meet the urgent problems of refugee employment, the Advisory Committee has organized meetings between representatives of various union and employer groups. A Vietnamese/Cambodian subcommittee has been organized under the sponsorship of the Advisory Committee to provide information on the reaction of refugees to the resettlement program. To help resolve problems encountered in refugee resettlement and encourage sponsorship, Committee members and staff have served in a liaison capacity with many national public and private groups. Where appropriate, the Committee referred problems or concerns to the Interagency Task Force for consideration. Additionally, the Committee has endorsed a program called Project FRIENDSHIP to encourage the participation of American youth groups in establishing early communication with refugee youth.

To insure a successful conclusion to the refugee resettlement effort, an aggressive public information program should be instituted, and additional organizations may need to become involved with the sponsorship program. More significant participation by state and local governments will be required in the areas of direct refugee sponsorship and in making available the various private and public resources that will facilitate resettlement and cultural adjustment.

It is the view of the Committee that while much has been accomplished, significant problems remain in the resettlement of the refugees from Indochina. In a period of declining national interest, the successful resettlement of the refugees still in camps and of those yet to arrive from other countries, may involve the identification and resolution of a different order of complex issues. The expedient measures adopted to place the first groups of refugees may well be inadequate to complete the entire resettlement program on a timely basis.

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THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REFUGEES

INTERIM REPORT

The President's Advisory Committee on Refugees has met on six occasions. In addition to the organizational meeting of May 19 and the trip to Fort Chaffee on May 22, the President's Advisory Committee has met on May 23, June 3, June 25, and July 23. At these meetings members of the Advisory Committee have reported on their visits to the refugee resettlement camps in the United States and in Guam, and a great number of individuals and organizations have presented reports or suggestions dealing with the refugee resettlement program.

The following presents a comprehensive summary of the activities, program reviews, and recommendations of The President's Advisory Committee on Refugees:

A. Performance of the Department of Defense

The Advisory Committee wishes to commend the Department of Defense for its excellent work in arranging for the reception, care, and movement of the refugees from the Pacific to the United States. Members of the Advisory Committee who have visited the refugee camps in the United States have reported very favorably on the efforts of the military in providing for the physical needs of the refugees. The efforts of the Department of Defense which are continuing to this day, reflect great credit upon the military establishment and clearly deserve special recognition.

B. Refugee Sponsorship

1. Public Information

The Advisory Committee discussed and endorsed a proposal to take a role in explaining the requirements for sponsorship, the need for additional sponsors, and other such public information activities. The Committee

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believed that the public information function was a most appropriate activity for the Committee, particularly since several of the members of the Advisory Committee were national figures, and that an appeal by such public figures would be very effective.

Although this program of public information was to be conducted in coordination with the Interagency Task Force, it did not meet with the approval of the Acting Director of the Interagency Task Force and was unilaterally rejected.

The Committee believes this decision to have been most unfortunate in that no substitute public information program has been implemented by the Interagency Task Force. It is the view of the Committee that even at this late date there exists a requirement for an aggressive public information program dealing with sponsorship.

2. Expanded Sponsorship Verification

The Advisory Committee urged that the Interagency Task Force explore an expanded role in refugee sponsorship by reputable national social organizations. This was done in the belief that additional agencies and organizations needed to become involved in sponsor identification and verification in order to place the maximum number of refugees within the shortest possible time.

This suggestion was not intended as a criticism of the voluntary agencies' efforts. The Committee recognized that the voluntary agencies were doing an excellent job within the limits of their resources, yet wished to encourage additional participation in this area in order to provide support to the voluntary agency efforts and to serve as a standby placement system in case of specific problems or requirements. A number of organizations, most notably the American Red Cross

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and the United Way, indicated an interest in participating in such an effort, in addition to discharging their other responsibilities.

The United Way has become active in encouraging the participation of local organizations in the sponsorship program. The Red Cross offered to assume a larger role in the sponsorship effort. However, following some preliminary discussions between the representatives of the Task Force and the Red Cross, the Task Force rejected the Red Cross' offer. This was a particularly discouraging development in that the Red Cross was the major secular agency with strong local identification that could have served as the focus of an effort to expand the sponsorship program.

The wisdom of the decisions to neither initiate a program of greater information concerning sponsorship nor to broaden the sponsorship mechanism remains to be seen.

C. Liaison With Public Groups, National Organizations

The Advisory Committee has coordinated a number of meetings between the representatives of the National Alliance of Businessmen, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of Commerce, the AFL/CIO, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the United Auto Workers, the United Mine Workers Union, and other public groups concerned with employment. The purpose of these meetings has been to secure from these national organizations a widespread endorsement and support for employment opportunities for Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees. This type of support was considered essential to create opportunities for employment that otherwise might not have been available.

In response to these efforts the Chamber of Commerce has completed a mailing to all of its local chapters in cities with an unemployment rate of 9% or less, asking that these chapters contact the unions for the purpose of coordinating and developing employment opportunities.

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Concurrently, Mr. Leo Perlis of the AFL/CIO, Mr. Meany's alternate, has sent out a letter to all AFL/CIO member organizations advising them of the coordination role to be assumed by the Chamber of Commerce and requesting that all AFL/CIO affiliates cooperate in the employment search.

D. Voluntary Agencies

It should be noted that the voluntary agencies who have performed the bulk of the placement work, have been the targets of much criticism.

The isolated and broadly publicized cases of sponsorship breakdowns, problems or abuses should be considered within the context of the thousands of placements that have been made, and with the understanding that these voluntary agencies have important programs other than the resettlement of refugees from Indochina. It is to the great credit of the voluntary agencies that the instances of breakdowns and problems have been few in number.

The principal concern expressed by the Advisory Committee in regard to the efforts of the voluntary agencies is that it may be to the detriment of the government resettlement program to rely almost exclusively on these voluntary agencies.

E. Liaison Activities

The Advisory Committee has also acted in a liaison capacity with various public groups, professional organizations, ethnic groups and ad hoc committees who offered their services in the refugee resettlement program but were not able to identify or to assume a role within the formal governmental mechanism of the Interagency Task Force. The Committee staff has also been able to discourage less capable organizations and charlatans attracted to this program for questionable reasons.

F. Vietnamese/Cambodian Refugee Advisory Group

One of the initial criticisms of The President's Advisory Committee on Refugees was the absence

therein of Vietnamese and Cambodians. Recognizing the validity of this criticism and wishing to draw information from the groups most clearly concerned with the refugee resettlement program, the Committee has established an advisory group of Vietnamese and Cambodian nationals for the purpose of providing the Advisory Committee information and recommendations on the resettlement program. The Advisory Group is composed equally of refugees who have been processed through the resettlement program and of Vietnamese and Cambodians who have resided in the United States over a period of years.

The deliberations and recommendations of the Vietnamese/Cambodian Refugee Advisory Group have been particularly useful to the Committee in that they have provided a source of immediate information on the refugee reaction to the government's resettlement program. In some areas the comments of the Advisory Group have been in praise of the efforts of the government, the military and the voluntary agencies. In other cases, there have been rather strong, but constructive, criticisms. Very briefly, the major subjects discussed by the Advisory Group and the recommendations are outlined here.

1. Follow-up Assistance by the Voluntary Agencies

   The Advisory Group pointed out that in some cases a family that had been placed with a sponsor was not provided with counseling or follow-up assistance by the voluntary agency. Accordingly, minor maladjustments or problems have resulted in a breakdown of the sponsorship effort. The Refugee Advisory Group recommended that the voluntary agencies be encouraged to provide follow-up assistance in all cases rather than only in those cases where an actual breakdown or serious sponsor-refugee problem has developed.

2. Standardized Assistance From Voluntary Agencies

   The Refugee Advisory Group was particularly critical of the lack of uniformity in the

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types of assistance offered by the various voluntary agencies. The most immediate and most readily identifiable lack of uniformity was in the amounts of pocket money made available to the refugee upon departure and the financial assistance during the period following placement. The Advisory Group recommended that every effort be made to standardize the assistance to preclude the problems that arise from such variations.

3. Service in the Armed Forces

The Advisory Group noted that a great number of young unmarried males were present in the camps. This group of refugees has been identified by the voluntary agencies as one of the groups that will pose very difficult placement problems. Generally these men were members of the armed forces of Vietnam and Cambodia and escaped alone and not as members of any family group.

Since these individuals will be very difficult to place in a conventional sponsorship arrangement, the voluntary agencies have suggested that an alternative to sponsorship for these individuals could be service in the U.S. Armed Forces. This alternative could only be possible if the various legal barriers to military service by parolees could be waived and appropriate legislation passed. The Task Force has requested the Department of Defense to prepare legislation to permit the enlistment of refugees in the Armed Forces.

This question has been discussed with representatives of the Department of Defense and it would seem that since each branch of the Armed Forces is in a reduction posture both in enlisted and officer ranks, service in the Armed Forces for the refugees under any exemption category is unlikely in the near future.

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4. Language and Skill Training for Professionals

The Advisory Group noted that remedial language training would be necessary for many individuals in order for these individuals to resume their professional careers in the United States. Committee staff reviewed this question and determined that programs of training and language education were available to all Americans and that any expanded opportunities for Indochinese refugees must necessarily be at the expense of others who were also attempting to establish their professional credentials in the private sector.

5. Return Visits to Camps

The Advisory Group noted that an increasing number of refugees were apprehensive about leaving the apparent security of the refugee camps and attempting to establish themselves in the American society. These fears were due in part to misinformation and rumors that refugees had been maltreated upon departing the camps. To reassure the refugees still in camps, it was decided to endorse a program by which selected refugees who had been processed through the resettlement camps and had been placed with a sponsor, could return to the camps to explain what had happened in the period of time since they had left camp. It was felt that former refugees who had been processed through the resettlement camps would be the most credible spokesmen on this subject.

6. Toll-Free Telephone Information for the Refugees

It was recommended that the toll-free information services be expanded to include Vietnamese

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and Cambodian operators, who would be able to answer questions from refugees throughout the country. This particular resource would be very valuable since it would provide an authoritative source of information available both to sponsors and refugees and might preclude a significant number of problems.

7. Cultural Centers

The Committee endorsed a proposal by the Refugee Advisory Group to encourage the establishment of cultural centers in areas with major concentrations of refugees.

The President's Advisory Committee has found the Advisory Group to be particularly useful in determining the views and reactions of Vietnamese and Cambodians involved in the resettlement effort.

Information on the deliberations of the Advisory Group and any attendant endorsements by the President's Committee, have been transmitted to the Interagency Task Force. Of necessity, the evaluation of these proposals or suggestions and any subsequent implementation has been left to the Interagency Task Force.

G. Letters to Governors

On June 27, 1975, I wrote to all of the Governors encouraging them to follow the example of the State of Washington, and offering whatever assistance necessary in order to permit state governments to effect this form of sponsorship. I am disappointed to report that only a few Governors have expressed an interest in establishing sponsorship programs similar to that of Governor Evans of Washington.

H. Project FRIENDSHIP

Committee Member, Ashby Boyle, proposed, and the Advisory Committee endorsed, a program to establish direct contact between American youth groups and

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the refugee youth. Mr. Boyle has written to various youth groups and national organizations soliciting their support and asking that these youth groups make a concerted effort to identify refugee youth in their communities and make every effort to include these refugees in the various activities of the clubs or groups. The response from the various national organizations has been very encouraging.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As of the date of this report, over half of the refugees who were evacuated from Southeast Asia have been resettled. In general, those who have been resettled were relatives or friends of American citizens, or possessed language or other skills and could be readily integrated into American society. When compared with those who have already been resettled, the refugees remaining in camps are at a significant disadvantage. Thus, while much has been accomplished, much more remains to be done. It is far too early to offer congratulations or commendations.

With reference to potential problem areas, there is no assurance that difficulties will not develop for some of the refugees who have already been placed. The commitments of the voluntary agencies to continue placement efforts for refugees who might suffer an initial sponsorship breakdown could significantly delay the departure of those refugees still in the camps. Thousands of refugees are in other countries and their status has not been decided. A great number will be admitted into the United States and these refugees will pose an additional burden on the existing placement program.

Accordingly, it would seem reasonable to expect that the placement of refugees will slow down to some extent and greater difficulty will be encountered in placing those refugees who are still in camps. In a period of declining national interest, the placement of these refugees will pose significant problems.

It would seem useful from both an administrative and public information standpoint to focus on the possible problems and orient the planning to a worst case approach, rather than project program completion as though few, if any, problems

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[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [

will develop. The expedient measures adopted to place the first groups of refugees may well be inadequate to complete the entire resettlement program on a timely basis. Optimistic predictions as to the rapidity with which this resettlement can be accomplished can only damage the credibility of the resettlement effort and reflect unfavorably upon the praiseworthy efforts of your administration.

John Eisenhower

John S. D. Eisenhower, Chairman

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

C. F.
FG 31-1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 10, 1975

MEETING WITH THE SPEAKER AND MINORITY LEADER RHODES
Thursday, April 10, 1975
3:45 - 4:15 p.m. (30 minutes)
The Oval Office

From: Max L. Friedersdorf

I. PURPOSE

To brief the leaders on the Vietnam situation and give them a preview of your speech tonight.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN

A. Background:

1. The Speaker and John Rhodes returned at 3:00 p.m. yesterday from a trip to the Peoples Republic of China and were unable to attend the bipartisan leadership meeting.

2. During a press conference at Andrews Air Force Base, both leaders indicated they were out of touch with the situation and desired to meet as soon as possible with the President.

3. Both were non-commital on further military aid until they had the opportunity to speak to the President.

4. Reports indicate the leaders' trip was without major incident except for some tense discussions with Chinese leaders. Rhodes mentioned a particularly heated exchange about the Mid-East.

B. Participants: The President
The Speaker
Rep. John Rhodes
Jack Marsh (staff)
Max Friedersdorf (staff)

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C. Press Plan:

Announce to the press only - Kennerly photographs

III. TALKING POINTS

1. I hope your trip was worthwhile and I would be interested in hearing about it when we have more time.

2. The situation in Vietnam is very serious. I would describe it as bleak but salvagable.

3. We have 6,000 Americans in South Vietnam and we are concerned about their safety and evacuation if that becomes necessary.

4. In addition, there are from 175,000 to 200,000 South Vietnamese who have worked for the United States, and they will be the first to go if the communists take over.

5. We are also concerned about the safety of Americans if an anti-American sentiment develops among the South Vietnamese. We are maximizing our efforts to get these Americans out and are developing contigency plans of a very sensitive nature.

6. We also have a moral responsibility to try and save those South Vietnamese people who have stood with us through thick and thin.

7. I intend to give a lot stronger speech tonight than when I originally planned to address the Congress on foreign policy.

8. I will describe the seriousness of the situation in Vietnam, together with my recommendations, but the speech will also include the Middle East, NATO, detente, the PRC and trade.

9. It will be a very frank speech and I will not recommend anything that is phony. My recommendations will be justified.

10. I believe we are at a very serious turning point in world affairs. We have achieved some excellent results in foreign policy over the past 25 years, and we have suffered some setbacks.

11. If we work together we can move to greater successes. This country has a great destiny to fulfill.

12. But, we cannot achieve our goals if we engage in finger-pointing and blaming one another.

13. I am hopeful you can support my recommendations to the Congress tonight, and continue to lend me the wisdom and strength of your experience and service to the Nation.

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4. The situation in Pretoria is very serious. I would describe it as more than serious.

5. We have 2,500 Americans in South Africa and we are concerned about their safety and evacuation if that becomes necessary.

6. In addition, there are from 175,000 to 200,000 South Vietnamese who have worked for the United States, and they will be the first on our list of evacuees when

7. We are also concerned about the safety of Americans in all Mediterranean and coastal countries along the South Vietnamese. We are developing our efforts to get them evacuated but are developing contingency plans in a very sensitive manner.

8. We also have a moral responsibility to try and save those South Vietnamese people who have stood with us through thick and thin.

9. I intend to give a full economic speech tonight when I am scheduled to address the Congress on foreign policy.

10. I will describe the seriousness of the situation in Vietnam, together with my recommendations, but the speech will also include the Middle East, Haiti, Bangkok, and the Gulf of Aden.

11. It will be a very strong speech and I will use persuasive messages when it is going. My recommendations will be received.

12. I believe we are at a key moment in our policy in world affairs. We have achieved some significant changes in foreign policy over the past 10 years, and we have suffered some setbacks.

13. If the world is watching us and sees us to greatest resources; this country has a great destiny as United.

14. But, we should achieve and make it as we engage in a bipartisan policy and bringing new members.

15. I am hopeful you can support my recommendations in the economic package, and continue to lend me the wisdom and strength of your experience and service to the nation.

Staff 4636

Saigon, September 19, 1974

NGUYEN VAN THIEU
President of the Republic of Viet-Nam

Dear Mr. President,

About a month ago, I wrote to Your Excellency about the situation facing the Republic of Viet-Nam as the Communist side spurned all negotiations and stepped up their armed attacks in complete disregard of the Paris Agreement.

Since then, the situation has become even more serious. In fact, the prospects for the resumption of the talks between the two South Vietnamese parties are bleaker than ever, while the Communist generalized offensive continues unabated. Now the leaders of the Hanoi regime openly declare their active support for movements aimed at overthrowing the legal Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam while they intensify their infiltrations and military action, thus baring their plans for a forcible conquest of the whole South Viet-Nam.

...

His Excellency Mr. Gerald E. FORD
President of the United States of America
Washington D. C.

I think that the main cause for the increasingly defiant and bellicose attitude of the Communists resides in their believing that the United States is now wavering in its dedication to our common goal, namely a South Viet-Nam capable of defending itself and of deciding its own future. The utterly inadequate amount of military and economic aid to the Republic of Viet-Nam which has been voted by the U.S. Congress might have induced the Communists to make such speculations.

This can in turn lead to very dangerous miscalculations on the part of the Communists, as they might be tempted to launch an all out offensive to complete their forcible conquest of South Viet-Nam.

Therefore, it is essential that the United States unmistakably demonstrates once again its attachment to a serious implementation of the Paris Agreement and its support for the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, if peace is to be restored in South Viet-Nam and in South East Asia.

In this respect, I am most appreciative of your efforts made on September 12th to persuade leaders of Congress to restore the cuts in aid funds. I sincerely hope that Your Excellency will succeed in bringing the amounts of military and economic assistance up to the levels required by the new realities of the situation and the need for South Viet-Nam to achieve an economic takeoff.

...

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam had signed the Paris Agreement in good faith, under the double assurance that, on the one hand, Russia and Red China will exercise a restraining influence upon Hanoi and that, on the other hand, all necessary military equipments and economic assistance will be provided by the United States to the Republic of Viet-Nam to maintain its capabilities of self defense and to develop its national economy.

The first assumption turned out to be an empty promise, as Russia and Red China continue to give North Viet-Nam all the ingredients to pursue an aggressive war in South Viet-Nam.

But I am convinced that thanks to your generous efforts, the second assumption will be borne out.

Our valiant soldiers by enduring daily sacrifices in the battlefields have proved beyond doubt our will to resist Communist aggression. It would be unfortunate indeed if sufficient means could not be supplied to them because of the lack of resolve and misconception on the part of our allies.

Beside providing us with an adequate amount of military and economic assistance, the United States can also show its support for the just cause of the Republic of Viet-Nam by solemnly restating our common goals. In this regard, I hope that some time in the near future, we can meet together

...

to discuss about ways and means to achieve a genuine peace in South Viet-Nam.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my lasting friendship and highest consideration.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 29, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN MARSH

THROUGH: MAX FRIEDERSDORF

FROM: VERN LOEN VL

SUBJECT: Congressional calls on the Vietnam evacuation - April 29

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MEMBER:	Minority Leader John Rhodes
DATE:	4/29/75
TIME:	12:30 a.m.
PLACE:	At his home asleep
CONTACT:	Vern Loen spoke personally with Mr. Rhodes
COMMENTS:	It's about time

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MEMBER:	Speaker Albert
DATE:	4/29/75
TIME:	12:45 a.m.
PLACE:	At the home of Mike Reed
CONTACT:	Vern Loen spoke with Mike Reed who is Administrative Assistant to the Speaker
COMMENTS:	O.K. - Speaker is out of town, will relay word.

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MEMBER:	Rep. George Mahon
DATE:	4/29/75
TIME:	12:55 a.m.
PLACE:	At the home of Keith Mainland
CONTACT:	Vern Loen spoke with Keith Mainland who is Chief Counsel - Appropriations Committee
COMMENTS:	Good under circumstances. You've heard reaction on Hill.

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MEMBER:	Rep. William Broomfield
DATE:	4/29/75
TIME:	12:48 a.m.
PLACE:	At the home of Everett Bierman
CONTACT:	Vern Loen spoke with Ev Bierman who is Minority Counsel for the International Relations Committee
COMMENTS:	All Americans? Broomfield on red-eye special coming in from San Francisco.

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MEMBER:	Rep. Elford Cederberg
DATE:	4/29/75
TIME:	12:40 a.m.
PLACE:	At his home asleep
CONTACT:	Vern Loen spoke personally with Rep. Cederberg
COMMENTS:	Sending troops in? O.K., Thanks.

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MEMBER: Rep. Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill

DATE: 4/29/75

TIME: 12:49 a.m.

PLACE: Washington, D.C.

CONTACT: Charles Leppert talked personally with Rep. O'Neill

COMMENTS: How many Americans do we have to get out?
Approximately 900 Americans with some Vietnamese.
How many Vietnamese did we get out today?
Do not know the number taken out today but we have evacuated approximately 38,000 who are staged at Subic Bay, Guam and Wake Island.
Do you expect some problems?
We do expect some problems but are using approximately 1200 Marines and U.S. tactical air-support to secure the operation.
"That's too bad that we have to go this route."
"Charlie, tell the President thank you for informing me."

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MEMBER:	Rep. Thomas E. Morgan
DATE:	4/29/75
TIME:	12:42 a. m.
PLACE:	In Washington, D. C.
CONTACT:	Charles Leppert spoke with Rep. Morgan personally.
COMMENTS:	Going to use helicopters? Yes. That's too bad because I have that resolution on humanitarian and evacuation aid up tomorrow. I wish it could have been delayed another day at least.

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MEMBER: Rep. Bob Michel

DATE: 4/29/75

TIME: 12:28 a.m.

PLACE: At his home in Washington, D.C.

CONTACT: Charles Leppert spoke personally with Rep. Michel

COMMENTS: I guess that helo operations means the use of troops?
Yes, to secure landing zones.
How many?
Approximately 1200 Marines will be used to secure the landing zones. The operation will also have U.S. tactical air support.
How many do we have to get out?
Approximately 900 Americans and some Vietnamese personnel but primarily - 98% U.S. personnel.
When will this take place?
Operation will begin at approximately 12:45 to 1:00 a.m. our time tonight EDST.

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MEMBER:	Rep. Bob Wilson
DATE:	4/29/75
TIME:	12:35 a. m.
PLACE:	Residence
CONTACT:	Doug Bennett talked personally with Rep. Wilson
COMMENTS:	Q - Does this mean evacuation of South Vietnamese will not continue? A - I don't know - probably will depend upon situation in Saigon after the extraction.

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MEMBER:	Rep. Mel Price
DATE:	4/29/75
TIME:	12:38 a. m.
PLACE:	Residence
CONTACT:	Doug Bennet talked personally with Rep. Price
COMMENTS:	Thank you, sorry you have to work so late.

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MEMBER:	Rep. John McFall
DATE:	4/29/75
TIME:	12:41 a. m.
PLACE:	Residence
CONTACT:	Doug Bennett talked personally with Rep. McFall
COMMENTS:	Thank you - good luck.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 29, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF

FROM: WILLIAM T. KENDALL WTK

SUBJECT: Notification of Senate Leadership of the evacuation of Saigon

The attached log indicates the Senators reached by William Kendall, Pat O'Donnell, and Bob Wolthuis this day relative to the notification of the Leadership of the evacuation of Saigon.

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April 29, 1975

SENATOR	TIME	W.H. CALLER	COMMENT
Mansfield	12:30 a.m.	WK	Oh Lord -- Thanks for calling.
Scott	12:35 a.m.	WK	Expected it. Called for it yesterday
Thurmond	7:15 a.m.	WK	Approved. Asked questions about military situation near Saigon
Stennis	12:35 a.m.	RKW	Hope all goes well. Thanks
McClellan	12:30 a.m.	RKW	Good luck. Thank you.
Eastland	12:38 a.m.	RKW	Not available. Talked to Courtney Pace. Did not give notice, but tried to find whereabouts of Eastland.
Griffin	12:22 a.m.	POD	"Thank you-hope it works out."
Sparkman	12:30 a.m.	POD	"Thanks for letting me know; I'll be relieved when we get the last American out."
Case	12:35 a.m.	POD	"Thanks very much; I appreciate your letting me know."
Byrd	7:20 a.m.	WK	Glad we are doing it. Asked if Vietnamese were included.
Young	12:30 - 1:00 a.m.	POD	Not reachable

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Second Notification
Vietnam Evacuation (Saigon)
Tuesday, Morning 4/29

SENATOR	TIME	W.H. CALLER	COMMENT
Griffin	10:15 a.m.	POD	"Thank you -- I'll look forward to details at the 11:30 Bipartisan Leadership meeting."
Robert Byrd	10:24 a.m.	POD	"Thank you; how many VN went out last night and this morning?"
Sparkman	10:20 a.m.	POD	"Thank you for letting me know. I'll have to leave the 11:30 meeting early--am hosting luncheon for King Hussain."
Young	10:22	POD	Senator on plane back to D.C. from Minneapolis. Gave statement to Gordon West who will meet at airport and drive him to 11:30 Bipartisan Leadership Meeting.
Case	10:18	POD	Francis Henderson, A.A. advises that Bill Kendall has already called with the information
Mansfield	10:15	WK	Thanked WK. No comment. Looking forward to 11:30 meeting.
Scott	10:44	WK	Took information. No comment General approval of the way things were going so far.
Thurmond	10:30	WK	No comment. Asked if South Vietnamese Air Force could get heavy equipment out.



Case	10:35	WK	Not available. Gave information to AA (Frances Henderson) who said it would be transmitted to Senator Case as soon as he arrived.
McClellan	10:05	RKW	Just want to make sure all Americans get out
Stennis	10:00	RKW	No comment
Eastland	10:08	RKW	This means they will occupy Saigon. Tragic.
Humphrey (at request of Sec. Kissinger)	10:45	WK	He thanked for a very complete briefing. Appreciated Secretary's thoughtfulness.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 29, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF

FROM: WILLIAM T. KENDALL WTK

SUBJECT: Final notification of Senators; Saigon evacuation

Attached is the final log of calls made to Senators to inform them of the completion of the evacuation of Saigon by U.S. Forces.

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SENATOR	TIME	W.H. CALLER	COMMENT
Griffin	5:18 p.m.	POD	"Very good, thank you"
Robert Byrd	5:30 p.m.	POD	"Many thanks"
Sparkman	5:25 p.m.	POD	"I'm delighted"
Young	5:35 p.m.	POD	"Thank you"
Stennis	5:10 p.m.	RKW	Fine job--congratulations. Apologetic about missing meeting. Was in mark-up session.
McClellan	5:12 p.m.	RKW	Very fine
Eastland	5:15 p.m.	RKW	Appreciate it.
Mansfield	5:15 p.m.	WK	Good
Thurmond	5:20 p.m.	WK	No comment. Asked what will happen to U.S. Embassy
Scott	5:25 p.m.	WK	All right--glad to have information
Case	5:30 p.m.	WK	Unavailable. Gave information to AA Frances Henderson



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 29, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JACK MARSH

As you are aware there is a question as to whether the War Powers Act applies in a rescue operation involving American citizens; however, to be on the safe side, we proceeded as though it does and consequently sought to comply with the Consultation Provision of the Act on the Saigon airlift.

These phone consultations began earlier this morning at about 12:30 a.m. shortly before the carrier lift off of the helicopters participating in the operation.

Leadership of the House and Senate and Jurisdictional Committees to include Appropriations were called by members of the White House Congressional Staff. There were a few cases where members could not be reached either because they were out of the City or their phone did not answer. Where a member could not be reached, a senior member of their staff was contacted, except in the case of three members in the Senate.

There is attached a summary of these early morning notifications.

Because the large number of Vietnamese evacuated exceeded initial plans and the advice given on the first notification to the Congressional leaders, a second consultation call was made at about 10:00 this morning to update these individuals. You are familar with the message contained in the second conversation and a copy is attached.

It is important should the question occur as to why consultations or notifications did not occur earlier, for you to point out that in your public statements over the past several weeks, as well as statements by members of the Administration and your request for legislation for evacuation and the statements before Congressional Committees by witnesses clearly put the Congress on notice of the impending evacuation operation.

You might expect questions on the status and future of pending legislation related to this subject matter.

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#6201

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE 2611427 APRIL 1975 VIA MARTIN CHANNEL

SAIGON 0743 IMMEDIATE

DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

APRIL 26, 1975

GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: AMBASSADOR GRAHAM MARTIN

REF: WH 50763

1. With respect to para 2 of your message, I have little to add to my 737.

2. I have an exhausted staff and I am not repeat not going to reduce the U. S. Government side, either direct hire or contractors, any more as long as you want us to continue with the airlift. I don't know what you mean by "only" thirty contractor personnel have been reduced. Which of the 243 left would you suggest? We need communications, the tugs for E&E. Do you want us to abandon any interest in orphans? If so, I'll send out the 5 with IRC. Do you want to tell George Meany we have no interest in labor leaders. If so, I'll send out. getting out the AAFLI guy? Do you want us to be completely without transportation? If so, I'll send out the Air America 87, who are our last resort when the military get conflicting instructions from Washington. Do you want to send in more Marines? If so,

AMB:GMartin:ek 4/26/75.

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
NLR 94-31, #7 State ltr. 5/13/94
By KBH NARA, Date 6/6/94

I'll send out the Mission Warden force. As far as other categories are concerned, I don't really know what level we will reach by Sunday night. Attracted by the drama of Big Minh, more reporters are coming back in. With the continuing lack of any military activity, several of the businessmen, we hear, are thinking of returning.

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3. Unless you wish me to ~~reduce~~ advise the GVN to refuse any admission to press and businessmen, the former will grow considerably and the latter a little bit over the weekend. I can ask the GVN to deport some of them, but I would prefer you have someone in Washington do the nominations.

4. I really think we have about come to the end of the road on any further pressure on us here about the American community. Since you have left the decision to me, I am not going to reduce any more on the American official community. We have notified other Americansthat they are now staying at their own risk.

5. As far as the military pressures on the President are concerned, you might care to inform him that the reports of the SA 2s, which so panicked one of your WSAG meetings, and which resulted in the closing of the Saigon airport to American commercial airlines, turns out to be incorrect. What was sighted was several logging

trucks full of logs. I think if the President would simply say that the American community has been reducted to the smallest possible number commensurate with our ongoing activities, (principally evacuation of "high risk" Vietnamese, although he should not say this) and the rest of the community is mainly comprised of the American press, which in its best traditions is augmenting its forces somewhat to cover the news, he will be home free and maybe the rest of us will have time again to work on more important problems.

6. Warm regards.

GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

MARTIN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

JOHN THIS JOE F WHAT YOU PLANNING DO BESIDES GET DRUNK KKK
ZUJ MIN GOING PUT YOU FOR ONE FLASH AND BACK OUT
VV ESBI73BRN302
****** ZZ RUKOIR
DE RUEASTA #1102 1191835
ZNY AAAAA
Z 291830Z APR 75 ZFF-1 TO RUHQHQA
FM CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
TO AMEMB SAIGON VS
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ SPECAT EXCLLUSIVE FOR AMBASSADOR MARTIN FROM GAYLER
1. (S) I HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO SEND YOLU THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT: QUOTE. ON THE BASIS OF THE REPORTED TOTAL OF 726 EVACUEES CINCPAC IS AUTHORIZED TO SEND 19 HELICOPTERS AND NO MORE. THE PRESIDENT EXPECTS AMBASSADOR MARTIN TO BE ON THE LAST HELICOPTER. UNQUOTE.
2. (S) FYI SECDEF WISHES LAST LIFT NLT 0345 HOTEL AND WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO MEET END. FYI. PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE THIS PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE.
3. (U) WARM REGARD.
GDS-83
DRAFTER: J00
J00/ J001/ J01/ J02/ PA/ J2/ J3/ J4/ J5/
BT
#1102

Unclassified
6 May 1975
CJR

NNNN

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
MR 94-122, #32; CINCPACLtr 6/20/94
By LR NARA, Date 7/7/94

(114)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

Z 291506Z APR 75 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH
FM THE SITUATION ROOM
TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON
ZEM
~~SECRET~~ VIA SRF CHANNELS WH50789

APRIL 29, 1975

TO: GRAHAM MARTIN
FROM: DON RUMSFELD

I UNDERSTAND THAT 154 IBM EMPLOYEES INCLUDING THEIR FAMILIES ARE STILL AWAITING REMOVAL FROM SAIGON. I FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT THEY ARE NOW STANDING IN FRONT OF THE IBM BUILDING AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS WHERE THEY SHOULD GO FOR EVACUATION. I ASK THAT YOU DO YOUR UTMOST TO SEE THAT THEY ARE EVACUATED WITH THE CURRENT HELICOPTER LIFT.

107
02388

NNNN

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NR 94-116, #35 USC Mr. 9/19/94
By KBH NARA, Date 10/6/94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

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NNN
***** ZZ RUEADUW RUHQHQA RUEKJCS
DE RUKOIR 00000 1191605
ZNY SSSSS
Z 291600Z APR 75
FM AMEMB SAIGON
TO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
INFO RUHQHQA/CINCPAC
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FOR ADMIRAL GAYLOR,
INFO GENERAL BROWN CJCS
BRENT SCOWCROFT, WHITE HOUSE.

THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE
IS CH46 SORTIES ARE MOST WELCOME. THER IS NOW ANOTHER LULL. NOTHING IN LAST 20 MIN. WE NEEDED THE CAPACITY REPEAT CAPACITY OF 30 C-53 SORTIES TO GET US OUT OF HERE. AS I RECALL, A CH46 HAS ABOUT 2/5THS THE CAPACITY OF A CH53.
WE STILL NEED THE CAPACITY RPT CAPACITY OF THE 30 CH53 SORTIES REQUESTED IN MY PREVIOUS MESSAGE.
IT NOW SEEMS I WILL SPEND PART OF APRIL 30 HERE - A VERY SMALL PART I HOPE.
BUT I SURE DONT WONT TO SPEND MAYDAY HERE.

[illegible] REGARDS

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
NLR 99-124, #3 State ltr. 4/22/99
By KBH NARA, Date 2/1/95

Retyped & Unclassified
6 May 1975

O 191801Z APR 75
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON
ZEM
~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS VIA MARTIN CHANNELS WH50728

APRIL 19, 1975

TO: GRAHAN MARTIN

FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER

1. THANKS FOR YOUR 0715.

2. MY ASS ISN'T COVERED. I CAN ASSURE YOU I WILL BE HANGING SEVERAL YARDS HIGHER THAN YOU WHEN THIS IS ALL OVER.

3. NOW THAT WE ARE AGREED THAT THE NUMBER OF AMERICANS WILL BE REDUCED BY TUESDAY TO A SIZE WHICH CAN BE EVACUATED BY A SINGLE HELICOPTER LIFT, THE EXACT NUMBERS ARE COMPLETELY UP TO YOU. THAT HAVING BEEN DECIDED, I WILL STOP BUGGING YOU ON NUMBERS, EXCEPT TO SAY THAT YOU SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE EMBASSY REMAINS ABLE TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY.

4. YOU SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH YOUR DISCUSSION WITH THIEU. IN YOUR SOUNDINGS RELATIVE TO HIS POSSIBLE RESIGNATION, HOWEVER, THE MATTER OF TIMING IS ALSO OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE. IN ANY EVENT ANY RESIGNATION SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE PRECIPITATELY BUT SHOULD BE TIMED FOR MAXIMUM LEVERAGE IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION. YOU SHOULD KNOW, ALTHOUGH YOU SHOULD NOT INTIMATE THIS TO THIEU, THAT WE THIS MORNING HAVE MADE AN APPROACH TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE SHOULD NOT BE SANGUINE ABOUT ANY RESULTS BUT, IF THERE ARE ANY, THEY COULD EASILY INVOLVE THIEU AS ONE OF THE BARGAINING POINTS.

5. YOU SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT THE FRENCH HAVE APPROACHED US WITH THE IDEA OF RECONVENING THE PARIS CONFERENCE. WE TOLD THEM WE WERE OPPOSED AND FELT IT WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.

WARM REGARDS.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
MR 93-39, #53; NSC letter 2/14/94
By Let, NARA, Date 11/10/94

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

RELEASED IN PART 1.3 (A)(5)

NLF MR Case No 93-37 f59

Document No #69

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE 15 12457 APRIL 1975 VIA MARTIN CHANNEL

SAIGON 0704 IMMEDIATE

DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

Richard Smith
6 Aug 1975

APRIL 15, 1975

GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: GRAHAM MARTIN

REF: WH 50679

1. My "philosophy" is to reduce the American community as rapidly as it is humanly possible to do and still get all of them out alive. I had previously sent you in Saigon 683 the comment of General Loan of what would happen in case of general evacuation. Listening to Mansfield, Church and Jackson on the radio, reading the newspapers, the NY Times editorial, all the leaks out of Washington, including even the code name "Talon Vise", and watching the pressure build up at home, I have been expecting your message. Whatever the reasons for setting the deadline of April 19th in the President's speech for completion of legislative action, it put us on a very short fuse here about both our drawdown and about time for the RVNAF to prove by decisive action that the "will to fight" is still very much alive. Action over the past days has established that, but it is difficult to get it into Congressional perceptions so soon. I shall comment on this in a

DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 12356, Sec 3.4
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED.
E.O. 12356, Sec 1.3 (a) (5)
State ltr. 11/5/93
By KBH, NARA, Date 2/11/94

AMB:GMartin:ok ~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
4/15/75.

RELEASED IN PART B1 (b)(3)

separate message.

2. Panic in Saigon arising from our actions in Washington, the nature of our actions here, and the increasing drumfire of statement and press comments is a far greater worry to me than North Vietnamese capabilities, as formidable as the latter are. I received a few moments ago the following memorandum which emphasizes the gravity of the effect of our actions on our Vietnamese friends:

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BEGIN TEXT:

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Ambassador

SUBJECT: Concern Among Top GVN Officials that U. S. Embassy Action in Preparing to Evacuate U. S. and Vietnamese Personnel is Contributing to the Level of Panic Among the Local Population.

1. In a 15 April 1975 discussion between Presidential Special Assistant for Military and Security Affairs Lieutenant General Dang Van Quang and a staff aide to Quang, considerable time was given to reviewing the recent actions of the U. S. Embassy in its preparations to evacuate. Quang's staff aide pointed out that a "census" is being conducted at the Embassy for the purpose of deciding who among the Vietnamese and Americans are to leave. The aide, who did much of the talking, said that he has been approached by a number of friends and relatives who are "panicking" because of the Embassy's action.

The aide noted that those Americans who speak Vietnamese are "all" talking to their Vietnamese employees about their own preparations to leave. The aide continued that in the population's mind, there is growing concern about why the "Americans are abandoning us," both the government and the entire nation. The aide stressed that the "mental condition" of the people now is "very bad," the "period is very dangerous," and now the Americans are doing a "crazy" thing like this. He added that the people will not listen to the government; now they look at the Americans preparing to depart and they, too, want to leave.

2. In response to this discussion, Quang immediately brought the matter up with Minister of Information Brigadier General Phan Hoa Hiep. Quang first noted that a census is being conducted at the Embassy, that Embassy personnel (U. S.) are making "massive preparation to evacuate" and that this is "starting a panic." Quang instructed Hiep to talk directly with the Americans on this -- to do so in low key but with firmness. Hiep is to say that U. S. Embassy action, in addition to the speech given by President Ford, is creating panic and causing popular morale to waver. Further, Hiep is to say that the Americans should conduct their survey quietly, and should "reduce their activities" and not let the Vietnamese know what is happening because the "Vietnamese will spread the story"

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and panic will set in. END TEXT.

3. In essence, whether the President is blamed for trouble here, or not, will depend on the soundness of my judgment and the coolness with which it is applied to getting the drawdown completed, and the plans in complete final shape for a complete evacuation should that become necessary. With complete cooperation from Washington, the vigor with which we fight on the hill, and the bit of luck I've always had, we will come out of this phase intact. The most calming influence in Saigon is my wife who goes about her regular way, makes appointments for weeks in advance, and who has refused to pack anything at all although we would hate like hell to lose our most valued possessions.

4. I have reduced the State contingent of the Mission to 106. We will move out 11 this week. Only six dependents - all senior wives - will be left by the 20th. The USIS contingent will be down to 7 by the 20th. The AID complement has been reduced to 150, and we will be down to that figure by 1 May. Sixty-six will be leaving this week. [redacted] 1.3,A5 [redacted] DAO civilian direct hire will be reduced to 398 by April 20. By the 20th they will still have 470 dependents, 367 of them non-American, all of whom

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with the new parole authority we expect to have out by 1 May. By the 20th we will be down to 1,124 American employees, well below your goal and this will be further reduced to slightly under 1,000 by 1 May.

5. Now that we finally have the parole authority we will reduce the 600 dependents of this group to about 50 by 1 May.

7. Our primary problem is the contractors. With the parole authority we will be able to cut substantially into this group, most of whom would not leave without their Vietnamese dependents. From the present 1,072 contractors (824-DAO) with a total of 1,416 dependents, we plan to reduce to 1,000 by 1 May.

8. We will have only about 250 American businessmen, press, missionaries, VOLAG personnel left on April 20th, and we do not expect much reduction. We are doing everything we can to pressure the approximately 1,450 military retirees, ex-contractors, and others who ~~luxxxdoobed~~ love the lotus life too much to leave. We expect to have indifferent success with this latter group until the last moment. They have been through it all too many times before to be impressed by yet another wave of panic.

MARTIN

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Tân Dân thời-báo

BỘI SỐ 17

TRẠI Chaffee, Ark.

20—5—75

THU BA NGAY

THỜI-SỰ QUỐC-TẾ

(Saigon-AP) - Nguồn tin phát thanh từ Sai Gon cho hay một số dân đang bị đói ở Thủ Đô miền Nam VN. Bản tin cho biết hàng đoàn dân tị nạn trước khi Thủ Đô bị Cộng Sản chiếm đã gặp phải nhiều tệ trạng. Những đài phát thanh cũng cho hay tân chính phủ đã phân phối 1.100 tấn gạo cho 220.000 dân.

(Nam Vang)- Đài phát thanh Nam Vang cho biết nhân dân Kamphuchia dù già hay trẻ cũng đang được phân loại tùy theo khả năng làm việc của họ, để phục hồi xứ sở đã bị chiến tranh tàn phá. Ở một thành phố nọ, bản tin cho hay các thanh niên làm việc ngoài đồng, các ông già thu dọn những đống gạch vụn do chiến tranh gây ra. Còn các bà già thì lo bếp nước và trẻ con thì chăn bò.

(Trại Ft. Chaffe - UPI)- Theo nguồn tin của một viên chức dân sự cao cấp ở Ft. Chaffee thì lời thỉnh nguyện được trở lại miền Nam Vietnam của 47 người tị nạn đã được chuyển tới chính phủ Hoa Kỳ. Ông Donald MacDonald, phối trí viên của Lực Lượng Đặc Nhiệm nói rằng Cơ Quan Quốc Tế thuộc Cao Uỷ Tị Nạn của Liên Hiệp Quốc tại Geneve, Thụy Sĩ là cơ quan điều hành việc tái định cư. Ông MacDonald còn tuyên bố rằng một viên chức chính phủ Hoa Kỳ ở Ft. Chaffee đã gặp những người tị nạn yêu cầu được trở về Vietnam hôm thứ Bảy vừa qua và đã đoan chắc với họ rằng đang có sự sắp xếp để thỏa mãn thỉnh nguyện của họ.

(Saigon-AP)- Đài phát thanh miền Nam VN cho hay một chiếc tàu chở các chính khách đối lập với chính quyền cũ đã cập bến Saigon. Hàng trăm tù chính trị đã được chở từ Côn đảo trở về. Côn đảo xưa kia nổi tiếng về "Chuồng Cọp". Bản tin cho hay 1.300 tù chính trị đã từ ngục tù Côn đảo trở về.

Bản tin phát thanh còn cho biết một chiếc tàu Hải Quân đã tự nguyện trở lại VN sau khi chạy trốn vào lúc chế độ cũ đầu hàng vào tháng qua.

(Bangkok-AP)- Hôm nay chính phủ Hoa Kỳ đã gởi công hàm đến Thái Lan tỏ ý rất tiếc đã xử dụng căn cứ của Thái để cứu chiếc thương thuyền Mayaguez và Tổng Trưởng Ngoại Giao Thái cho rằng bức công hàm đó là một lời xin lỗi chính thức. Do đó ông nói Thái lan mong đợi nối lại mối giây thân thiện với Hoa Kỳ. Ông nói "Những gì đã qua hãy để cho nó trôi vào dĩ vãng".

TRỞ VỀ VIỆT-NAM

Đồng bào tị nạn Việtnam nào có ý định trở về nước, xin liên lạc với Đại Diện Chánh Phủ Hoa-Kỳ tại bldg. 1479 vào buổi sáng từ 11 giờ đến 12 giờ hàng ngày. Những người đã ghi tên rồi không cần phải liên-lạc nữa.

Chính-Phủ Hoa-Kỳ sẽ thu xếp phương-tiện di-chuyển cho những đồng-bào này. Tuy nhiên công việc thu xếp sẽ phải mất một thời gian. Khi có kết-quả chúng tôi sẽ thông-báo sau.

TIN NỘI BỘ

Mỗi ngày từ thứ hai đến thứ sáu đều có chương-trình phát thanh bằng Việt-Ngữ trên đài phát-thanh Fort Smith bằng-tần số KMHW 13,20 vào hồi 9g00 sáng. Xin Đồng-bào nhớ đón nghe.

Văn phòng đại diện các Bác Sĩ VN trước đặt tại tòa nhà số 1780 nay đã dời sang tòa nhà số 1686. Mọi liên lạc với Ban Đại Diện xin đến tòa nhà trên, sáng từ 10g. đến 11g., chiều từ 4g. đến 5g.

NHIỆM-VỤ CỦA QUAN-CẢNH

Quân Cảnh Mỹ từ Texas đến Ft. Chaffe với ba nhiệm vụ chính:

1. Kiểm soát sự di-chuyển của mọi người và xe cộ. Kiểm-soát sự ra vào trại tạm trú của mọi người hầu bảo vệ tài sản cho đồng bào tị nạn. Chỉ cho phép những người có phận sự mới được ra vào trại tạm-trú.

2. Giữ gìn trật tự, kỷ-luật cho trại Chaffee nói chung và trại tạm cư nói riêng. Xin báo ngay cho Quân - Cảnh mọi sự phạm pháp hay tai nạn xảy ra, bất cứ lúc nào.

3. Giữ gìn an-ninh trong trại bằng cách đề phòng sự xâm nhập của những người lạ mặt không có thẩm quyền vào trại. Ngăn ngừa ẩu đả, cãi vã, phá rối trật tự giữa các cá-nhân hay các nhóm người.

Tóm lại, nhiệm vụ của Quân Cảnh là bảo vệ lẽ phải, tài-sản cho đồng bào. Mọi trại viên đều có quyền và được khuyến khích trong việc gọi Quân-Cảnh lúc hữu sự.

Đồn Quân-Cảnh tọa lạc tại dãy nhà số 1355, điện-thoại số 2666.

LỘ-TRÌNH XE BUÝT

Lộ trình 1: Ký hiệu bằng mầu "NÂU" sẽ chạy quanh khu-vực cư-ngụ, có thể dùng để đi lại trong phạm-vi này.

Lộ trình 2: Mầu "VÀNG" sẽ chạy theo 4th street và chở hành khách đi bệnh viện, ngân-hàng rồi trở về theo 4th street.

Lộ trình 3: Mầu "ĐỎ" sẽ di-chuyển giữa khu cư-ngụ và khu lấy thẻ căn-cước nhập trại.

Lộ trình 4: Mầu "XANH" dùng để chở đồng bào đã hoàn tất thủ-tục ở bệnh viện về khu Di Trú, Nhập Tịch, An-Ninh Xã Hội và ngược lại.

LỊCH-TRÌNH ĐỔI KHĂN TRẢI GIƯỜNG, ÁO GỐI.

Lịch trình đổi khăn trải giường và áo gối áp dụng mỗi tuần bắt đầu từ ngày 19-5-1975

Ngày	Trại số	Địa điểm	
Thứ Hai	1605 - 1612	Bldg	1636
	1618 - 1625	"	"
	1269 - 1277	"	1308
	1414 - 1425	"	1529
	1427 - 1438	"	"
	1446 - 1451	"	"
	1126 - 1137	"	1146
	1010 - 1021	"	1077
Thứ Ba	1627 - 1639	"	1636
	1641 - 1652	"	"
	1276 - 1283	"	1308
	1300 - 1311	"	1308
	1459 - 1464	"	1529
	1466 - 1477	"	"
	1500 - 1511	"	"
	1139 - 1150	"	1146
	1152 - 1163	"	"
Thứ Tư	1654 - 1665	"	1636
	1667 - 1678	"	"
	1329 - 1335	"	1308
	1513 - 1524	"	1529
	1526 - 1537	"	"
	1165 - 1176	"	1146
	1049 - 1060	"	1077
Thứ Năm	1700 - 1711	"	1636
	1713 - 1724	"	"
	1336 - 1340	"	1308
	1346 - 1352	"	"
	1541 - 1546	"	1529
	1551 - 1556	"	"
	1558 - 1560	"	"
	1200 - 1211	"	1146
	1213 - 1219	"	"
	1062 - 1073	"	1077
	1075 - 1086	"	"
Thứ Sáu	1730 - 1735	Bldg	1636
	1739 - 1745	"	"
	1748 - 1754	"	"
	1756 - 1761	"	"
	1361 - 1365	"	1308
	1406 - 1412	"	"
	1562 - 1569	"	1529
	1571 - 1581	"	"
	1220 - 1224	"	1146
	1232 - 1237	"	"
	1244 - 1250	"	"
	1100 - 1111	"	1077
	1113 - 1124	"	"

Mọi chi-tiết xin liên-lạc với ông Pierre, nhân-viên phụ-trách tại bldg 1627 trong giờ làm việc.

TIN TIẾP LIỆU

Kể từ nay trại tạm cư được chia ra làm 5 khu:

Khu 1:	từ dãy nhà số	1605 - 1761
Khu 2:	"	1414 - 1581
Khu 3:	"	1269 - 1412
Khu 4:	"	1126 - 1250
Khu 5:	"	1010 - 1124

Mỗi khu kể trên sẽ có một điểm tiếp-liệu để phân-phối tiếp-liệu cho đồng bào từng khu. Các điểm tiếp liệu sẽ hoạt động theo các giờ sau đây:

- Sáng: 9g. - 11g.
- Chiều: 14g.30 - 16g.30

VẤN-ĐỀ VỆ-SINH DOANH-TRẠI

Xin quí trại trưởng nhắn nhủ đồng bào:

1. Giữ gìn sạch sẽ trong và ngoại trại.
2. Đừng vứt rác bừa bãi mà bỏ vào thùng rác và luôn luôn có nắp đậy.
3. Giữ gìn nhà vệ-sinh thật sạch sẽ.
4. Tham-gia các công-tác vệ-sinh chung.

Ban "Vệ Sinh Doanh Trại" của người Hoa Kỳ sẽ thường xuyên đến thanh tra và sẽ có biện pháp chế tài đối với những trại nào dơ bẩn. Xin đồng bào lưu ý để tránh mọi sự than phiền và khó khăn về sau.


CHƯƠNG TRÌNH CHIẾU BÓNG

Cinema 1: Xuất 18g.45 và 20g.45 tại nhà số 1667. Phim "Blood From the Mummy's Tomb".

Cinema 2: Xuất 19g. và 21g. tại nhà số 1576 Phim "Cartoon Festival".

Cinema 3: Xuất 19g.15 và 21g.15 tại nhà số 1435. Phim "Jesus Christ Superstar".

Cinema 4: Xuất 19g. 30 và 21g.30 tại nhà số 1108. Phim "Winter Comes Early".



Tờ "Tân Dân Thời Báo" này do Lực Lượng Đặc Nhiệm của Fort Chaffee thực hiện hàng ngày và không xem như một tài liệu chính thức. Các quan điểm được bày tỏ nơi đây, nếu có, không nhất thiết là của Bộ Lục Quân Hoa Kỳ. Mọi ý kiến hoặc bài vở, xin gởi thẳng cho Lực Lượng Đặc Nhiệm 1 JFKCENMA, Bldg số 1592 Ft Chaffee, Arkansas 72905, điện-thoại 501-484-2922, hoặc Phòng Điều Hành Trại Tạm Cư, Bldg số 1685.

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UNITED STATES ARMY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

4 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vietnam Assessment

In accordance with your instructions, I visited South Vietnam during the period 28 March - 4 April. I have completed my assessment of the current situation there, analyzed what the Government of the Republic of Vietnam intends to do to counter the aggression from the North, assured President Thieu of your steadfast support in this time of crisis, and examined the options and actions open to the United States to assist the South Vietnamese.

The current military situation is critical, and the probability of the survival of South Vietnam as a truncated nation in the southern provinces is marginal at best. The GVN is on the brink of a total military defeat. However, the South is planning to continue to defend with their available resources, and, if allowed respite, will rebuild their capabilities to the extent that United States support in materiel will permit. I believe that we owe them that support.

We went to Vietnam in the first place to assist the South Vietnamese people--not to defeat the North Vietnamese. We reached out our hand to the South Vietnamese people, and they took it. Now they need that helping hand more than ever. By every measure we have been able to apply 20,000,000 people have told the world they fear for their lives, they cherish values that are closely allied with those of non-communist systems, they desperately seek the opportunity to continue their development of a way of life different from those who now live under North Vietnamese rule.

The present level of U.S. support guarantees GVN defeat. Of the $700 million provided for FY 1975, the remaining $150 million can be used for a short time for a major supply operation; however, if there is to be any real chance of

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By DAD NLF Date 11/19/80

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success, an additional $722 million is urgently needed to bring the South Vietnamese to a minimal defense posture to meet the Soviet and PRC supported invasion. Additional U.S. aid is within both the spirit and intent of the Paris Agreement, which remains the practical framework for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

The use of U.S. military airpower to reinforce Vietnamese capabilities to blunt the North Vietnamese invasion would offer both a material and psychological assist to GVN and provide a much needed battlefield pause. I recognize, however, the significant legal and political implications which would attend the exercise of this option.

Given the speed at which events are moving, there is one other matter you should consider. For reasons of prudence, the United States should plan now for a mass evacuation of some 6,000 U.S. citizens and tens of thousands of South Vietnamese and Third Country Nationals to whom we have incurred an obligation and owe protection. The lessons of Danang indicate that this evacuation would require as a minimum a U.S. task force of a reinforced division supported by tactical air to suppress North Vietnamese artillery and anti-aircraft, as required. At the appropriate time, a public statement of this policy should be made and the North Vietnamese clearly warned "of U.S. intention to use force to safely evacuate personnel". Authority should be obtained to authorize appropriate use of military sanctions against North Vietnam if there is interference with the evacuation.

United States credibility as an ally is at stake in Vietnam. To sustain that credibility we must make a maximum effort to support the South Vietnamese now.

A more detailed analysis is contained in the attached report.

Respectfully,

FRED C. WEYAND
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

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As stated

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REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

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INTRODUCTION

On 24 March 1975 you directed me to conduct a fact finding mission to the Republic of Vietnam. My task was to:

Assess the current military situation and probable North Vietnamese intentions during the current offensive.

Determine and assess what the Government of the Republic of Vietnam is now doing and intends to do in coping with this offensive and with its impact on both the military and civilian sectors.

Determine what the United States Government can do to bolster South Vietnamese military capabilities and to alleviate suffering among the civilian population.

Assure President Thieu that this Administration remains steadfast in its support of the efforts by the Republic of Vietnam to resist North Vietnamese aggression and that it will do what it can to provide the materiel assistance necessary for the defense of the republic.

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By DAD NLF Date 11/19/80

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I. THE CURRENT SITUATION

A. The Background

The Paris Agreement of 27 January 1973 marked not the beginning of peace in Vietnam, but instead the beginning of a Communist build-up of supplies and equipment for continued North Vietnamese military aggression in Vietnam. In the ensuing 26 months since the Agreement was signed, North Vietnam rebuilt the Ho Chi Minh Trail into a major all-weather supply artery. They built pipelines extending 330 miles into South Vietnam for movement of their POL. With this major supply system in full operation, they quadrupled their field artillery, greatly increased their anti-aircraft and sent six times as much armor into South Vietnam as they had in January 1973 (See Table A). At the same time, they increased their troop strength by almost 200,000 men. All of these actions were in direct violation of the Paris Agreement. The US, by contrast, did not fulfill its obligations to maintain South Vietnamese equipment and materiel levels as they were authorized to do under the Agreement. Ground ammunition declined by 30% from 179 thousand short tons at the cease fire to 126 thousand short tons when the current NVA offensive began. Shortages of POL and spare parts curtailed operations of the South Vietnamese Air Force by 50%.

The historical record outlined above set the stage for the current situation in South Vietnam. This situation is both fluid and fragile. It changed markedly during the month of March and has the potential for further rapid change in the weeks, or even days, immediately ahead.

On 10 March, the Communists launched "Phase II" of their 1975 campaign. Two North Vietnamese Army Divisions assaulted Ban Me Thuot, a strategic cross-roads in the western highlands, which was lightly defended by ARVN. At about the same time, North Vietnamese Army units west of Saigon initiated a systematic effort to eliminate the GVN presence, give the Communists a shortened, more secure infiltration corridor south into the Mekong Delta and, simultaneously, to interdict the only two roads between Saigon and Tay Ninh.

In mid-February, President Thieu sent Senator Tran Van Lam to the US as a private emissary to assess the mood of Congress with respect to Vietnam and the prospects for favorable Congressional action on aid legislation. Lam submitted a very pessimistic appraisal, which Thieu felt was confirmed by the early March votes of the House Democratic caucus. Thieu was digesting Lam's bleak estimate when the Communists launched the aforementioned "Phase II" attacks. Thieu saw his country faced with a major Communist offensive coinciding with a curtailment, and possible cessation, of US aid. He and his military advisors therefore decided that a drastic strategic retrenchment was essential to the GVN's survival.

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This new strategic concept entailed writing off most of the mountainous, sparsely populated portions of MR's 1 and 2 to concentrate the GVN's assets and resources on defending MR's 3 and 4 plus the coastal lowlands of MR's 1 and 2, the agriculturally productive areas of South Vietnam in which the bulk of the population resided. This strategy was sound in concept and Thieu's estimate of its necessity was correct. Its execution, however, was disastrous.

In a 13 March meeting with his MR 1 Commander, General Truong, President Thieu outlined his new strategic concept and his resultant decision to withdraw the Airborne Division from MR 1 to MR 3, despite General Truong's strong objection that the withdrawal of the airborne division would make the GVN's position in MR 1 untenable. During the next twelve days (13-25 March) there was vacillation, both in Mr 1 and in Saigon, over what portions of MR 1 were to be held--and particularly, whether any attempt should be made to defend Hue. As a result of the changing orders he was receiving from Saigon, General Truong had to revise his troop deployment plans at least three times, even as the North Vietnamese Army attack was steadily increasing in intensity. Quang Tri City was evacuated in orderly fashion on 19 March, but before a new GVN defense line could be stabilized along the My Chanh River, territorial forces in the area began evaporating in the face of North Vietnamese pressure; Saigon recalled the last airborne brigade in MR 1, and an unravelling process began. North Vietnamese pressure mounted daily at a sharply increasing rate. Hue was evacuated on 25 March, but by then NVA units had cut Route 1 south of the city and the removal of Hue's 20,000 defenders, including most of ARVN's 1st Division, became largely dependent on haphazard, improvised sealift operations. During this same period, over-extended GVN units in Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai Provinces, were being dispersed or defeated piecemeal by advancing NVA forces.

The GVN's presence in MR 1 collapsed into an enclave at Da Nang. What was left of the GVN's effective strength in that region--basically the Marine Division and a part of the 3rd ARVN Division--tried to set up a defense of Da Nang, but the effort was not successful. Arrayed against the GVN's 10,000 odd organized defenders were over 30,000 NVA troops advancing with the momentum of success. Further compounding the situation's problems was the influx of more than a million refugees. With a total of close to 2 million people increasingly desperate to get out, panic spread and on 28 March order collapsed. NVA tanks began moving into the town soon thereafter. No more than 50,000 refugees were brought out by air or by sea, and the GVN succeeded in extracting approximately 22,000 troops, including about 9,000 marines and 4,000 - 5,000 troops from the 2nd and 3rd ARVN divisions, but the fate of the remainder of Da Nang's civil and military population is unknown.

In MR 2, President Thieu and his regional commander, General Phu, met at Cam Ranh Bay on 14 March to discuss the situation in light of the loss of

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Ban Me Thuot. At that meeting, President Thieu outlined his new strategic concept to withdraw from the highlands and consolidate GVN forces for defense of vital coastal areas. The exact wording of the President's orders are not known, but General Phu interpreted them as authorizing at his discretion the immediate, total evacuation of Pleiku and Kontum Provinces, for which no plans or preparations had been made. The exodus began in the next two days, with the evacuating ARVN forces following Highway 14 and Route 7B across Phu Bon and Phu Yen Provinces to the coast at Tuy Hoa. Compounding the already severe difficulties inherent in this unplanned exodus, 7B was a secondary road, virtually unused for years, with many bridges out and no fords prepared. Command and control broke down. The six ranger groups and one infantry regiment from Kontum and Pleiku became interspersed among the increasingly desperate 200,000 odd civilians fleeing with the exfiltrating column. At least two and possibly three NVA regiments wheeled northward from Darlac to Phu Bon and Phu Yen Provinces to harass the column, systematically and methodically engaging the dispersed ARVN military units, none of which were combat effective when the column's lead elements entered Tuy Hoa City on 26 March. The carnage inflicted en route on the hapless civilian refugees was horrendous.

While the above events were in train, the GVN diverted one airborne brigade from the Hue area to Khanh Hoa Province to block the two to four NVA regiments pursuing the remnants of the 23rd ARVN eastward from Ban Me Thuot across Darlac Province. The 23rd Division already battered by its stand at Ban Me Thuot, had virtually ceased to exist as an organized unit by the time its survivors began trickling into Nha Trang.

B. The Present Situation

The military situation existing in the first week in April has to be assessed in light of what happened in March. Amid the general chaos in MR's 1 and 2, a number of ARVN units performed well. Without the effectiveness of the Marines and some elements of the 3rd ARVN, no one would have gotten out of Da Nang. In Ban Me Thuot, elements of the 23rd ARVN held out for more than a week against two NVA divisions. The 40th and 41st regiments of ARVN's 22nd division fought savagely to delay superior NVA forces from breaking through to the coast at Qui Nhon in Binh Dinh Province. The net effect of March's events, however, has been severely adverse both in concrete terms and, even more, in psychological ones.

Communist forces have the momentum of success and though they have suffered casualties which may have been heavy, they are being augmented daily by fresh replacements and supplies from North Vietnam (Table, TAB A). During the last three weeks in March, five ARVN divisions, twelve Ranger Groups and two brigade equivalents of armor have been rendered combat ineffective. Officers and men from these units can be regrouped into new formations, but virtually all of their equipment has been lost. Many other GVN units have suffered heavy losses in personnel and equipment.

As of 1 April, Communist combat forces in South Vietnam, predominately North Vietnamese Army units and personnel, totalled over 200,000 organized

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into 123 regiments--71 infantry, 7 sapper, 4 armor, 16 artillery and 25 AAA*.

Comparable, currently effective ARVN ground combat forces total just over 54,000 troops, organized in 39 regiments/brigades or equivalents--18 infantry regiments, 2 armored brigades, 5 ranger groups, 3 airborne and 2 marine brigades**. Given replacement equipment, effective ARVN combat manpower and unit strengths can be augmented by new units formed out of the personnel remnants of the units dispersed during the March battles in MR's 1 and 2, but this will take time. As of 1 April, the predominantly North Vietnamese Communist combat force in South Vietnam outnumbers equivalent GVN forces just under 3 to 1 in size.

Territorially, all of MR 1 has been lost by the GVN, along with most of MR 2***. The GVN currently holds a coastal lowland strip running southward from about Cam Ranh to the MR 3 border, plus the southern portion of Tuyen Duc Province. Lam Dong Province fell on 1 April, Dalat City was evacuated on 2 April and what is left of Tuyen Duc Province is disintegrating.

In MR 3, Phuoc Long Province was lost in January. In March there was further territorial erosion in a broad arc about 50 miles west, north and east of Saigon. The fighting in MR 3 has been sporadic and, on occasion, heavy but there, the ARVN has basically held its own during the past three weeks. In MR 3, ARVN forces do not yet face the problem of being significantly outnumbered. Though the Communists are already applying severe pressure in several areas (e.g., Tay Ninh and around Xuan Loc) and are clearly planning a round of new attacks, GVN forces by and large are holding their own and fighting well, and in the process have badly mauled a few Communist units. Barring a wholesale morale erosion on the part of

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*See Table, Tab B, for details. This does not include administrative service and combat support personnel, nor does it include Viet Cong provincial and district territorial units.

**See Table, Tab C, for details. These figures do not include the South Vietnamese Air Force or Navy, nor do they include the Regional and Popular Forces, Police Field Forces or other miscellaneous non-ARVN units. Strength estimates for the GVN Regional Forces are included in the table as part of the GVN's overall armed strength. With some specific exceptions, these territorial units, however, were ineffective during the March campaigns in MR's 1 and 2, often dispersing and dissolving at the first serious probes (or even appearance) of North Vietnamese Army line units. ARVN commanders in MR's 3 and 4 generally doubt the territorials would be more effective in the face of heavy North Vietnamese attacks in the lower half of the country. As a consequence, territorial forces are being upgraded into the regular ARVN structure.

***See Maps (Tab D).

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ARVN forces or a significant further increase in Communist strength beyond that of the past week, the GVN should be able to hold the situation in MR 3 about as it stood on 3 April, at least for the immediate future.

In the Mekong Delta (MR 4), the past several weeks have not seen any appreciable change. Opposing regular combat forces are about evenly matched (See Tables, Tabs B & C). The tactical situation could deteriorate rapidly if additional Communist units come into the area or if the GVN should redeploy to MR 3 any one of the three ARVN divisions now assigned to MR 4.

Militarily, the GVN is on the defensive and beleaguered. March's military reverses and their attendant consequences--the loss of territory, military and civilian casualties, and the enormous population dislocation of the more than two million civilian refugees--have had a heavy, adverse impact on the whole political and social structure of South Vietnam. Just how heavy, extensive or lasting is hard to tell, partly because the South Vietnamese people are in a state of shock and because a full knowledge of what actually has happened in MR's 1 and 2 is not yet widespread, even in Saigon, let alone the populated rural areas in MR 3 or the still prosperous and agriculturally busy Mekong Delta.

C. North Vietnamese Plans and Intentions

North Vietnam's intentions are hard to discern and its next moves are probably the subject of active discussion now being conducted by the Lao Dong Politburo in Hanoi. Such evidence as is available suggests that Hanoi is weighing two broad options:

a. Exert a maximum effort to exploit the recent tactical successes and present battlefield advantage of the North Vietnamese Army in an all out effort to collapse the GVN and eliminate it as a functioning political entity.

b. Consolidate recent gains and try for one or two more major victories (e.g., disperse the 25th ARVN Division and/or capture Tay Ninh), then call for negotiations on terms tantamount to a GVN surrender, planning to try again for military victory later in 1975 or 1976 if the GVN can not be pressured politically into accepting some form of "coalition government" that would give the Communists de facto political control over South Vietnam.

From the time the Paris Agreement was signed in 1973, Hanoi has been steadily improving its military capabilities in South Vietnam through a continuous improvement of its logistic infrastructure (roads, trails, depots, etc., in both Laos and South Vietnam) and a continuous infusion of supplies, equipment and troops--all in direct violation of Article 7 of the 1973 Agreement. This flow has peaked and valleyed over the past 26 months, but it has never stopped.

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In the summer of 1974, when the GVN's overall position looked promising, this manpower and supply flow augmenting North Vietnam's invading expeditionary force in the South was down. It began to pick up soon after last summer's political developments within the United States and diminishing Congressional support for continued assistance to South Vietnam. The logistic flow of men and materiel out of North Vietnam--and, hence, the North Vietnamese Army's capabilities in the south--began to pick up in the latter part of 1974. The pace has been intense since the beginning of 1975, was increased in February and March, and is now going at full throttle.

Hanoi certainly had planned a significant level of offensive action this spring. In retrospect, the "Phase I" January campaign (which overran Phuoc Long Province), among other things, seems to have been a test of whether the US would react to what even Hanoi must have considered a blatant violation of the 1973 Paris Agreement. Judging from the Communists subsequent behavior--e.g., the sharply rising build-up, introduction of North Vietnamese strategic reserve units, the assault on Ban Me Thuot with two NVA divisions (one recently brought south from Hanoi's strategic reserve) and the increasing stridency with which the Communists have played the propaganda theme of US "impotence"--Hanoi seems to have decided that the US was too preoccupied with other problems to react significantly to anything North Vietnam did in Indochina.

Official party directives and high level instructions issued in January and February and even through the third week in March suggest that at least the initial objectives of the 1975 campaign were something less than near term total victory--i.e., an improved territorial position (probably including capture of Tay Ninh City), harassment and attrition of ARVN, and heavy overall pressure on the GVN. The main goal of this campaign appeared to be that of putting the Communists in a commanding position from which they could demand negotiations leading to a coalition government, and, if such were not forthcoming, from which they could launch a "final" assault in 1976.

How much Hanoi's goals may have escalated or its appetite been whetted by the past month's events in South Vietnam--and in the United States--is impossible to tell, particularly since even Hanoi has not had time to digest the most recent developments. The rate at which men and supplies are coming down from North Vietnam into South Vietnam, however, certainly suggests that Hanoi intends to keep pressing its invading expeditionary force's attacks.

II. MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS

The GVN is faced with an interlocking web of rapidly mounting problems which fall into three broad areas.

First, there are physical or concrete problems. The most important of these is the North Vietnamese Army--including its present size, increasing

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strength and aggressive activity. Then, there is the sheer magnitude of the past three weeks' losses in personnel and equipment which--unless or until replaced--puts an increasingly debilitated ARVN in a worsening position against a growing North Vietnamese threat. In the civil sphere, there is the concomitant magnitude of the refugee flow, uprooting close to ten per cent of the entire population, whose urgent needs for food, clothing, shelter, and medical care place enormous strains on the machinery of government. Meeting these refugees' immediate needs is in itself a massive problem but resettling them and absorbing them in the areas still under GVN control is an even more formidable task.

There are many other concrete problems that are intrinsically important (e.g., keeping the roads and lines of communication open, food supplies moving, maintaining basic law and order in areas inundated with refugees, controlling or checking Viet Cong subversion and terrorism in areas not under immediate conventional attack), but these are overshadowed by the three "physical" problems mentioned above.

In addition, there are a host of burgeoning, related problems which might be termed "administrative". These involve providing the leadership, guidance and direction necessary to cope with the physical problems noted above. They also involve the leadership and administration, military and civil, necessary to rally a nation after a series of defeats, check the spread of despondency and hopelessness, develop a sense of national unity and common purpose, and wage a war for survival. In a Vietnamese context, the situation requires the kind of leadership and effective administration Churchill and his War Cabinet gave Great Britain after Dunkirk and the fall of France. To date (as outlined in Section III below) this kind of leadership and administration is not evident--and in Vietnam, there is no English Channel to check the onrushing tide of invasion or provide a respite for regroupment.

Then there is a complex of psychological and attitudinal problems which, in the end, may prove the most important of all. In refugee-clogged coastal MR 2, the kind of fear and panic which erupted in Da Nang also rose to the surface before the GVN's position north of Cam Ranh collapsed. In MR 3 and Saigon, the people are shocked and bewildered. They may not yet have a sense of immediate personal danger and crisis, but that emotion is beginning to spread with increasing rapidity. In the Delta, where news of northern developments takes time to circulate, life is prosperous and there is no change in the pattern of the past two years' events yet perceptible to the ordinary citizen, people are perplexed and troubled but do not yet feel immediately threatened. The GVN has a little time in which to act before the full story of what has happened in MR 1 and MR 2 becomes widely known throughout the rest of the country; but the time is very short.

In the Army, the psychological problems are more focused and more intense. Army units in coastal MR 2 know they may soon be overwhelmed. Despite certain local tactical successes, the units in MR 3 could fall prey to a

[illegible] and [illegible] activity. Then, there is the sheer magnitude of the [illegible] which tended to [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

sense of defeatism and hopelessness. In the Delta, senior ARVN commanders assert that the morale of their troops is still good and that when attacked they will fight, but when talked to privately by Americans they know, and whose discretion they trust, these same commanders caution that their troops' morale could not stand the news of major defeats in MR 3.

One of the most serious psychological and attitudinal problems at all levels, military and civilian, is the belief that the South Vietnamese have been abandoned, and even betrayed, by the United States. The Communists are using every possible device of propaganda and psychological warfare to foster this view. The higher one goes in the social or hierarchical scale the greater the degree of sharpness and focus to such sentiments. Much of this emotion is keyed on the 1973 Paris Agreement and subsequent US withdrawal. It is widely believed that the GVN was forced to sign this agreement as a result of a private US-North Vietnamese deal under which the US was allowed to withdraw its forces and get its prisoners back in return for abandoning South Vietnam. This sense of abandonment has been intensified by what is widely perceived as a lack of public US acknowledgement of South Vietnam's current plight or willingness to provide needed support.

All of the above problems are interacting. One result of this interaction is a spreading loss of confidence in the GVN's top leadership, a sentiment felt throughout the politically aware population and mounting rapidly in the Army. President Thieu's inner core of senior advisors is felt to be disgraced. With every passing day, more of this bitterness and resentment is being focused on President Thieu himself. There is a general awareness that any coup attempt, even if successful, would probably be the ultimate disaster; but the odds are mounting that unless this crisis of confidence is dispelled, President Thieu will have to step down.

III. CURRENT GVN PLANS AND INTENTIONS

The GVN has what it calls a "strategic plan" but it is being revised almost daily in the light of events. A week ago (25 March) it envisioned an enclave at Da Nang and a southern defense line anchored on the coast at Binh Dinh or, failing that, just below Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen Province. The contemplated line was to swing through Tuyen Duc and Lam Dong Provinces, then to Xuan Loc in Long Khanh Province and over to Tay Ninh. Since the plan was developed, Da Nang has fallen, the GVN's position in coastal MR 2 has collapsed north of Cam Ranh.

The GVN intends to reorganize and refit the ARVN and Marine units decimated in last month's battles with all possible speed. It also intends to take other steps to augment ARVN's strength by upgrading significant numbers of territorial forces and Ranger groups. The success of all of this will depend on the degree to which RVNAF is able to correct serious deficiencies in command and control and its capacity to translate plans into coordinated action. President Thieu and General Vien are aware of the need and have promised corrective action.

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[illegible]

[illegible]

III. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

The refugee problem reflects similar deficiencies in planning and administration. There is a concern and desire to be helpful and sources of international sympathy and support which could be tapped, including funds, medical personnel, supplies, etc.. Dr. Dan--the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for refugees--is doing what he can, but there is, as yet, no internal GVN mechanism capable of addressing the intricate details and systematic follow through this enormous and complex problem requires. As a result, the burden tends to fall on a few officials, including local provincial ones, some of whom have been imaginative in coping with immediate crises but whose efforts are individual, fragmented and not part of an integrated whole.

Propaganda and psychological warfare and even essential governmental communication with the GVN's own people show similar deficiencies in overall concept and systematic follow through.

The GVN, in short, has hopes and aspirations, and a desire to cope, but few of these are focused, chanelled or truly organized. The government, especially the bureaucracy, is in a state of shock and bewilderment and the top echelons do not seem to have a full realization or comprehension of the magnitude of the GVN's many problems.

IV. CURRENT PROSPECTS

What happens in South Vietnam over the next month or so, let alone a longer time frame, depends very much on what is done--or not done--by North Vietnam, the GVN, and the United States during the next two to three weeks and even the next few days.

Unless North Vietnamese Forces are somehow checked in battle or Hanoi induced to pause by some form of diplomatic or other suasion, the North Vietnamese will defeat the GVN militarily. There is no evidence that the North Vietnamese are developing logistic problems or beginning to outrun their supplies. The southward march of one, let alone two, of Hanoi's five divisions now in MR 1 would be enough to seal the fate of the GVN's hold on coastal MR 2. If one of Hanoi's five divisions already in MR 2 were brought down into MR 3, particularly if augmented with more armor and artillery, that would tilt the present balance of forces in MR 3. The GVN's forces in the Delta have all they can handle with the North Vietnamese troops already in that region, and MR 4 could not hold if MR 3 collapsed in. the wake of defeats in MR's 1 and 2.

The above picture may be altered as the GVN deploys into MR 3 units reconstituted from the remnants of the ones recovered from MR 1 and MR 2. This, however, requires time to reorganize and equip. The odds are that in pure capability terms, the North Vietnamese can move and commit existing divisions within SVN faster than the GVN can form new ones.

As for the GVN, some steps--dramatic and demonstrably effective--have to be taken not just to prevent any near term deterioration in the GVN's

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military position in MR 3, but also--and perhaps more important--to give the population, and the RVNAF, a psychological lift and confidence in the GVN's top leadership. In the morale sphere, South Vietnam--at least in MR 3, including Saigon--is very near the brink of a slide into the kind of hopelessness and defeatism that could rapidly unravel the whole structure.

V. THE US ROLE AND POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

What the US does, or does not do, in the days immediately ahead will probably be as critical a determinant of the next few weeks' events as the actions or non-actions of Saigon or Hanoi. The US, alone, can not save South Vietnam but it can, however inadvertently, seal its doom.

My specific recommendations fall into two different categories. There are short term actions--partly physical but primarily psychological--needed to give South Vietnam a morale lift and, if possible, to induce Hanoi to pause. This buys nothing but time, but at the moment that time is urgently needed. Secondly, there are longer term actions, mainly material though still with a strong psychological dimension, which are necessary if South Vietnam is to have any hope of physically surviving the North Vietnamese onslaught or negotiating any settlement short of unconditional surrender.

The essential and immediate requirement is Vietnamese perception of US support. Perceptions are important in every respect. A perception of diminishing US support for South Vietnam encouraged the North Vietnamese to launch their current offensive. It was this same perception that caused the Republic of Vietnam to begin withdrawal from the dispersed and exposed positions in the northern provinces. These perceptions were shaped by the following actions: Immediately following the signing of the Paris Agreement, $1.6 billion was requested to meet the requirements of the South Vietnamese in FY 1974; $1.126 billion was provided--70% of the needs. A subsequent request for a $500 million supplemental was ultimately turned down. For the current fiscal year, $1.6 billion was requested to maintain a viable Vietnamese military capability for defense; $700 million was provided--44% of the stated requirement. These and related actions helped generate the crisis of confidence that precipitated the GVN strategy of retrenchment.

Now, the key to Vietnamese national survival is the GVN's ability to stabilize the situation, and to bring their military resources to bear in blunting the North Vietnamese offensive. Their ability to stabilize the situation hinges, to a very large extent, on the ability to convince the average soldier and citizen that all is not lost, and that the North Vietnamese can be stopped. Though this is largely a task for the Government of Vietnam, the actions of the US are vital in restoring confidence.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

The action which the US could take which would have the greatest immediate effect on Vietnamese perceptions--North and South--would be the use of US air power to blunt the current NVA offensive. Even if confined to South Vietnam and carried out for only a limited time, such attacks would take a severe toll on the North Vietnamese expeditionary force's manpower and supplies, and have a dramatic morale impact on North Vietnam's invading troops. These attacks would also give Hanoi's leaders' pause and raise concerns, which do not now exist, about the risks involved in ignoring a formal agreement made with the United States.

South Vietnamese military leaders at all levels have repeatedly cited the importance of B-52 attacks to the conduct of a successful defense against superior enemy forces and there is sound military justification for such a point of view.

The above comments convey only a military assessment. I recognize, however, the significant legal and political implications which would attend the exercise of such an action.

One important step that the US should take is to make it clear that the US supports South Vietnam. This should include positive statements by the President and other senior US officials. Sagging Vietnamese morale was clearly bolstered by the arrival of the United States team sent by the President to investigate the situation. Additional US actions of this nature would highlight US concern. In addition to statements from the Executive Branch, there should be an effort to insure that a broad spectrum of concern is evident in the United States. Support from Members of Congress; public statements from responsible individuals both in and outside of the Government; and understanding in the US press will foster changing US perceptions of the situation in Vietnam.

This effort could stress three principal themes:

--The Vietnamese people, with first-hand knowledge of life under both the Thieu Government and Communism, have clearly indicated their choice by "voting with their feet," as the East Germans did before the introduction of the Berlin Wall. The mass exodus from the northern provinces, in the face of hardships, danger and intense human suffering, is a true sign of their feelings. In their choice, none have fled north to Hanoi and North Vietnam--where there is no fighting, where there are no refugee columns, and where war has not touched since the Paris Agreement. The question is not an academic one to the individual Vietnamese; it is one of life and death. By their actions they have chosen liberty and possible death.

--South Vietnam is fighting a <u>defensive</u> war. US materiel is used to defend South Vietnam, while Soviet and Chinese tanks and war materiel are being used by the North Vietnamese for open, naked, defiant aggression. It is this North Vietnamese invasion, not the actions of the South Vietnamese, that has already required the Administration to seek additional support from the Congress.

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--We should continue to emphasize the effect of Vietnam on the credibility of any US commitment. The world clearly understands past US commitments to Vietnam. Our expenditure of lives and resources in pursuit of this commitment is well known to all. The governments of the world know the past, but will see any present inability to support the Vietnamese in their crisis of survival as a failure of US will and resolve. If we make no effort, our future credibility as perceived by ally and potential adversary alike will be lost for years to come.

Statements of US support are important, but it is also essential that the message be validated with concrete actions to demonstrate that the United States stands behind her ally. While the ultimate availability of military resources will rest with supplemental appropriations in the Congress for the current fiscal year, there is more than $150 million available from the $700 million voted in the Defense Appropriations Act. This money can be used to meet the most immediate needs now and in the next few weeks. However, the rapid expenditure of the remaining funds will soon exhaust US capabilities to provide support. A supplemental appropriations bill, probably for about $722 million, is urgently needed for basic military necessities to provide a chance for the survival of the Republic of Vietnam. Details of the requirement follow:

The present offensive campaign by the NVA has caused serious materiel losses which must be replaced now:

--Five ARVN Divisions have been destroyed or rendered combat ineffective and another division has been only partially salvaged. While at this writing an exact numerical count of personnel and equipment losses is impossible to obtain, the following are the presently known materiel losses:

GROUND MUNITIONS (DEPOT STOCKS ONLY)	$ 129.0 M
INDIVIDUAL & CREW SERVED WEAPONS	24.6 M
ARTILLERY	16.0 M
TRACK VEHICLES	85.0 M
WHEEL VEHICLES	77.0 M
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT	15.6 M
POL	6.3 M
MEDICAL	7.9 M
ENGINEER	1.8 M
GENERAL SUPPLY STOCKS	110.5 M
TOTAL	$ 473.7 M

S E C R E T

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[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
TOTAL	[illegible]

S E C R E T

--In addition the VNAF has lost 393 aircraft valued at $176.3 million, $52.8 million of air munitions, and $68.6 million of spare parts and support equipment.

--During the current offensive the Vietnamese Navy lost three craft valued at $2.4 million and $5.4 million in supplies and support equipment.

The total estimated cost for RVNAF military supplies and equipment lost in the current offensive is $779.2 million. These losses do not include basic load munitions, non-divisional support units or fixed facilities such as airfields, ports and military installations.

The GVN believes the current offensive can be blunted with military forces currently available and to be reconstituted. They contemplate retaining a reduced RVN consisting of the southeastern portion of the MR 2 lowlands, the southern two-thirds of MR 3 and all of MR 4. The territory to be held contains the bulk of the population and has the requisites for a viable political and economic entity. They are working on a reorganization plan which, if successfully implemented, could provide military protection for this truncated RVN.

At this writing, the GVN reorganization plan envisages reconstitution of four infantry divisions, conversion of 12 ranger groups into four ranger divisions and the upgrading of 27 mobile Regional Force Groups into 27 infantry regiments. To be effective, implementation must begin immediately. Under the critical assumption that the GVN can stabilize the present military situation, with the materiel and manpower resources presently at their disposal and within the limited remaining FY75 appropriation, they need immediate additional materiel replenishments which will require new authorizations and appropriations. Our estimate of these immediate requirements is:

--Equipment for four infantry divisions:	$ 138.6 M
--Conversion of 12 ranger groups to four divisions:	118.0 M
--Conversion of 27 RF groups to 27 ARVN Regiments:	69.6 M
--Ground munitions to sustain combat operations and reconstitute stockage levels:	198.0 M
--Air munitions to sustain combat operations and reconstitute stockage levels:	21.0 M
--POL products to sustain combat operations and insure adequate stockage levels:	10.4 M
--General supplies and repair parts:	21.0 M

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

--Medical Support (Hospitals & Supplies):	$ 7.0 M
--Aircraft (two C-130's), spares, ground support equipment, and airfield repairs:	44.9 M
--Cost of transportation of supplies and equipment:	93.7 M
TOTAL	$ 722.2 M

We estimate that the bulk of the above materials can be delivered to RVN within 45 days of availability of funds. It must be understood that without this supplemental funding, RVNAF's ammunition supply will be exhausted before the end of this fiscal year at the present level of combat. Reconstitution of combat ineffective units will not be possible without supplemental funding.

Beyond satisfying these immediate military requirements we should seek separate appropriations for refugee relief. The GVN should not be burdened with the expense of resettling over one million refugees when its resources are already needed for its fight for survival.

There is not and can not be any guarantee that the actions I propose will be sufficient to prevent total North Vietnamese conquest. The effort, however, should be made. What is at stake in Vietnam now is America's credibility as an ally. We must not abandon our goal of a free and independent South Vietnam.

NVA/INCREASED NVA WEAPONS IN RVN SINCE CEASEFIRE
(All Numbers Rough Estimates)

WEAPONS	ON HAND 23 JAN 73	MOVED IN THRU 1 MAR 75	TOTAL 1 MAR 75	MOVED IN 1 MAR-1 APR 75	TOTAL INCREASE 23 JAN 73-1 APR 75	MOVING SOUTH 1 APR 75
Field Arty Pieces (85, 122, 130MM)	85-105	270-380	355-485	15	285-395	30-40
Anti-Aircraft 12.8, 14.5, 23, 37, 57, 100MM	700	800	1500	250	1050	250
SA-2	----	15-25 LCHRS	15-25 LCHRS	16-25 LCHRS	31-50 LCHRS	Poss 50-75 LCHRS
SA-3	----	----------	----------	----------	----------	
ARMOR PT76, T54, T63, etc.	90-115	575-635	665-750	20-30	595-665	Unk

	ARRIVED BETWEEN 28 JAN 73 AND 1 MAR 75	ARRIVED DURING MARCH 1975	DETECTED APRIL ARRIVALS	ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL APRIL ARRIVALS	TOTAL
PERSONNEL INFILTRATION ARRIVALS IN RVN	195,400	19,400	23,400	10,000	248,300

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By DMD NLF Date 11/19/80

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DAO VC/NVA OB
MAJOR COMBAT UNITS IN RVN

	JAN 73		MAR 75			APR 75 (Change over Mar 75)			Moving to SVN	
	DIVS	REGTS	DIVS	BDES	Regts	Divs	Bdes	REGTS	Divs	REGTS
COUNTRY-WIDE	17 (16 Inf, 1 AA)	97 (85 Inf, 12 AA)	20 (+3) (15 Inf, 1 Arty 3 AA, 1 Sap)	4 (+4) (1 Inf, 2 Arty, 1 Armor)	117 (+20) (65 Inf, 16 Arty, 4 Armor, 24 AA, 1 SAM, 7 Sap)	22 (+2 Inf)	4 (No Change)	123 (+6 Inf)	4 (3 Inf, 1 AA)	16 (12 Inf, 3 AA, 1 SAM)
MR-1	9 (8 Inf, 1 AA)	50 (39 Inf/ Arty, 11 AA)	6 (-3) (4 Inf, 2 AD)	4 (+4) (1 Inf, 2 Arty, 1 Armor)	46 (-4) (20 Inf, 6 Arty, 2 Armor, 17 AA, 1 SAM)	6 (No Change)	4 (No Change)	50 (+1 Inf)		
MR-2	3 Inf	10 Inf/ Arty	4 Inf (+1)	-	23 (+15) (15 Inf, 3 Arty, 1 Armor, 4 AA)	6 (+2) (1 Inf, 1 AA)	-	27 (+4) (3 Inf, 1 AA)		
MR-3	2 Inf	17 (16 Inf/ Arty, 1 AA)	7 (+5) (4 Inf, 1 Arty, 1 Sap, 1 AA)	-	31 (+14) (15 Inf, 5 Arty, 1 Armor, 1 Sap, 3 AA)	8 (+1 Inf)	-	34 (+3 Inf)		
MR-4	3 Inf	20 Inf	3 Inf (No Change)	-	18 (-2) (15 Inf, 1 Sap, 2 Arty)	3 Inf (no Change)	-	18 (No Change)		

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TABLE

COMBAT UNITS IN SOUTH VIETNAM *

(NO. OF UNITS) (STRENGTH)

END-JANUARY 1975

	MR 1		MR 2		MR 3		MR 4		RVN	
Inf Regts	(10)	16,000	(7)	11,500	(9)	14,800	(9)	10,800	(35)	53,100
Armd Bdes	(1)	1,300	(1)	2,000	(1)	1,700	(1)	1,100	(4)	6,100
Arty Regts	(6)	7,800	(3)	3,900	(4)	5,200	(4)	5,000	(17)	21,900
Rgr Gps	(4)	4,800	(7)	8,400	(4)	5,000	(0)		(15)	18,200
Abn Bdes	(3)	4,500	(0)		(0)		(0)		(3)	4,500
Mar Bdes	(3)	6,000	(0)		(0)		(0)		(3)	6,000
TOTAL	(27)	40,400	(18)	25,800	(18)	26,700	(14)	16,900	(77)	109,800
RF BNS		20,000		32,000		33,000		40,000		125,000

END-FEBRUARY 1975

	MR 1		MR 2		MR 3		MR 4		RVN	
Inf Regts	(10)	16,000	(7)	11,500	(9)	14,800	(9)	10,800	(35)	53,100
Armd Bdes	(1)	1,300	(1)	2,000	(1)	1,700	(1)	1,100	(4)	6,100
Arty Regts	(6)	7,800	(3)	3,900	(4)	5,200	(4)	5,000	(17)	21,900
Rgr Gps	(4)	4,800	(8)	9,600	(4)	5,000	(0)		(16)	19,400
Abn Bdes	(3)	4,500	(0)		(1)	1,500	(0)		(4)	6,000
Mar Bdes	(3)	6,000	(0)		(1)	2,200	(0)		(4)	8,200
TOTAL	(27)	40,400	(19)	27,000	(20)	30,400	(14)	16,900	(80)	114,700
RF BNS		19,000		31,000		32,000		34,000		116,000


END-MARCH 1975

	MR 1		MR 2		MR 3		MR 4		RVN	
Inf Regts	(0)		(0)		(9)	11,800	(9)	12,000	(18)	23,800
Armd Bdes	(0)		(0)		(1)	1,500	(1)	1,500	(2)	3,000
Arty Regts	(0)		(0)		(5)	6,500	(4)	5,000	(9)	11,500
Rgr Gps	(0)		(0)		(5)	6,200	(0)		(5)	6,200
Abn Bdes	(0)		(0)		(3)		(0)		(3)	4,500
Mar Bdes	(0)		(0)		(0)	5,000	(2)		(2)	5,000
TOTAL	(0)	0	(0)	0	(23)	35,500	(16)	18,500	(39)	54,000
RF BNS		0		0		31,000		32,000		63,000

* Includes only personnel in combat effective units, does not include stragglers, processees, trainees, etc.

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GVN & COMMUNIST TERRITORIAL CONTROL */ JANUARY 1973



South Vietnam


- International boundary
- Province boundary
- National capital
- Province capital
- Da Lat — Autonomous municipality
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- Road
- Trail

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
NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION ARE NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE

Base 500877 5-72

* WHITE AREAS ARE CONSIDERED UNPOPULATED


Thailand
Laos
Cambodia
South China Sea
Gulf of Thailand
South Vietnam

GVN & COMMUNIST TERRITORIAL CONTROL / 31 MARCH 1975



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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/GDS

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
MR 91-16, #12 NSC ltr 8/20/92
By KBH NARA, Date 9/23/92

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, April 14, 1975
3:30 p.m.

PLACE: The White House
Washington, D.C.

President: I would hope we could consider this an executive session so we could have this a free and open session.

Sparkman: We just came from one.

President: We put a great deal of time and effort into the speech. There was unanimity in the Administration with what I said and the policies I recommended. I was therefore able to speak with conviction about where we should go.

Sparkman: I thought the first 30 minutes of your speech, which covered the world -- I don't know who wrote it but it was the best word structure I have seen and a great delivery.

I would like to hear from the two Secretaries.

President: Henry.

~~TOP SECRET~~ (XGDS (3))
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/GDS

Kissinger: Perhaps I should talk about the political situation and Jim will discuss the military situation and the figures we are requesting.

It is clear the military situation in South Vietnam is extremely difficult. North Vietnam has the military superiority. They have occupied much of the territory. It is caused in our view by too little assistance and incompetent management of the retreat. But whatever the reason, we are trying to bring about a political situation and a negotiation which would exploit the new balance of forces. We have thought that the U.S. should not be a principal agent in these negotiations but should rely on the South Vietnamese or others such as France. We are prepared to support negotiating efforts and the elements that are prepared to negotiate. This is a process which will take a few weeks to sort out in Saigon.

With respect to the legal situation on evacuation. We want to reduce the number of American citizens as soon as possible but not so fast as to precipitate a panic. The Embassy has resisted evacuation, but we have ordered it to get down to about 1,250. I would appreciate no mention of it.

President: We had a similar problem in Cambodia. We started with over 400 and had reduced it to about 75 when the time for evacuation came. We were prepared for 600 Americans and 300 Cambodians. We had few, because the gutsy Cambodians chose to stay and die rather than leave. So we got it down in an orderly manner to a manageable figure.

Kissinger: We offered the Cabinet members in Phnom Penh a chance to leave and without exception they stayed even though they were on the assassination list.

The total list of the people endangered in Vietnam is over a million. The irreducible list is 174,000. This doesn't mean we could get them out; it would be just those in overwhelming jeopardy. We would have to assemble them where we could get to them and have conditions where we could move them.

There are two Acts of Congress: the War Powers Act and the Indochina proscription. We think under the War Powers Act the President has authority with respect to evacuating American citizens; with the Indochina Act we would appreciate clarification. We think there is no authority for evacuation of Vietnamese.

[redacted] Perhaps I should talk about the political situation and how we see it and the military situation and the figures we are requesting.

It is clear the military situation in South Vietnam is extremely difficult. Sharp Thursday has the military experience. They have remained aloof of the battle. It is meant to put more for the little assistance and encouragement encouragement of the soldiers. But whatever the reasons, we are trying to bring about a political situation and a negotiation which would uphold the core interests of Saigon. We have thought that the U.S. should not be a principal agent in these negotiations but should only aid the South Vietnamese to achieve such an [redacted]. We are prepared to support negotiating efforts and the elections that are proposed by Saigon. This is a process which will take a few weeks to work out in Saigon.

I'd like to speak to the legal situation on extradition. We have to review the question of American citizens as soon as possible but not in time for the prosecutions [redacted]. The Embassy has received prosecutions, but we have advised it to get back to about 1 PM. I would appreciate any mention of it.

[redacted] We had a similar problem in Cambodia. We started with some aid and had ordered it to stop [redacted] when the Lon Nol administration [redacted]. We have proposed for the Americans and for Cambodians. We had to [redacted] because the group Cambodians chose to stay had the method that basis. We've got it down to an orderly manner to a manageable figure.

[redacted] We advised the Cabinet members in Phnom Penh a chance to leave and evacuate a couple that stayed even though they were on the evacuation list.

The total list of the people underground in Vietnam is over a million. The evacuation [redacted] 150,000. This wouldn't mean we could get them out. It would be just those in [redacted] areas. We would have to evacuate Phnom Penh where we could get to there and have conditions where we could move more.

There are two Acts of Congress, the War Powers Act and the [redacted] prescriptions. We think under the War Powers Act the President has authority with respect to evacuating American citizens and the [redacted] Act we would appreciate clarification. We think there is an authority for evacuation of Vietnamese.

[redacted]

Schlesinger: Henry has touched the high points. There has been some improvement in the past few days. They have been fighting well in Xuan Loc and the Delta but whether it is temporary depends on North Vietnam and President's request. In the military area the North Vietnamese have eight divisions and the GVN seven. They are doing well but they are dipping into stocks of ammunition. Generally speaking, if the North Vietnamese bring up their forces they will have preponderance, but the South Vietnamese know the terrain and have their backs to the wall.

We have requested $722 million which reflects the results of the Weyand mission. The difference reflects the hope on the GVN side to equip four infantry divisions. That is $140 million. To convert the four ranger groups is $120 million. For general munitions, $190 million. If you would like more detailed data, General Weyand is here.

President: Let's see what the Committee wishes. The $722 million is designed to meet the current situation and is totally different from the $300 million. Fred's report reflects a different situation.

Case: You are very good to see us, especially on such short notice. The reason for the meeting is that the Moose Mission just came back and briefed us. We have a consensus on the immediate actions: There should be urgent action to reduce American personnel to the point where they could be lifted out in one lift. We feel there is grave danger if this reduction is not being done in a timely manner. We fear the people on the ground would panic so we are not moving rapidly. We would go to them frankly and say this is how we would do it. Stew suggests a sea evacuation.

Kissinger: We waited to press him until the President's speech so it would not be in the context of pulling the plug. We now have a cable saying it is underway.

President: Not to be critical, Stew, but 4,000 on one ship would pull the plug. We could have taken over 600. I don't know how many more could be handled.

Percy: Couldn't we give orders for every plane outgoing to be full?

Javits: There are orders and orders. We think you should be sure through someone other than Martin that your orders are being carried out. Within any context of aid, the first priority must be to get Americans and deserving South Vietnamese out. It is your problem, but we think you should be sure that your orders should be carried out.

[redacted]: Bombs have touched the high points. There has been some improvement in the past few days. They have been fighting well in Binh Long and the Delta has started to be responsive to Pacification and Development programs. In the northern area the South Vietnamese have eight divisions and the Corps ranger. They are doing well but they are fighting take pieces of reconnaissance. Essentially speaking, all the North Vietnamese facing up there in those days will have preponderance, for the South Vietnamese have the terrain and have their backs to the wall.

We have requested $761 million which reflects the results of the Honolulu conference. The conference reduces the base to the $715 mark to equip four infantry divisions. That is $146 million. To convert the five Skyhawk groups is $127 million. $14 general maintenance, $146 million. If you would like more detailed data, General Forrest is here.

[redacted]: Let's see what the Committee wishes. The $761 million is designed to meet the current situation and is vastly different from the $1.04 billion. I feel a report pattern a different situation.

[redacted]: This was very good to see us, especially on such short notice. The reports for the morning is that the Korea Minister just came back and briefed me. It's been a concession on the Mekong situation. There should be no great action by Indian Americans promised to the point where they could be killed and no one left. We feel there is no great danger of that today, also is not being done by a friendly country. We feel the people on the ground would panic for we are not wearing republic. We would go to Hong Kong and may have to have to leave by it. That suggests a new intervention.

[redacted]: We wished to please him said the President's council as a result and he is the instead of pulling the plug. We were here a week ended in a conference.

[redacted]: Had to be ordered. Sorry, but I, CIA as any ship would pull the plug. We could have taken over 10%. It don't seem how many more could we handle.

[redacted]: Couldn't we give orders for every plane carrying to be hit?

[redacted]: There are orders and orders. We think we should be more through ourselves when they decide that your orders are being carried out. While we cannot at any, the first priority must be to get Americans and the coming South Vietnamese out. It is very sensitive, but we think we should be sure that your orders should be carried out.

[redacted]

President: I assure you my orders will be carried out. This is a two-way street. We will do our part but we think we have a good schedule and program and want your cooperation. I think we have an obligation to do whatever we can for the people to whom we are obligated.

Baker: We felt an evacuation of the American citizens was so urgent that everything else -- legality, Thieu's incumbency, everything else -- was secondary to that. We appreciate your forthcoming attitude toward this problem in your speech. We wanted to tell you our concerns and hear from you your concerns. We hope when we have, we will have established a new era of negotiation between the Executive and Legislative branches. We will talk with you on the amounts, which should be designed to facilitate the evacuation of Americans.

Sparkman: How is the report?

President: I have read it. I don't agree with all of it but it is a forthright report.

Sparkman: The Cambodian evacuation went well because of planning. We hope there is some planning going on in Saigon.

Schlesinger: The situations are not parallel. The Viet Cong infrastracture, the congestion, the high potential levels of violence -- it could be complicated.

Case: We appreciate this. That is why we are concerned.

Percy: Could we get clarification on the 1,200 -- when they will be there and could they be pulled in one lift?

Kissinger: I don't have that today. I will have it tomorrow and I will let you know. On Thursday, the Ambassador was told to take it down as soon as possible, and to tell Thieu immediately.

Percy: Is 1,200 the immediate minimum? It sounds like a vast number. The reason it was easy in Cambodia is that we put a ceiling on.

President: If there isn't some indication of aid, the situation could disintegrate rapidly.

Javits: I will give you large sums for evacuation, but not one nickel for military aid for Thieu.

[redacted]: I assure you our orders will be carried out. This is a [redacted] mission. We will do our part but we think we have a good schedule and going over will cost your corporation. I think we have an obligation to the shareholders and to the people to whom we are obligated.

[redacted]: We felt as a condition of the franchise interest was to expand that everything else -- basically, Pizza's declaration, everything else -- was secondary to that. We appreciate your forthcoming attitude toward this proposal in good spirits. We wanted to tell you our concerns and hear from you your concerns. We have ideas we have, we will have established a task for of negotiation between the Executive and Legislative branches. We will talk with you on the concerns, who is closest to managers to facilitate the presentation of documents.

[redacted]: How is the report?

[redacted]: I have read it. I don't agree with all of it but it is a forthright report.

[redacted]: The [redacted] presentation went well because of planning. We have [redacted] in some places we going on a target.

[redacted]: The [redacted] are not provided. The Tax Corp infrastructure, the congestion, the high potential levels of violence -- it could be complicated.

[redacted]: We appreciate this. That is why we are concerned.

[redacted]: Could we get clarification on the [redacted] -- what they will be there and customary to police in the city?

[redacted]: I don't have that today. I will have it tomorrow and I will let you know. On Thursday, the [redacted] we will be late if there is [redacted] as possible, and to talk Pizza considerably.

[redacted]: Is [redacted] the [redacted]? It sounds like a real number. The [redacted] was sorry in [redacted] to that we get a ceiling on.

[redacted]: If there isn't some indication of a [redacted] the situation could turn into [redacted].

[redacted]: I will give you [redacted] that [redacted], but not one ruled the [redacted] out for Pizza.

[redacted]

Church: I would think that if money is required to facilitate getting the Americans out, that can be worked out. What has not been worked out is the Vietnamese evacuees. Secretary Kissinger has said maybe there are 175,000. Clearly there is no legal inhibition to bringing some out along with Americans, but 175,000, with American troops involved, could involve us in a very large war. This raises the specter of a new war, thousands of American troops holding on in an enclave for a long period.

President: It is not envisaged that this would be for a long period but as quickly and precisely as possible.

Biden: What concerns us is that a week ago Habib told us we would be formulating a plan. A week has gone by and nothing has happened. We should focus on getting them out. Getting the Vietnamese out and military aid for the GVN are totally different.

Kissinger: The plan for American evacuation is in pretty good shape. But we had a report that if we pulled out and left them in the lurch, we may have to fight the South Vietnamese. It was that we were concerned with and that is why we waited to go to Thieu so we didn't do it in the context of a bug out. The second problem is getting American citizens out in an emergency. Third is the Vietnamese to whom we have an obligation. This is infinitely more complicated and large-scale. It requires cooperation from the GVN and maybe the North Vietnamese.

Biden: I feel put upon in being presented an all or nothing number. I don't want to have to vote to buy it all or not at all. I am not sure I can vote for an amount to put American troops in for one to six months to get the Vietnamese out. I will vote for any amount for getting the Americans out. I don't want it mixed with getting the Vietnamese out.

President: There are three operations that are intertwined. There is getting out 4,500, the last 1,800 and the Vietnamese. The worst way to do it is to label it evacuation aid.

Symington: I am very familiar with Vietnam. In 1967 I decided it was hopeless. My people are asking if we are asking if we are holding Americans hostage for more aid. We know that is not so, but what worries me is the feeling we have been wrong so many times. We are all surprised at the collapse of South Vietnam. Why did we leave the 6,000 there so far? Where are the 175,000 going? Who is going to take them? These could all be dealt with if we could get the Americans out.

Pell: We could put these people in Borneo. It has the same latitude, the same climate, and would welcome some anti-Communists.

[redacted]

[redacted]: I would like to ask if we're to succeed in Southeast Asia by the Americans only, that can be worked out. What has not been worked out is the Vietnamese economy. Economic Stabilization has cut imports from $1.5 billion. Exports down to one-half billion as to bringing some aid along with Americans. But if it is not, with Americans moving [redacted], could become up to a very large one. That means the opening of a new era. Thousands of American troops building up to an economy for a long period.

[redacted]: It is our assumption that this would be not a long period but a quickly and generally we provide.

[redacted]: What concerns us is that a move like this would be considering a plan. It would be gone by and nothing has happened. We should have an gaining there can. Getting the Vietnamese out and workers and the the GVN are beside statement.

[redacted]: The plan for a workers movement is a pretty good shape. But we feel a report that it was pulled out and left there in the field, we now have to fight the local Vietnamese. I was that we were concerned with and that is why we wanted to go to Phase III so we didn't do it to the contract of a big job." The second problem is getting Americans volunteer are an emergency. There is the Vietnamese to whom we have an obligation. This is extremely more complicated and complicate. It requires cooperation from the GVN and maybe the Khmer Vietnamese.

[redacted]: I don't get upset to bring pre-mixed as all as nothing matters. I don't want to have to vote to buy it all or not at all. I am not sure I can vote for an increase to get Americans troops in for one to six months to get the Vietnamese out. I will vote for any request for getting the Americans out. I don't want a vote with getting the Vietnamese out.

[redacted]: There are three operations that are interlocked. There is getting out a bill, the loan to GVN and the Vietnamese. The end of war to be at to be asked a conversation with.

[redacted]: I am very familiar with Vietnam. In 1967 I decided to run [redacted]. Any people was saying if we are winning if we are losing Americans because the press will. We have that to not say but what worries me is the feeling we have been wrong on many issues. We are not representative of the members of South Vietnam. Who did we leave the $ 200 there on fire? Where are the 270,000 going? Who is going to take them? There could not be much work if we could get the troops out out.

[redacted]: We could put these people to bronze. It has the more behind, the more chance, and would welcome more anti-Communists.

[redacted]

President: Let me comment on where they would go: We opened our door to the Hungarians. I am not saying the situation is identical but our tradition is to welcome the oppressed. I don't think these people should be treated any differently from any other people -- the Hungarians, Cubans, Jews from the Soviet Union.

Clark: Is the request for military assistance primarily to arrest the situation and bring on negotiations, or for something else?

President: I think I stated it clearly: We wanted the sum to stabilize the military situation in order to give a chance for negotiations and to permit evacuation of Americans and deserving Vietnamese.

Sparkman: Do we have any obligations under the Paris Accords?

President: We signed with the understanding we could uphold it. The means were taken from us.

Sparkman: But our obligations....

Kissinger: The Accords had not obligations but authorities, that is, Article 7. President Nixon and others judged that permitting the United States to extricate itself would permit the United States to provide aid and enforce the agreements. Under the Paris Accords we have no obligation. To the GVN we said that if they let us get our forces out it would enhance our chances of getting aid for them and enforcing the agreement. It was in this context, not that of a legal obligation. We never claimed an obligation; we never pleaded an obligation. But some of us think there is a moral obligation.

Mansfield: My position is well known and I won't change. The caucus was concerned about the pace of the evacuation. Also that the witnesses should be the highest members of your Administration. We are trying to comply with your request as soon as possible. If Hugh [Scott] agrees, we will not meet Tuesday and Wednesday so we can process these requests rapidly. There was concern about humanitarian aid and the desire to send it through non-governmental agencies and the UN.

Scott: I agree to the proposal. One thing we haven't discussed is the amounts. I think we need to discuss a figure.

Biden: I don't want to commit myself to any precise number. How much money depends on how many we try to get out.

[redacted]: Let me comment on where they could go. We agreed not here in the Congress. I am not saying the situation is unusual but our position is to enforce the agreement. I don't think these people should be handled any differently than any other people -- the Congressman, Soviets here from the Soviet Union.

[redacted]: Is the argument that military assistance proceeds to ensure the transition and bring us negotiations, or for something else?

[redacted]: I think I stated it clearly. We wanted the men to withdraw the military situation to enable to give a chance for negotiations and to prevent a resumption of intervention and threatening Vietnamese.

[redacted]: Do we have any obligations under the Paris Accords?

[redacted]: We signed with the understanding we could advise it. The Soviets were taken from us.

[redacted]: But our obligations. ...

[redacted]: The accords had our obligations for reparations, that is, Article V. President Ford and others helped that preventing the United States to undertake would cancel pursuit the United States to provide aid and violate the agreements. Under the Paris Accords we have no obligations. On the aid we said that if they let us get some Vietnam and a cease-fire and allowing aid for them and enforcing the agreement. It was in this context, and that of a legal obligation. We never checked on obligations we never pleaded on obligations. But some of us think there is a moral obligation.

[redacted]: My problem is with Congress and I won't change. The charge was concerned about the pace of the withdrawal. Also that the Vietnam should be the highest members of your Administration. The are trying to compile with press request as much as possible. If Hugh [Scott] agrees, we will not meet Thursday and Wednesday so as not pressure those negotiate agreed. There was concern about humanitarian aid and the desire to meet it through non-governmental agencies and the UN.

[redacted]: I agree to the proposal. One thing we haven't discussed is the timetable. I think we need to discuss a figure.

[redacted]: I don't want to commit myself to any part the number. How much money depends on how many we let in and out.

[redacted]

Kissinger: This is a matter of extreme delicacy. We can't take them under crisis conditions. No one is thinking of a long period of time to get people out. We are thinking of ten days to two weeks.

Church: I think we should establish an emergency fund to allow you to deal with the situation and carefully draw the language about troops so as to insure there are limits.

President: We are not wanting to put American troops in but we have to have enough funds to make it look like we plan to hold for some period.

Glenn: The idea here is very different from what I envisioned. I and most Senators thought of a surgical extraction, not of a ten-day to two-week operation with a bridgehead. This is a re-entry of a magnitude we have not envisioned.

I think we have to keep this very quiet. I thought it was a one-shot airlift.

Case: This was essential to have been said. The only way we could do an operation of this kind is through negotiations between the North and South.

Glenn: I can see North Vietnam deciding not to let us get these people out and attacking our bridgehead. Then we would have to send forces to protect our security force. That fills me with fear.

Javits: Tell the press we are thinking of $200 million.

President: If this is a meeting to plan an evacuation, this will panic the GVN totally.

[The meeting ended]

[redacted]: This is a matter of extreme delicacy. We can't take these matters lightly. We are in receipt of a long period of notice to get people out. It's one thousand of ten days in two weeks.

[redacted]: I think we should establish an emergency fund to allow you to deal with the situation and somebody down the language school knows of us to borrow those two hundred.

[redacted]: We are not wanting to put Americans hostage to but we have to have enough cash to make it look like we plan to hold the lease periods.

[redacted]: The other issue is very delicate from what I understand. I met some Americans thought of a weighted instruction, and of a few who to have much agreement with a 'bridgehead'. This is a necessity of a magnitude we have not encountered.

I think we have to keep this very quiet. I thought it was a very nice article.

[redacted]: This was essential to have been in it. The only way we could be any agreement of this kind is through negotiations between the front and South.

[redacted]: I was not North Vietnam deciding and to be up and there people not want attacking our bridgehead. What we would have to most believe to prevent our area using bases. That kills our aim from.

[redacted]: Tell the phone we are listening at 5:00 million.

[redacted]: I'd like to a meeting to plan an invasion. We'll pass the [redacted] weeks.

[The meeting ended]

[redacted]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 2, 1975

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger HK

SUBJECT: Parole of Additional Numbers of Vietnamese into the U.S.

On April 17, 1975, you approved parole for Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees in six different categories including up to 50,000 "high risk" refugees. The total number of refugees anticipated among the different groups was 130,000. Congress was consulted and agreement was achieved.

We now face a new and continually changing situation. In addition to those Vietnamese we assisted in leaving South Vietnam and who are now already in the U.S. or being processed at Guam and Wake (47,000), there are approximately 80,000 Vietnamese on the high seas or in third countries seeking refuge in the U.S. This figure includes some 70,000 people aboard U.S. naval and chartered vessels and a Vietnamese flotilla of assorted craft, all headed for Subic Bay. We have just learned that a U.S. merchant ship has picked up still another 3,000 from a sinking Vietnamese freighter.

As the Congress has asked, we are doing our best to internationalize the problem both by appealing to international refugee agencies and by making bilateral demarches in foreign countries, asking them to take part in the resettlement of newly displaced Vietnamese. The responses have not been encouraging thus far, although it appears Canada will be helpful. Particularly difficult is the attitude of a number of Asian countries who have their own population problems and are now making adjustments in their relationships with the new communist regimes in Indochina. Singular in this regard are the Philippines and Thailand, who continue to press us to move the refugees from Cambodia and Viet-Nam off their soil.

Altogether we now have over 120,000 Vietnamese who have fled in one way or another from South Vietnam and Cambodia. This could reach 150,000 or more over the next few weeks. We need to deal with at least 80,000 of these immediately. Many of these people will qualify only within the "high risk" category. There is of course a certain amount of resistance to all of this domestically. We have basically only one option in the manner in which we proceed, given the change in the types of people who may apply for asylum and the fact that we did not in the first instance assist many of them in their departure from Viet-Nam.

I recommend that you instruct the Attorney General to immediately authorize the parole of 150,000 Vietnamese and Cambodians into the U.S. with the understanding that we would attempt to resettle at least 20,000 of this number abroad. With an appropriate public presentation of the facts the public should accept the case. With regard to the needed legislation for funds, we suggest the dollar request be based on the assumption that 130,000 will be resettled in the U.S.; that the U.S. will pay, through international agencies, transportation costs to third countries for the remaining 20,000; but that additional funds might be needed to the extent we are unsuccessful in resettling the full 20,000 outside the U.S.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEETING WITH GOP LEADERSHIP

Tuesday, April 22, 1975
Time: 8:00 a.m.
Place: The Cabinet Room

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

To inform the leadership of the situation in Indochina and to discuss the status of your requests for military and humanitarian assistance and the status of U.S. evacuation efforts.

To discuss the status of your energy proposals in Congress and to provide an overview of current budget planning.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. Background

1. The Situation in Congress

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has reported out a $200 million bill providing humanitarian assistance and funds for evacuation efforts, but the bill contains unacceptable limitations on your ability to use U.S. forces to evacuate Americans and Vietnamese while requiring that the humanitarian aid be channeled through multi-national agencies. The House International Relations Committee has passed a similar but much less restrictive bill providing $150 million in humanitarian/evacuation funds. The Senate Armed Services Committee has rejected any additional military assistance funds beyond the $300 million already authorized. The House Armed Services Committee and neither of the Appropriations Committees have yet acted.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
NR 92-58, #15 NSC Ltr, 9/20/95
By KBH NARA, Date 10/25/95

Action on the humanitarian aid legislation is likely in both Houses on Tuesday or Wednesday. Our current strategy is to attempt corrective amendments on the Senate bill and to seek a record vote on military assistance by introducing a floor amendment to the Senate humanitarian aid bill. There is little likelihood of obtaining any additional military assistance in either House, although there is some chance of obtaining a partial appropriation of the $300 million already authorized.

2. The Situation in Vietnam

The military situation in South Vietnam continues to deteriorate. The North Vietnamese have rapidly brought several corps command headquarters south to direct the assault on Saigon. There are now some 17 divisions along the three major approaches to the capital. The Communists are also moving five sapper regiments into the Saigon area to disrupt government control, terrorize the population, and guide North Vietnamese regulars into the metropolitan area.

Saigon no longer has any reserve forces available to help defend the city, and the intelligence community does not believe that the South Vietnamese forces can prevent a total military defeat.

At the same time, the Communists appear to be ruling out any consideration of a genuine negotiated settlement of the conflict.

A tough line reportedly emerged from a secret briefing of senior Communist officials in COSVN (the top Communist headquarters in the South) on the ninth and tenth of April. Reports indicate that COSVN believed the "whole thing" would be finished in a short time and that the Communists would not agree to enter into negotiations, nor would they join any coalition government. It is too early yet to fully assess the impact of the resignation of President Thieu on Communist plans to attack Saigon or on the morale of the South Vietnamese defenders. Any positive vote on U.S. assistance will be helpful in stabilizing the situation in Saigon as our evacuation of Americans proceeds.

[redacted]

8. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

3. Energy

While a good deal of progress has been made, Congress is still delaying or proceeding in directions opposed to your proposals for a national energy program. On April 10 you again asked for rapid action on pending legislation and you have directed Frank Zarb to intensify his efforts to work with the Congress to resolve the outstanding issues and to restate the Administration's opposition to a program of specific control devices.

4. The Budget

Both the House and Senate Budget Committees have reported out budget levels higher than your recommendations. Director Lynn will be prepared to discuss the impact of the higher levels and outline prospects for future floor action.

B. Participants: See Tab A

C. Press Arrangements: Meeting to be announced. Press photo session.

III. TALKING POINTS

See Tab B - Indochina
Tab C - Energy
Tab D - Budget

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP MEETING

April 28, 1975

Time and Place: 10:38 a.m. - 11:14 a.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Vietnam Evacuation

Participants:

Chairman:	Henry A. Kissinger		
State:	Robert Ingersoll Amb. L. Dean Brown Philip Habib Robert Miller	**CIA:**	William Colby ....
Defense:	William Clements Robert Ellsworth Morton Abramowitz	**NSC Staff:**	LTG Brent Scowcroft W.R. Smyser William Stearman Col. Clinton Granger
JCS:	Gen. George S. Brown Lt. Gen. John W. Pauly		James Barnum

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (4)
MR 95-41, # 1 NSC 3/8/95
By KBH, NARA, Date 3/15/95

Secretary Kissinger: Bill.....

Mr. Colby began to brief from the attached text.

Gen. Scowcroft: Excuse me a minute, Bill. I just talked to Graham Martin out in Saigon. He says that those planes that attacked Tan Son Nhut today were probably South Vietnamese defectors or VNAF pilots disgruntled with the new Minh Government. It is also possible that the North Vietnamese held a gun to their head and told them to go down and do some damage. It isn't clear as to who it was, but they bombed only the VNAF side of Tan Son Nhut. They did not attack the DAO side of the field. Also, our C-130 pilots report that they were trailed by the A-37s. They were not fired on, and there was no damage. The planes flew over the Presidential Palace, but did not release any ordance. They didn't hit the Palace.

Secretary Kissinger: Why should they now? They never hit anything before!

Mr. Colby continued to brief.

Secretary Kissinger: Are the South Vietnamese fighting at Bien Hoa?

..... Yes they are. So far they are not doing badly.

Mr. Colby continued to brief.

Secretary Kissinger: Have the Communists captured Vung Tau?

Mr. Colby: No, not yet. They are pressuring Vung Tau. (Continued to brief.)

Secretary Kissinger: That means that ships will no longer be able to get up the Mekong, doesn't it?

Mr. Colby: Vung Tau should fall--within 24 hours. But, the entrance to the Mekong is farther to the south. Ships will still be able to get up the River. (Finished his briefing.)

Secretary Kissinger: What is ..... (CIA Station Chief in Saigon) saying? What is his estimate of the situation?

..... He says that the Communists are following two tracks--military pressure and negotiations--simultaneously.

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[redacted] Bob-----

Mr. Daly began to brief from the attached note.

[redacted] Bureau and a Mobster, Bob. I just talked to Cosmos. Hoffa not in Bogota. He says that Bob's people had attempted two bus. Most today were probably Bobby Kennedy supporters on their' going to agreement with the new Union Commissioner. It is also possible that the Bobby Kennedy held a gun to their head and told them to go home and do normal duties. It didn't exist on the map a year, but they insisted upon the 'third' suit of Tax Bob Hoffa. They did not attend the [redacted] vote of Bob Bobb. Also, one [redacted] pilots report that they were arrested by the Air Fla. They were not bothered, and there was no damage. The planes flew over the Presidential Palace, but did not release any artillery. They didn't hit the Palace.

[redacted] Why should they not? They never do anything helpful?

Mr. Daly continued to brief.

[redacted] Are the Bobb Professors fighting at Bob Bob?

[redacted] Bob Bobb are. At the time are not being fully.

Mr. Daly continued to brief.

[redacted] Have the Communists captured Bobb Tax?

Mr. Daly No, not yet. They are pressuring Bobb Tax. Continued to brief.

[redacted] That means that ships will no longer be able to get up the Bobbsy. Bobb's air?

Mr. Daly Bobb Tax should fall within 24 hours. Bob, the entrance to the Bobbsy is further to the south. Ships will still be able to get up the Bobbsy. Continued to brief.

[redacted] What is [redacted] the Bobb Bobb Bobb to Bogota morning? What is the situation at the airport?

[redacted] We were told the Communists are bombing key bridges—evidently precision not sophisticated—nonetheless.

[redacted] (Whisper)

Secretary Kissinger: But Graham (Amb. Martin) has the opposite view. He says they are negotiating.

Mr. Colby: It looks to us, right now, that they are running along two tracks.

Secretary Kissinger: Graham doesn't think it will collapse for another one-to-three days.

..... In the time frame we are talking about, and this is over the last few hours, we see a shift taking place. We believe they are following the negotiating track and are now beginning to apply the military pressure.

Mr. Colby: We should know for sure by tomorrow morning.

..... Could I ask what Ambassador Martin is saying?

Secretary Kissinger: He says that we will still have negotiations for several weeks.

Mr. Habib: I think the North Vietnamese are putting the military pressure on Minh so that they can get a negotiated surrender.

Mr. Colby: Besides, the demands are going up.

Secretary Kissinger: That's what I would expect.

Gen. Brown: To show you some of the practical implications of the situation over there now, Henry, we stopped the flights of C-141s yesterday. No more are going in.

Secretary Kissinger: Why did you stop them?

Gen. Brown: Because of the threat from the artillery.

Secretary Kissinger: We weren't told that you stopped the C-141 flights, were we (to Gen. Scowcroft)?

Gen. Scowcroft: No.

Secretary Kissinger: Why weren't we told, It used to be that we were asked about these things before the order went out. Who gave the order?

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Gen. Brown: I don't know, but the way we had it pre-positioned was that those C-141 flights would stop when the threat became greater. The C-130s are still flying, we haven't disrupted those flights. They got something like 6,000 people out of there yesterday.

Secretary Kissinger: Can't we keep each other informed around here?

Gen. Brown: Tomorrow--this evening, our time--we are prepared to go all-out with the C-130s. We could evacuate as many as 9,000 people tomorrow. What I am also concerned about is that we have told General Smith not to get out of there when the first hit is made on Tan Son Nhut. The problem is that all Smith and his people are doing over there now is evacuating personnel. He and his people are totally involved in the evacuation process. The odds are that Tan Son Nhut will get hit tomorrow. If it's hit, he has orders to stay, but there won't be any more C-130s and no more people to evacuate. My question is, at what point do Smith and his people get out of there? They are betting that the negotiations will drag on a few more days, but if the negotiations fail, we can't get many of those people out. At what point do we pull Smith and his people out? By the way, General Vien has left the country.

Secretary Kissinger: Why?

Gen. Brown: He and "Big" Minh don't get along. They have been at each other's throat for years. What this means is that the General Staff will begin to break down and that control over the ARVN weakens.

Secretary Kissinger: I had better talk to the President. This is in complete contradiction to what Martin is saying.

Mr. Clements: Henry, Bob (Mr. Ellsworth) and I were talking about this on the way over here today, and, well, we think the situation is getting worse. Now, you may know more about it than we do. What I'm saying, is, do you know more than we do?

Secretary Kissinger: I know nothing more than you do.

Gen. Brown: We have a report from a C-130 pilot that he was trailed by an A-37 yesterday. We can patrol the (air) lanes and protect the C-130s from cover, but are we willing to accept the risk?

Secretary Kissinger: So what do you propose?

Mr. Clements: Well, Henry, we're dependent on information that you may or may not have.

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Secretary Kissinger: You have all the information that I do.

Mr. Clements: Then I think we have only twelve to fifteen hours of lift time left.

Secretary Kissinger: You would like to pull Smith and his people out tomorrow?

Gen. Brown: Yes, we would feel more comfortable getting those people out of there.

Mr. Colby: And you would use helicopters after the fixed-wing lift has stopped?

Gen. Brown: Yes.

Mr. Colby: Then you would have only one more day to bring more Vietnamese out.

Mr. Clements: I think we should take a real close look at it tomorrow. By tomorrow we may be able to develop just where we stand, but that's the information we have now--that's where we are.

Gen. Brown: My concern on the helicopter lift is the South Vietnamese. Now, they have given us no trouble yet, but they are apt to give us trouble when they see all the Americans leaving.

Mr. Clements: We could go on with the C-130 lift tomorrow and take a look at the situation in this room tomorrow morning.

Secretary Kissinger: I think that we will probably have to go with the helicopter lift at first light Wednesday. I'll talk with the President about it. Our obligations diminish as the governments change. I'll raise the question again with the President.

Amb. Brown: There are still a lot of interest groups that we haven't gotten out of there yet.

Secretary Kissinger: Like who?

Amb. Brown: Oh, the Catholic relief organizations, the Mormons.

Secretary Kissinger: Are the Mormons in danger?

Amb. Brown: There are all kinds of groups like that that look to us to get them out.

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Secretary Kissinger: Well, I feel sure that as long as Brent Scowcroft is Deputy Assistant to the President, the Mormons will get out of there. How about the Jews? Does anyone care about the Jews?

Gen. Brown: Two-hundred labor people are getting out of there today. There are 1,400 orphans ranging in age from six to sixteen at Vung Tau that the Ambassador wants to get out. The Vietnamese Navy will take care of them. We made two C-130 runs to Vung Tau yesterday to pick up the families of some Vietnamese marines the Ambassador wanted to evacuate. It was successful.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think that when we can no longer get C-130s into Tan Son Nhut we should pull out all the Americans. I mean, if there are no more people to evacuate, there is no need for 900 Americans sitting around over there.

Mr. Clements: That's my point exactly. When the last C-130 takes off, we can get down to 500.

Gen. Brown: Yes, that would be great. Smith has about 400 people.

Secretary Kissinger: Can you take 1,700 in one helicopter lift?

Gen. Brown: No, we can take only about 1,000. It would be in two waves. The security forces would go in on the first wave, the 1,000 people would be lifted out, and the second wave would go in to pick up the security forces.

Gen. Scowcroft: What happened to the capacity of the lift? I thought that the last figure was that you could take out 2,000 people.

Mr. Habib: You said you could take out 2,300 in two cycles.

Mr. Clements: My recollection is that we can take out only 1,000. We'll check on that.

Secretary Kissinger: I think that we should go ahead with the C-130 lifts full blast as long as we can. If the airfield is closed down, then we will have to decide when to trigger the helicopter lift.

Mr. Habib: And the last C-130s should take out U.S. personnel, not Vietnamese. Didn't I see a press article that "Big" Minh says that no more Vietnamese will be allowed to evacuate?

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..... No, that report is not true. There has been no opposition from Minh on the evacuation.

Secretary Kissinger: What's the total figure of Vietnamese evacuated so far?

Amb. Brown: There are 38,000 in the camps.

Mr. Habib: Can you handle 9,000 per day at the camps if you had to?

Amb. Brown: No, there is no way.

Mr. Clements: If we have to, we can push them in there. We'll take care of them later.

Secretary Kissinger: How about picking up the refugees at sea? How are we doing on that?

Amb. Brown: Well, an increasing number of Vietnamese are drifting out from the beaches.

Secretary Kissinger: What are our rules--what are we doing about the refugees at sea?

Amb. Brown: We're picking up those that we can.

Gen. Brown: We've ordered our people not to go in to pick up people. If refugees come alongside, we pick them up. We've asked all our ships to stay beyond the 12-mile limit.

Mr. Abramowitz: Which reminds me that we'll need a decision on taking non-high risk people off Phu Quoc Island.

Secretary Kissinger: Why are all these people going out to sea?

Mr. Abramowitz: Well, because they are afraid of what will happen to them. Most are not in the high-risk category as we have defined it.

Gen. Scowcroft: Once they land on Phu Quoc, however, they become high-risk.

Mr. Colby: The question is, do we want to continue taking those people that we pick up to Phu Quoc Island?

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Secretary Kissinger: If they have already gone there, it would be impossible for us to do anything. I would think that the Vietnamese Navy will be putting to sea once the end is in sight.

Mr. Abramowitz: Most of the Vietnamese Navy will go to Subic Bay.

Amb. Brown: The question is, do we want our Navy to stay out three miles or twelve miles, or go in closer?

Secretary Kissinger: Where are our ships now?

Gen. Brown: They are no closer than three miles offshore. We have encouraged them orally to stay about three miles offshore.

Secretary Kissinger: That means they are probably beyond the twelve mile limit.

Mr. Clements: No, Henry, I think they are probably looking for people.

Secretary Kissinger: So the rules are that they are not to actively search for people, just pick them up when they can?

Gen. Brown: That's the idea.

Secretary Kissinger: What are you doing with them? Can we determine who they are?

Mr. Colby: Most of them are just scared people. There are some high-risk people mixed in, but most are just ordinary refugees. It's hard to separate out the high-risk from the normal.

Secretary Kissinger: Can you separate them out on board?

Mr. Stearman: Sure, can't you screen out the high-risk and take the others to Phu Quoc?

Secretary Kissinger: Our policy is not to favor the ordinary refugees. Get us the facts on who these people are that are getting on the ships (to Gen. Brown).

Gen. Brown: Well, these ships are all commercial cargo ships on lease to the Navy. There is a small Marine detachment on eight of the thirteen

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ships, but they are there only to keep the ship from getting messed up anymore than it has to be. The Marines are capable of putting off the people onto Phu Quoc Island, but what I'm trying to say is that they are not trained to screen people. They have had no training in that. They just don't have the capability to screen people.

Mr. Colby: We were able to get some of our high-risk people to Taipei. There is about 1,000 of them. You said the limit was 1,000, so we took out 1,000. Some have also gotten to Thailand.

Secretary Kissinger: You can take your CIA people to Taiwan, that's no problem.

Mr. Miller: Getting those people off Phu Quoc Island is going to be a real problem.

Mr. Habib: The answer is that we're not going to get them off.

Secretary Kissinger: We just can't take 50,000 refugees off Phu Quoc, and we can't use it as a dumping ground.

Gen. Brown: Could I make a plea for help in evacuating the people from the other islands around Phu Quoc?

Secretary Kissinger: Those people we should take out, if only so that the South Vietnamese can fly their planes in.

Amb. Brown: The South Vietnamese Air Force can fly to Clark (AFB).

Gen. Brown: Not all of them will.

Mr. Habib: A lot will go to Thailand.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we'll meet again tomorrow about this time.

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~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP MEETING

April 29, 1975

Time and Place: 9:04 a.m. -9:20 a.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Vietnam evacuation

Participants:

Chairman:	Henry A. Kissinger		
State:	Robert Ingersoll	**CIA:**	William Colby
	Amb. L. Dean Brown		.....
	Philip Habib		.....
	Robert Miller		
		NSC	
Defense:	William Clements	**Staff:**	LTG Brent Scowcroft
	Robert Ellsworth		W.R. Smyser
	Morton Abramowitz		William Stearman
			Lt. Col. Don MacDo
JCS:	Gen. George S. Brown		James Barnum

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MR 95-41, #3 NSC 3/9/95
By KBH NARA, Date 3/15/95

Secretary Kissinger: The President wants no briefings by any of the departments until after the White House briefing. Can you all arrange that please? There will be no briefings until after we have briefed here.

Mr. Ingersoll: I'm scheduled to go before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at 10:00. I'm going to be asked questions. What shall I say?

Secretary Kissinger: What are you going up there for?

Mr. Ingersoll: To testify on the State Authorization Bill.

Secretary Kissinger: If you are asked, just say that you want to wait until after the White House briefing.

Gen. Brown: (Secretary) Schlesinger went on television about six o'clock this morning, you know.

Secretary Kissinger: That was brought to my attention. I didn't know it, but it was brought to my attention. I'm just relating Presidential instructions, okay? Just wait until after the White House briefing.

Gen. Brown: What time is the White House briefing going to be?

Secretary Kissinger: We have a Cabinet meeting at 9:45 a.m., and the President wants to meet with the Congressional leadership at 11:00. After that is finished--I would say about 1:00 to 1:30 p.m. we'll have the briefing.

Mr. Habib: Is the helicopter evacuation finished?

Gen. Brown: With a lot of luck it should be over shortly--by 12:00 noon our time. The number of people to be evacuated keeps going up though, and the weather is bad. It's rainy and foggy. It's slowing us down.

Secretary Kissinger: Where are all these extra people coming from?

Gen. Brown: Over the wall and through the gates. I don't know where they are all coming from.

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Secretary Kissinger: Can someone explain to me what the hell is going on! The orders are that only Americans are to be evacuated. Now, what the hell is going on?

Mr. Clements: There are still something like 350 to 400 Americans still to be evacuated.

Amb. Brown: There have been 4,500 people taken out so far. That's raw information.

Secretary Kissinger: And there are still Americans to be evacuated?

Gen. Brown: Yes, there are 500--close to 600 still to be evacuated.

Secretary Kissinger: And there is still no sign of opposition to the evacuation?

Gen. Brown: There has been some sniper fire from the roofs of buildings near the Embassy. One problem is that the weather is bad.

Secretary Kissinger: The weather is bad?

Mr. Habib: The rainy season starts in the middle of April. What you get is rain and fog early in the morning.

Secretary Kissinger: Does it clear during the day?

Mr. Habib: There are some clear spots during the afternoon.

Gen. Brown: We don't know yet if.....

Secretary Kissinger: Why did it take so long to get the helilift started?

Gen. Brown: I don't know, but I suspect we'll need to have an investigation. I suspect that what happened was that some of the local commanders changed their plans at the last minute. Also, I suspect that they miscalculated when they converted the time from Zulu to Saigon time. They miscalculated by about two hours. The result was that we wasted two hours doing nothing. I was sitting over there in the command center doing nothing for two hours.

Secretary Kissinger: I know. I must have told the President three times that the helicopters were ten minutes out (from the carriers).

Mr. Clements: I don't know about you, Henry, but I'm just madder than hell about it. I know George (Gen. Brown) is too.

Gen. Brown: Once we got going, it went rather smoothly.

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Secretary Kissinger: So we lost two hours.

Mr. Habib: It may end up that we will still have 200 Americans still at the Embassy compound and will have to evacuate them the next day.

(Secretary Kissinger was handed a note at this point.)

Secretary Kissinger: This says that the helicopters are taking fire from small arms, tracers, and anti-aircraft. It's..... message. Who could they be, ARVN?

Gen. Brown: It's hard to say.

Mr. Colby: Probably some ARVN and the local police. When they say small arms fire and tracers, it is probably police and ARVN.

Secretary Kissinger: Who's firing the anti-aircraft?

Mr. Colby: It's hard to say. Flying bullets sound like anti-aircraft to pilots under fire. It's just hard to tell.

.....

..... The only anti-aircraft guns in Saigon are those controlled by the South Vietnamese at the Presidential Palace grounds.

Secretary Kissinger: Do they (U.S.) have authority to fire back?

Gen. Brown: Yes, but it's hard to do, particularly at night. There's no coordination with the ground, and they can't see anything. It's just damn tricky to fire back at night.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay. I have to go see the President in a few minutes. Bill (Mr. Colby), do you have anything?

Mr. Colby: I can just briefly re-cap what has happened. (Began to brief from the attached.)

Secretary Kissinger: I just saw a news release that Huyen (South Vietnamese Vice President) and the North Vietnamese had agreed to a cease-fire to begin on Wednesday.

Mr. Colby: Yes, I just saw that too, but it's not confirmed. (Finished his briefing.)

Secretary Kissinger: Well, okay. I think the North Vietnamese have elected to take over Saigon militarily. Why do you think they changed their mind?

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Mr. Colby: I think that the real question is, did they really hold back so that we could evacuate, or did they hold back only to reposition and resupply their troops?

Mr. Habib: You know, they will probably attack (propaganda) our evacuation.

Secretary Kissinger: They could have given us a warning that they would attack in 24 hours.

Mr. Colby: There's one thing I would like to bring up. There are about 1,000 high-risk people at Phu Quoc Island that we would like to get out.

Secretary Kissinger: They should be taken out, definitely.

Mr. Habib: There are a lot of others there who want out too.

Secretary Kissinger: We can't take the refugees out, but I think that anybody who worked with us should be taken off the island.

..... We do have a communications link out to the Naval Base at Phu Quoc.

(Secretary Kissinger was summoned by the President at this point.)

Secretary Kissinger: Okay, is there anything else? I have to go see the President.

Gen. Brown: I have one plea, Henry. There are still some 400-odd Americans still in the compound at the Embassy. The Ambassador has got to get those people out of there. Can't you tell him to get them out of there?

Secretary Kissinger: Those are his bloody orders, goddamnit!

Gen. Brown: I know, but he's not complying.

Secretary Kissinger: There is no reason for Americans to still be there. He has been ordered by the President of the United States to get them the hell out of there. My impression was that you said that it would take one and one-half hours for the evacuation and that it would be only Americans. At four o'clock this morning I find out that nobody is off the ground yet. Now what the hell is going on? Yes, I'll instruct the Ambassador to get those people out, but he's been ordered to get those people out a hundred times. Look, call Martin (to Gen. Scowcroft) and tell him of the concern here. We can't tell him how to load his helicopters. I'll call him. I have to go.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

MINUTES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Date: Wednesday, April 9, 1975

Time: 11:25 a.m. to 1:15 p.m.

Place: Cabinet Room, The White House

Subject; Indochina

Principals

The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby

Other Attendees

State: Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll
Assistant Secretary of State Philip Habib

Defense: Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements

JCS: Chief of Staff, U.S. Army General Fred C. Weyand

WH: Donald Rumsfeld
Robert Hartmann
John Marsh (at end of meeting)

NSC: Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
W. R. Smyser

XGDS - 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (4)

NLR 92-10 #19 NSC ltr. 10/7/94

By IGH, NARA, Date 2/6/95

President: The best way for us to proceed would be to have Bill Colby give the intelligence community's judgment. Will you please go ahead, Bill.

Colby: After a week's lull, the Communists have begun a new round of fighting, with Saigon as the ultimate target.

East of Saigon, a North Vietnamese division supported by artillery and armor attacked Xuan Loc, the capital of Long Khanh Province this morning, and heavy fighting is reported inside the town.

Xuan Loc sits astride Route 1, which links Saigon and the coastal provinces.

Fighting also has increased in the delta. The heaviest attacks occurred in the northern delta provinces of Dinh Tuong and Long An.

Elements of the Communist 8th division attacked Tan An, the capital of Long An Province, but have been pushed back.

Schlesinger: They cut Route 4.

Colby: They cut it, but they have been pushed back.

A Communist troop buildup in Kien Tuong Province had raised the possibility that the North Vietnamese were preparing to attack the provincial capital at Moc Hoa. Late reports indicate, however, that these forces have withdrawn, apparently in preparation for attacks closer to Saigon in Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia provinces.

The fighting is likely to intensify further in the near future. .....
.....new COSVN instructions which call for achieving final victory this year rather than 1976.

.....
.....Communist gains have far exceeded their expectations for 1975 and have created the "most opportune moment" for total victory this year.

The COSVN instructions call for the Communists to press the attack and expand Communist territorial holdings during April by "liberating" Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia, and Binh Duong provinces.

.....when "the time comes" the North Vietnamese will attack Saigon.

.....
.....
the Communists are planning a three-pronged assault from the south, west and north on the capital itself.

As the fighting moves closer to Saigon, the likelihood of confusion, public disorder and even panic will increase.

The past week of relative inaction has given the government some chance to consolidate its military position. Nevertheless, in terms of capabilities, the strategic balance decisively favors the Communists.

The North Vietnamese now have 18 infantry divisions in South Vietnam supported by numerous armor, artillery, and air defense units. Eight of these divisions are located in Military Regions 3 and 4.

Moreover, there are strong indications that a North Vietnamese Army corps headquarters and three more reserve divisions are moving to South Vietnam. Two of these divisions have already reached the DMZ and could show up north of Saigon in two to four weeks. In addition, two NVA Air Defense divisions are in South Vietnam, one in MR-3 where it could soon threaten Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut airports.

By comparison the South Vietnamese, at this moment, now have seven combat-ready infantry divisions. They are rebuilding three from personnel extracted from the north and plan to form two more by early summer.

On paper, the GVN's long-term prospects are bleak, no matter how well Saigon's forces and commanders acquit themselves in the fighting that lies ahead.

This is already beginning to become an accepted judgment within both civilian and military circles in South Vietnam.

At this moment, pressure continues to build among the civilian opposition and among some military commanders for President Thieu either to exert the vigorous leadership which has been conspicuously needed and missing, or step aside.

So far Thieu has shown considerable skill in keeping the opposition divided. He is aided by the fact that there is no single figure who his various political and military critics believe would provide more effective leadership.

While yesterday's bombing of the Presidential palace was an isolated act, it underscores the ever-present possibility of a single incident that would overturn Thieu and bring on political chaos.

Thieu's new nominee for prime minister, Nguyen Ba Can, hopes to have a government formed by this weekend.

Can will try to encourage representatives from the civilian opposition to join the cabinet. There is considerable reluctance, however, especially among important Buddhist and Catholic groups, to be associated with a Thieu government.

In any case, we see no dramatic improvement likely to stem from this new government.

Another factor is U.S. aid. A prompt and large-scale infusion would tend to restore confidence. The converse is obviously also true.

The most likely outcome is a government willing to accept a settlement on Communist terms, i.e., surrender.

The Communists are repeating their willingness to negotiate with a post-Thieu government, in an obvious effort to encourage a political upheaval in Saigon.

At the same time, Hanoi is making it clear that it is not interested in a compromise but rather in a figleaf for a North Vietnamese takeover under military pressure.

In this regard, the new COSVN instructions mentioned state that negotiations or a tripartite government are merely stratagems to isolate the GVN.

We have few indications yet on how the Communists are setting up their new administration in the northern half of South Vietnam.

In at least some instances they seem to be maintaining the facade of a transitional national liberation government.

We believe, however, that there has been a basic downgrading of the Viet Cong's PRG in North Vietnamese thinking. Hanoi now sees no need for a lengthy intermediate stage of negotiation and coalition rule, and has little incentive to maintain the PRG as a separate political entity.

In sum, we believe Hanoi will take whatever action is necessary to force the war to an early conclusion -- probably by early summer. The remaining questions

have to do with Communist tactics and timing, and whether or not a political solution on Communist terms can be arranged prior to a final South Vietnamese military collapse.

Finally, Mr. President, there is the question of how these recent events may effect the attitudes of other nations toward us.

In general, the current debacle is seen not as a turning point, but as the final step on a particular path that most governments had long seen coming. They have, in short, seen the whole Indochina experience as a major setback for the U.S.

Many, especially in Europe, had long questioned America's judgment and the propriety of its involvement.

Others were disillusioned with America's ability to cope with an uncommonly complex situation.

Still others gradually lost faith in America's will to stay on a difficult course.

The circumstances of the Vietnamese collapse have dramatized these perceptions, but adjustments were already being made.

There will, however, be apprehension over the repercussions, and the American reaction to the dramatic finale.

Our allies have been disturbed, and our adversaries heartened, over trends in American attitudes toward:

-- limiting the flexibility of U.S. foreign policy in meeting new challenges,

-- reducing U.S. support for our allies and friends, and

-- reducing the share of U.S. resources devoted to maintaining our military power and foreign policy.

Any signs that the American people are beginning a prolonged and bitter internal debate will heighten these concerns and intensify fear that we may be heading into a new era of isolationism. U.S. actions in the Middle East, in particular, will be closely watched in judging our future course.

Levels of trust, however, will be affected mainly by perceptions of U.S. behavior on issues of direct and compelling interest to the countries concerned.

Western Europeans and Japan, for example, do not expect a reduction of U.S. power relevent to their immediate concerns. And none of them consider U.S. aid to their security any less necessary than before.

A number of regional powers, such as Iran and Brazil, will continue their trend toward self-reliance rather than linkage with the U.S. in anything but major confrontations with the USSR.

Among those on the firing line, uneasiness will increase, and the drive toward self-reliance will accelerate.

The South Koreans and Nationalist Chinese will see greater parallels to their own situation, and will put pressure for maximum support as long as possible.

Southeast Asians, especially the Thai, will feel more exposed, but have long anticipated eventual U.S. withdrawal from the mainland. They may now advance their adjustment to growing Communist power.

Middle East countries will see U.S. interests there as compelling continuing involvement. However, there is one particular situation on which Vietnam developments could have a direct impact. Both

Prime Minister Rabin and President Sadat have been very reluctant to place their respective nations' vital interests hostage to any agreement which was not self-enforcing, especially any agreement that was silent on matters which either regarded as being of major concern. The experience with the 1973 Paris Agreement could reinforce this already manifest reluctance.

Soviet, Chinese, and other Communist leaders, for their part, will not automatically conclude that other U.S. commitments are placed in question, unless:

The U.S. public reaction points to a repudiation of other foreign involvement, or

Internal U.S. recriminations are so divisive as to raise doubts of the U.S. ability to develop any consensus on foreign policy in the near future.

North Vietnamese leaders will exploit their victories to denigrate U.S. power, especially among third-world countries.

Hanoi may increase its support to Thailand's insurgency.

Its principal energies, however, at least for the next year or two, will be devoted to consolidating its control over Indochina.

Do you wish me to go on to Cambodia now or later?

President: Please go ahead now.

Colby: In Cambodia, it is difficult to see the government holding on for much more than another week.

Communist attacks in the Phnom Penh area have weakened government defenses north and west of the capital to the degree that they could collapse at any time.

..... the Communists are calling in even more units from the countryside for an all-out attack against the capital's defenders.

The Communists are also placing additional artillery near the capital.

The insurgents will soon have their forces ready to begin the final push.

Meanwhile, the time is rapidly approaching when ammunition shortages will directly affect Cambodian Army capabilities.

By April 17 all ammunition earmarked for Cambodia will have been delivered. In-country stocks of some types of ammunition will be exhausted soon thereafter and all ammunition will be gone by April 25.

In the face of the steady battlefield pressure and uncertainty over U.S. assistance, morale in the army is plummeting.

The army high command is nearly paralyzed and is issuing only limited guidance to units in the field.

A number of key unit commanders in the Phnom Penh area have expressed the belief that the end is near and the fight may soon go out of the army completely.

..... government troops in at least one isolated enclave have contacted local Communist forces to discuss the possibility of surrender.

On the political front, most Cambodians now realize that President Lon Nol's departure has had little effect on the prospects for meaningful negotiations with the other side.

Prime Minister Long Boret returned to Phnom Penh yesterday saying that there were no prospects for a compromise solution or a cease-fire.

Boret met with Sihanouk's son, Prince Yuvaneath, in Bangkok. Yuvaneath admitted that he was not authorized to speak for his father but his claim that Sihanouk would not negotiate is undoubtedly correct.

The government may soon invite Sihanouk to return and try to tie the invitation to an agreement that Communist forces not enter Phnom Penh or hinder the flow of relief supplies to the city.

At this point, this sort of an orderly surrender is the best that can be hoped for.

President: Thank you, Bill. Are there any questions?

Schlesinger: .....an attack on Phnom Penh may occur on Friday. We do not have much time.

President: Fred, will you give us the benefit of your report?

General Wevand: In preparing this report, I went back and referred to the report I did on a trip I took in July, 1973, about two years ago. In that report, I said that the position of the North Vietnamese and of the PRG had been dramatically improved since the start of the cease-fire. They were shipping major quantities of supplies to their forces.

On the other side, the leaders of the South Vietnamese army were aware that they were now engaged in a political struggle. General Truong's civic actions in MR-1 were especially impressive. The political struggle was engaged, and the GVN was determined to win it.

I found this interesting in the light of recent developments. The South Vietnamese continued the concept that this was a political struggle and they organized their forces to this effect.

I said then that the top South Vietnamese leaders thought the question was not if the Communists would attack but when. Those leaders were very sensitive to American support and they were counting on the intervention of U.S. air power in the case of such a Communist attack.

They are still in this mood. They clearly still cherish the hope that the U.S. will help them. There are many reasons why they responded as they did; that is one of them.

I found the situation critical. It is clearly going in favor of the other side. Hanoi has many options; the GVN and the U.S. have few.

The South Vietnamese have suffered heavy losses. Their morale was very low when we got there, but it has been improving since then. I believe your decision to send a team, whatever may be said about its composition, is clearly vindicated.

I believe the South Vietnamese are on the brink of total military defeat. I examined a plan that is intended to deal with the area that they now hold. They have been thinking of this for some time, once they saw that American support was dwindling and would continue to dwindle whereas North Vietnamese support would grow.

They have been rationing arms and ammunitions for some time. They have been trying to husband their resources. They have cut down the use of rifle ammunition and of grenades very dramatically.

They had made plans to complete their resources in an area which corresponds roughly to what they now have, though they had hoped to hold more of the coast, especially to the extent to which they had some expectation of finding oil. The Delta, of course, is their rice bowl and very valuable. The rest of the area, south of the present line, contains lumber and a lot of population.

I told Thieu this plan was sound but a linear defense was not appropriate to the type of situation that they face. They should find enemy divisions and destroy them wherever they are, and not just try to hold the line that it is not identifiable by some geographic feature. The big question is whether they now have time to get organized.

The issues they face are as follows:

First, to reconstitute their forces and to create four more divisions in order to defend against the larger North Vietnamese army.

Second, to upgrade their territorial forces to 27 regiments (which would have been done a long time ago if they had though that they would face this kind of military challenge).

Third, to upgrade their ranger groups.

If they could do all that, they would be in pretty good shape. There is a limit to what the North Vietnamese can send down. The South Vietnamese could mass, and with the very strong air support that they have they could do a good job for a time.

We all agree that the long-range prospects are just impossible for them. The issue is: can we get the stuff to them in time and will the enemy give them time?

I have not tried to be too optimistic. However, there have been reports from some of the places where I testified that I said the GVN could win. They can, locally, but I do not believe they can push the North Vietnamese army back.

I have said that the South Vietnamese could and would fight. I have said this in part in order to help keep the South Vietnamese together. But their leadership is very doubtful. I have talked to Thieu. If he does what he says, it can go pretty well. As for the will to fight, I have said that in March, 1972, there were 16 North Vietnamese divisions down there. And they were defeated, though with American help. General Vogt and I concluded that they had the will to fight. But they had our support.

Last year they had 600 people a week killed and many wounded. So I think they have the will to fight. I do not think one should regard this panic as a sign that they have no such will. I have seen such panic in Korea in 1950 as well as in Burma. It is not pleasant, but it is not unprecedented. The 18th and the 25th divisions have been doing well. The question is the will of the people to resist or to accept a form of government that they consider alien.

The other question is the support of the American people. I assume they would support more assistance, having stuck with it this long. That is the way I dealt with it in my report. I have found support on our determination not to let force prevail over the will of the people.

I have recently seen some talk about secret commitments. In a visit last year to Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand, I spoke of continuing American support. It is clear that they all expected American support, although Thieu was worried about threats in the Congress. Thieu clearly believes you have done all you could. He understands the Congress.

One thing that I had in the back of my mind as I wrote my recommendations was that we owe it to them to help them or at least we should not deny them the help if they need it. If I did not believe it, I would not be here. Neither, I guess, would the rest of you.

The question is whether the American people would accept the burden. As I have watched the orphan program and the refugee movement, I have concluded that the American people desperately want to help the South Vietnamese. Whether this sentiment translates into military

assistance it is hard to say, but I believe it exists.

The price that I think it requires is $722 million which would build four more divisions and upgrade other units. This amount subsumes the $300 million that is now in the supplemental.

I also had recommendations on refugee assistance and on evacuation policy. You are aware of these.

President: Thank you, Fred. I read your report and I talked to you about it in California. I am impressed with its solid factual analysis.

Henry, may I have the options as you see them?

Secretary Kissinger: If I may wear my hat as Secretary of State for a time, I want to take issue with the estimate of the Director of Central Intelligence regarding the impact on our worldwide position of a collapse in Vietnam. It was his judgment that the world reaction would be negligible, based on the fact that everybody had been anticipating what would happen.

Let me say that, whatever their long run expectations, no country expected so rapid a collapse. I believe their reaction would also be affected if they did not even see an effort made.

We have reports that the Japanese, the Indonesians, and other Asian nations are watching closely, and they are forming judgments. It is not in their interests to say this publicly.

Especially in Asia, this rapid collapse and our impotent reaction will not go unnoticed. I believe that we will see the consequences although they may not come quickly or in any predictable manner.

So I cannot share the judgment expressed by the Director of Central Intelligence. I believe that, even in Western Europe, this will have a fall-out.

Let me now come to the options.

On military assistance, the first option would be to ask for no military aid but to follow the predominant mood in the Congress and do nothing. You could say that your predecessors have put in $150 billion and that it has not worked, and that no amount foreseeable is going to work. You could say that you are concentrating on the economic and humanitarian side. You would have the advantage that you could be the first President since 1947 who will have had nothing to do with Vietnam.

President: Not as President perhaps, but as a member of Congress I have.

Secretary Kissinger: The negative aspect of such an option is that it would trigger an immediate collapse in Saigon and that this collapse would be caused by the United States.

It would give Saigon the least opportunity to negotiate. It would imperil 6,000 Americans, and it would make it impossible to evacuate any Vietnamese. The international implications would compound those that I have described. But, it would provoke the least dissension in this country.

Between that and the $722 million that Fred has mentioned, you can about pick your own figure.

You can go for $300 million saying that this is all that is immediately available. You can say that you will either try to get some more later, or you can say that you will specifically try for the $422 million later.

President: This would be easiest to get but, as Fred told me in California, it could not be justified in terms of additional forces.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct. The $300 million is designed to bring supply stocks up to the 60-day level.

Schlesinger: You should know that Mahan is marking up the $300 million tomorrow. I told him he may want to wait until after the speech. You may want to send him a signal.

Secretary Kissinger: The problem with $300 million is that it will be hard to defend. It is important to get the debate behind us and not to go on for months. So a case can be made that you either go for close to nothing or that you go for Fred's recommendation, since $300 million is not enough.

If you say $300 million and more later, you are simply bringing about months of Vietnam debate. But you could do it that way. It is possible that South Vietnam may collapse, and then you may not need to ask for the $22 million. It is, of course, also probable that if you go for $722 million, there will still be a collapse.

The advantages of the $722 million are: First, that it's militarily defensible; second, that it would strengthen the South Vietnamese position for inevitable negotiations -- as Fred says, South Vietnam can then negotiate with North Vietnam; and, third, that it would put us in the best position to negotiate our extraction, with South Vietnam, North Vietnam, or both.

So I see three viable options:

-- First, to ask for nothing or next to nothing;

-- Second, to ask for $300 million and indicate that there might be more to come;

-- Third, to ask for the whole amount.

Next, we must deal with the options regarding economic assistance.

President: If we ask for $722 million, can we say that this is all we ask?

Weyand: We think that the amount for 1976 that we have requested, which is $1.3 billion, would be enough to carry us from there on.

President: Then, if the $722 million is granted, and if it is effective, we would expect that about $1.3 billion would do it.

Secretary Kissinger: As I understand it, the $722 million would have to be followed by $1.3 billion in order to have a chance for success.

There is also the question of economic assistance. It is also related to the military option. AID wants to stay within the limit of its original authorization, so they do not want to ask for more than $167 million. This was our appraisal as being what we needed before the attack, but it would appear unbalanced in comparison to the great increase in our request for military aid.

President: Does this figure include economic and humanitarian aid?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Our Embassy has asked for $450 million which has a lot of money for economic development that makes very little sense right now.

I am inclined to think that anything between $170 million and $450 million might make sense. We can say that anything around $250 million or in that area would make sense, but there is no hard basis for any of these figures.

There is a hard basis for the Embassy figure, but we cannot defend it on the Hill under present circumstances.

Since we are talking of emergency assistance, it should be more than in the past. Certainly, anything between $170 million and $300 million can be put to use.

We need also to determine our stance on a Congressional resolution that some of our aid should go to support people living in Communist areas.

We have several options: We can oppose, we can be neutral, or we can be favorable toward such a resolution.

The major problem is that we would be supporting the rear area of a country that is attacking an ally. A case can be made for the argument that they have the Soviet Union and China to help them.

As Secretary of State, I think that this kind of idea presents an image of a sappy America getting creamed and at the same time helping those who are attacking it.

Schlesinger: What is your opinion as National Security Advisor?

Secretary Kissinger: As National Security Advisor, I have to be impartial, but that is a hard one. I will risk the recommendation that we should oppose such legislation.

President: I gather that Senator Kennedy tends to advocate it, wanting to administer the funds through the United Nations.

Secretary Kissinger: It amounts to the same thing: it relieves Communist resources and personnel. If the U. N. wants to do it without U. S. participation, that is its business. But for the United States to do this, while a war is going on, would be hard to explain to the American people and to foreign countries.

President: Have all the refugees come to the South Vietnamese area, or are they still in areas controlled by the North Vietnamese?

Colby: Some have come to the South Vietnamese area, but many are still in the North Vietnamese area.

Weyand: We are now talking of a refugee figure of about 400,000 in areas under South Vietnamese control as opposed to 1 million earlier.

President: Do we still hold Cam Ranh?

Colby: No.

Secretary Kissinger: It is a terrible tragedy. Nobody can deny the ineptitude of the South Vietnamese. But for the United States to send relief to Communist areas and to help them devote resources to the war seems very questionable.

President: In effect, we would be financing both sides.

Kissinger: You have these three choices. You can oppose the proposal for providing aid to refugees in Communist areas, or you can give the Congress the facts and let them decide, or you can support it. It is not a disgraceful argument.

With regard to evacuation of Americans and Vietnamese, there are three things that affect a decision. First, the number of people who might need to be evacuated; second, the political conditions under which they might need to be evacuated; third, the question of how to organize such an effort.

I have a list of potential evacuees. The maximum total of those included in this list is 1,700,000. They fall into eight different categories:

1. American citizens and their relatives;

2. The diplomatic corps;

3. The ICCS;

4. Third country nationals under contract to us;

5. The employees of the United States and their dependents. This latter category is estimated at about 164,000 people.

The total included in those five categories comes close to 200,000.

President: Of which, I understand, 6,000 are Americans.

Kissinger: There are about 5,400 and 500 dependents.

We would then have the other categories.

6. The Vietnamese relatives of American citizens.

7. Senior GVN and military officials and their dependents.

The total for this category is given as 600,000, which seems high.

8. Former Vietnamese employees of the United States intelligence and other agencies as well as their dependents.

One problem is that, even if you accept the level of 200,000 on the list, Graham Martin refuses to carry out the order to evacuate them.

Clements: Why don't you fire him?

Kissinger: Graham Martin's major problem is that he does not want to trigger panic by beginning any evacuation process.

Schlesinger: Conditions will get worse.

Kissinger: Once we get a Presidential decision, I shall see to it that Graham Martin carries it out. But we have not had a clear-cut decision.

It depends a great deal on what the President recommends for aid to South Vietnam. If the President recommends nothing, then panic could create an immediate problem. If the President recommends support and asks for money, we can then tell Thieu that we are going to have to take out some Americans and it should not create the same result.

As for the Vietnamese, there are some problems. For one thing, they are scattered all over the place. We would have to get them to the aircraft. If we gave the order to evacuate, it might well be impossible to carry it out.

Schlesinger: We have to have the cooperation and the acquiescence of the Vietnamese.

Kissinger: This is the next point: We have to decide how to organize such an effort. This will require immediate

consultation with Thieu, once we decide, or with whatever successor government there might be. But, whoever is in power in Saigon, we will need to coordinate. Your speech will have some effect on this.

We have looked, with the Department of Defense, at all available assets. It is clear that, with the numbers involved, this cannot be a one day operation like Eagle Pull in Cambodia.

By commercial aircraft, we could take out 600 a day. By military aircraft, we could take out 15,000 in a day. By ship, we could take out anywhere from 26,000 to 125,000 a day. Of course, ships have a longer turn around time of four to five days. So you have an evacuation that will take a week if you go to 240,000.

Schlesinger: It also depends on the cooperation of the North Vietnames They have anti-aircraft weapons. If those weapons are brought near Tan Son Nhut, they can make it very difficult.

Kissinger: So the issue depends first on your decisions, second on identifying the persons to evacuate, third on the cooperation of the GVN, and fourth on the cooperation of the North Vietnamese. I should add that this is one area where I believe the Soviet Union and the Chinese could be helpful.

In your decision you would have to deal with evacuation, with what to say to the GVN, with what you want the Department of Defense to do, and with what diplomatic efforts you would want the State Department to make vis-a-vis these countries and others. I agree with the Secretary of Defense that it will be hairy.

President: To put into effect an evacuation proposal for our own people and for 200,000 others, would that not require violation of the law or the agreement of Congress if we need to use force.

Kissinger: My own personal view is that you would have to ask Congressional authority to take forces in. It is not like Cambodia. It will last longer. Even if we have the consent of the GVN, we will have to fight Vietnamese. If that is your decision, this will require U.S. forces.

First we have to decide what to go for. Then we can talk to Thieu. Then we can get the Embassy to thin out our personnel, removing those who were assigned to I Corps and II Corps as well as dependents and the like.

President: Do you have any observations on this, Jim?

Schlesinger: You have the innate power to protect Americans. I think the Foreign Relations Committee is anxious to cooperate and would not object to our use of force. Moose and Meissner, who have been out there, have been cabling back favorable recommendations on this issue.

Kissinger: The problem is not under the War Powers Act, as I see it. It is under the Indochina Restrictions, where the issue becomes more difficult. Elsewhere, it would appear to be easy to use U.S. forces for this purpose.

President: Which of these was approved last?

Kissinger: We went through that at the time of this legislation and determined that the War Powers legislation superseded the other. But the Administration of your predecessor took the position at the time that it would not claim this.

However, despite this kind of issue, the question is whether it would be politically acceptable for us to do this. I question whether we should rely on Moose or Meissner.

President: It is great for people to say this, as they have in Turkey and Greece, to the effect that we can go ahead. But, of course, if it does not work it is we who are in trouble.

Schlesinger: On Turkey, the General Accounting Office says that it is all right.

President: If Congress wants us to do it, let them pass a Sense of the Congress Resolution.

Kissinger: Another problem is that in Vietnam it is not just a matter of evacuating American citizens but also of evacuating Vietnamese.

Clements: If we go to the Congress, we should have one package and go for it.

President: I think we should ask for a change in the law that we can use certain resources that we need for evacuation. Somebody should be preparing it so that we can send it up by Friday. We should not just be limited to one division, or one other type of unit, or just to our personnel.

If we have a disaster, Congress will evade the responsibility. Let us get some language. I am sick and tired of their asking us to ignore the law or to enforce it, depending on whether or not it is to their advantage.

Brown: When this legislation came up, Admiral Moorer spoke specifically of this problem. He was told that the U.S. of course had the power to protect Americans.

President: Let's get that testimony.

Does anybody wish to comment on the general issues?

Schlesinger: I think we have a number of problems. The first one is Vietnam itself. We must recognize that it is gone. It is going now and it will go quickly depending on the North Vietnamese. With any aid we give them

we are buying time, partly to get out the Americans.

We must try to see what it will look like in 90 days. It is desirable to avoid fragmentation of the people and an argument with Congress. We must state clearly in closed rooms that hope is slim, and that we are moving on a strategy of 60 days to 6 months. We should say that we are doing this to save the Americans and to protect the Vietnamese.

I think in your speech you should push for $300 million and say that we will ask for more later. We will use the time to get the Americans out. Fred says we just have a chance and that it depends on the North Vietnamese. So far, the South Vietnamese have not been able even to regroup the unruly people of the Second division. We may be faced with a situation that will last only 30 days.

The important thing is for you to establish leadership and to give a call to the people. You could talk along the lines of Churchill's blood, sweat and tears. You could say that U.S. foreign policy is in the most difficult period since 1939. I would tick off Portugal and say that we insist on a free election. We should tell the Europeans we expect them to do more in their own defense. Also, we should speak of Turkey and of what must be done there.

I think that if you have a fighting speech, you will have a positive impact on the Congress. I think there are two kinds of people on the Hill: Those who want to get out of Vietnam and those who are just waiting for an inspirational message.

Let us not talk of detente or of past achievements. I am concerned for the country and for you. We need to challenge the Soviet Union. We should say that detente is not consistent with revolutionary actions in Portugal and with what they have been doing in Southeast Asia. We want to preserve detente but it cannot be

a one way street. The speech should also have a tone of admonition to the Chinese, who have supported North Vietnam and the Cambodian Communists. We need a Churchillian speech that would establish a fighting leadership, even if we have to postpone it for a few more days. When the speech was originally scheduled, we thought the situation was more manageable, but the situation has changed to the point where we need this kind of address. As for Vietnam, the situation is now hopeless.

Clements: I want to endorse what Jim says. I think the time has come to be candid. The people want the President to get out in front and to give us leadership.

The American people do not like what has happened. We should say that Vietnam is bad and has been for twelve years. Americans have been divided. Now let us look ahead and not get into acrimonious debates over the past.

We should not get into recriminations. We have to move forward. You can say that you are the man who will take them forward. We should not promise anything that we cannot do. In my judgment, there is very little we can do. All options are bad. It takes a strong leader to be able to cut your losses. But more important things lie ahead. I agree with the humanitarian side. But we should not get out in front on an idle threat or on some bluff that we cannot support.

Colby: If I may take advantage of the precedent set by the National Security Advisor, and if I may state my views on policy, it would be that you should put your stress on the Vietnamese people.

In 1954, 900,000 Vietnamese went to South Vietnam from North Vietnam. It will be important to speak of the free choice of the Vietnamese. We should ask Congress to commit money to carry out the

pledge to let the Vietnamese, perhaps one to two million, leave, and to provide diplomatic support. Also, the forces could leave. This would give those forces something to fight for.

Americans could respond to their feelings. We would accept the fact that Vietnam has been a defeat, but go on to our concern with the people.

Brown: I would like to support what Jim Schlesinger says. I have been on a trip, to Indonesia, Singapore, Pakistan and other countries. In Pakistan, I was approached on whether we would let the Vietnamese fall. I cited the record.

There is great interest. People wonder if we will turn our backs on Asia. The main question is what we will do about Asia. I think $722 million, even with Fred Weyand's objectives, would be wasted. We would have no hope. Perhaps $300 million would maintain some effort on behalf of the Vietnamese and would say we are not turning our back on Asia.

The large sum would also have an impact on the equipment of our own units. We would have to send material that our own forces should use.

Clements: In any case, we cannot get the material there in time.

President: Bob, do you have anything you want to add?

Ingersoll: If you say what Jim suggests, you will have chaos in Saigon.

Schlesinger: You would not say it publicly. You would say it privately to the Congressional leaders.

Kissinger: It will certainly get out.

President: I am not going to tell the Congressional leaders that sort of thing. I will tell them my decision. We have an executive and legislative branch. I still think we have to make our own decision within the executive branch. We solicit their views, but I have to make the decisions. I do intend to make a strong speech. It will be looked upon as a strong speech.

I believe my speech has to be consistent. I cannot make a strong speech on certain areas of the world, and then, as I look at it, ask for $300 million. No military estimate can justify it. If we are going to be blunt and say we will do nothing, that is one thing, but we have to use figures that are justifiable. Maybe Congress will not give it to us, but at least, on the record, we have to say what will do it.

Marsh: Congressman Don Fraser has just made a speech calling for Vietnam aid.

President: I will ask for $722 million because we can justify it. At least the record will be clear. I will ask that it be done by a date certain, perhaps May 1, though we still have to decide that.

I will ask for humanitarian aid but not through the United Nations. Third, I will ask for authority, which I think is needed, to evacuate the Americans and others to whom we have an obligation.

I do not rule out at some point letting the North Vietnamese know that any interference with our humanitarian efforts will be met with strong measures. That is why I want flexibility.

It will be a strong speech in my own way, not perhaps in Churchill's. It will not be a phony.

I gather, Jim, that you have reservations. But this is the decision. This will be the only group that knows

it. I have spent a lot of time on this, now and even earlier, going back to 1952. I think our policy, going back to Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, was the right policy. We did not always implement it well, and we may have made many mistakes. But it was the right policy.

But to go to Congress and ask for nothing, that is dubious. It is our best hope, if we can get it.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

4/24/75
2745X

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ford
Vice President Rockefeller
Secretary of State Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General George S. Brown
Director of Central Intelligence,
William Colby
Deputy Secretary of State,
Robert Ingersoll
Deputy Secretary of Defense,
William Clements
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft,
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
W. Richard Smyser, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, April 24, 1975
4:35 p.m.

PLACE:

The Cabinet Room
The White House

SUBJECT:

Vietnam Evacuation

President: As you know, before we got into the Phnom Penh evacuation, we had a meeting. I wanted to know what our plans were. It took place at the right time and in the best of circumstances.

I have kept in daily contact with Henry and Brent on where things stood in Vietnam. I know the Congress has been on us on this, to get it off their

~~SECRET/XGDS~~

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back. I think it is very important to stay there as long as we can contribute, to evacuate in a way that will not promote panic, and to contribute as much as possible to a peaceful solution.

Now, I understand we are down from 6000 to about 1600.

Schlesinger: It has gone up to 1700.

President: I have ordered a reduction by Friday night of to 1090.

Schlesinger: That is a lot in one day.

President: That is what I ordered. There will be another order that by Sunday non-essential non-governmental personnel must be out of there. The group that is left will stay until the order is issued to take them all out.

We just got a reply from the Sovets to a request we made. Henry, give us the background and the message.

Kissinger: At the President's request, I contacted Dobrynin Saturday to request their assistance to permit a safe evacuation and the beginning of political discussions and asked them to help create the conditions where this would be possible. [See U.S. oral note at Tab A]. We also told him specifically on Monday that we would take a serious view of an attack on Tan Son Nhut. We have received the following reply.

[He reads from the Soviet message at Tab B.]

This means, in effect, that if we keep the dialogues going we have an assurance against military action as we pull our people out. On the political side, the tripartite arrangement gives us the hope of a coalition solution which can be better than surrender. We will go back to the Soviets to find out what they mean by implementation of the Paris Accords and to say we will cooperate. We will say we won't take precipitate action and we assume they won't.

President: My interpretation is that the lull which we have is a result of this. You could assume they weren't yet ready and would move when they are ready. This looks like they are willing for an agreement within the framework of the Paris Accords and that we can keep our people there, and reduce them until such time as we decide to remove them.

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We have been through a difficult time. It was a risk and a gamble but it was my responsibility and I didn't want to do anything to risk the situation. I think I was right, and I will continue to act that way.

Every one should be guided by the 1090, and the further removal of non-essential, non-governmental people. These are Americans, not Vietnamese dependents, who I assume are adding to the list everyday, in a ratio of about four to one.

Brown: About 15 to 1 in the last few days.

Kissinger: You asked the Soviets about American and South Vietnamese evacuation and they only answered about American citizens.

Vice President: How do you read that?

Kissinger: I read that as they are tacticly saying "Get them out" but they can't give us approval.

President: I take it to mean we can't use force.

Schlesinger: We are delighted with such restraint.

President: But I want to do whatever is needed to secure the American evacuation. George, would you review the plan for us?

Brown: The first stage we are in now. In the second stage we would send two companies in just to keep order. If we lost the airfield we would go to helos. We have two landing zones -- one at old MACV compound and one at the Embassy. We can put about six helos down at once. We would put 1100 Marines in with the first wave. The helos would come in and evacuate the 1100 people in an hour and 15 minutes. Then they would go back for the Marines.

President: Then the total is about 2 1/2 hours.

Kissinger: Graham [Martin] said he had a deal with the airborne commander and he would keep order.

President: How about the typhoon?

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Kissinger: There is no danger now.

President: I think these orders to Martin will get us within the 1100 required.

Clements: How many Vietnamese are we talking about?

Kissinger: We don't know.

Colby: I think we should move a soon as possible for the high-risk people.

Kissinger: We told him yesterday and today to get moving on the high-risk people.

Brown: I think we should keep mixing the loads -- Americans and Vietnamese -- so we don't get criticized for leaving American personnel there as hostages.

Schlesinger: Henry's message is a source of reassurance, but there are some sources of concern. Their control might be limited; there are reports of sappers going in; and reports of attempts to stir up unrest: and there are some risks of attempts to go after Americans. In light of Henry's message, that appears manageable. A more difficult problem is population control, especially in conditions where they might have to fire on Vietnamese. You know we have favored going down to minimum levels. We should consider what we do if Americans are held hostage. We could say no ships will go into Hanoi until the hostages are released. So we should reduce as low as possible.

Colby: We have some people who are prisoners now.

Schlesinger: Just missionaries.

Colby: No. Also some advisors.

President: I understand the risk. It is mine and I am doing it. But let's make sure we carry out the orders.

Vice President: You can't insure the interests of America without risks.

President: With God's help.

Vice President: It takes real courage to do what is right in these conditions.

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~~SECRET~~ (A)

ORAL NOTE

The President wishes the following brought to the urgent attention of General Secretary Brezhnev.

For the past three years Soviet-American relations have proceeded from the Basic Principles of May 1972, and above all from the principle of restraint. The situation in Viet-Nam has now reached a point, that the United States and the USSR must consider the long term consequences [~~of further developments there for Soviet-American relations and~~] for the international situation as a whole. There is little to be gained from a debate over the origins of the present situation or over which parties must be held responsible.

Under present circumstances our overriding concern is to achieve controlled conditions, which will save lives and permit the continued evacuation of American citizens and those South Vietnamese to whom we have a direct and special obligation. This can only be achieved through a temporary cease fire.

We urgently request that the Government of the USSR use its good offices to achieve a temporary halt to the fighting. In this connection, we are prepared to discuss the special political circumstances that could make this possible. We request the most expeditious answer.

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SECRET

Talking Points

-- We are not going to the Chinese or any other intermediary; nor are we willing to approach the DRV.

-- We are going to Moscow because it is in our long term mutual interest that the situation be brought to its conclusion in a manner that does not jeopardize Soviet-American relations, or affect the attitude of the American people toward other international problems.

-- If there is a temporary cease fire, we would be prepared to convene the Paris Conference immediately, or we can consider alternatives that the Soviet Union might work out with Hanoi.

-- During the period of a temporary cease fire we would be willing to halt military supplies.

-- But we are concerned that there will be attacks on the airfields, that will make it impossible to continue an orderly reduction in American citizens.

-- Moreover, we have detected Soviet surface-to-air missiles within 50 miles of Saigon; any attack on passenger aircraft would create a most dangerous situation.

-- In light of the developing military situation, we need to know now whether there is a chance for a temporary halt in the fighting that might permit a political process to start.

[-- The Soviets' answer will have a significant bearing on our relations.]

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SECRET

(R)

Delivered to the Secretary at State Dept.
4:00 pm, April 24, 1975

As it has already been said to the President immediately after the mssage of the President of April 19 was received by L. E. Brezhnev we took appropriate steps to get in touch with the Vietnamese side in this connection.

As the result of those contacts now we can inform the President about the following: the position of the Vietnamese side on the question of evacuation of American citizens from South Vietnam is definitely positive. The Vietnamese stated that they have no intention to put any obstacles in the course of military actions to evacuation of American citizens from South Vietnam and that now in fact favorable conditions have been established for such an evacuation.

At the same time it was emphasized that in the struggle for achieving a political settlement the Vietnamese side will proceed from the Paris Agreement. We were also told that the Vietnamese do not intend to damage the prestige of the United States.

Informing the President of the above in a confidential manner L. E. Brezhnev expresses his hope that the President will duly appreciate such a position of the Vietnamese side and will not allow any actions on the United States part which would be fraught with a new exacerbation of the situation in Indochina.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

April 28, 1975

Roosevelt Room

7:23 - 8:08 p.m.

Participants:

President Ford
Vice President Rockefeller
Secretary of State Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
W. R. Smyser, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
MR 92-10, #21, NSC ltr. 10/7/94
By KBH, NARA, Date 2/6/95

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President: Brent Scowcroft this afternoon brought me the report that two Marines had been lost, so I felt we should convene the National Security Council to discuss the situation in Saigon.

Who can bring us up-to-date?

Colby: I think I can.

What has happened is that the Viet Cong have rejected Minh's cease-fire offer. They have now added a third demand, which is to dismantle the South Vietnamese armed forces. Bien Hoa is in the process of falling. The Viet Cong have cut off the road to the Delta and are advancing on Vung Tau.

It is a very dangerous situation. The North Vietnamese are bringing artillery within range of Tan Son Nhut airport. At 4:00 a.m. they had a salvo of rockets against Tan Son Nhut. This is what killed the Marines. This salvo was followed by 130 millimeter artillery fire. Some of this artillery fire hit the American side, not the Vietnamese side like last night.

Three aircraft have been shot down. All are Vietnamese. They include a C-119, an A-1, and an A-37 helicopter. The latter was shot down by an SA-7 missile. The presence of these missiles increases the risk factor greatly.

President: Has the rocket and the other fire now stopped?

Colby: No. It's continuing.

Schlesinger: The latest information is that there is still artillery fire against the airport. A flight of C-130's is going in to take out the DAO (Defense Attache Office). They hope to be able to land, but they can be waved off by a controller on the ground if it is unwise. North Vietnamese ground forces are one kilometer from Tan Son Nhut and advancing.

Colby: Those forces are of platoon strength, perhaps one or two platoons.

President: We should not predicate our judgments on two platoons. How many people is that?

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Schlesinger: About 100.

President: When did you get a report that the firing was last going on?

Schlesinger: About 30 minutes ago.

President: What is the status of the runway?

Schlesinger: Landable.

President: Do you have air controllers?

Schlesinger: There are some on the ground.

President: Are there any C-130's on the ground?

Schlesinger: Only one, which had been hit. We are loading weapons and bombs on aircraft in Thailand. Our aircraft are in the air for potential cover, but they are over the water.

President: What kinds of bombs are these? Are they the "smart" bombs?

Brown: They are regular iron bombs. The aircraft do not carry "smart" bombs unless they have special equipment.

President: How many DAO people do you have at the airport?

Schlesinger: About 400, including contractors.

President: If the C-130's can land, they should. How many are there?

Brown: The plan is for 70 sorties, with each of 35 aircraft coming in twice.

President: Who will decide whether they come in?

Brown: The controller on the ground at Tan Son Nhut.

President: If these attacks continue, would he bring the aircraft in?

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Brown: If it is artillery fire, he would wave them off. If it is rocket fire, he would bring them in.

He had a message yesterday that one artillery unit was to fire on two targets. They have now hit those two targets, an apron and a gymnasium used for processing.

President: For the processing of Vietnamese?

Brown: Yes.

Kissinger: Was that artillery or rocket fire?

Schlesinger: It is not certain.

Brown: What worries me more than the artillery fire is the report of an aircraft being shot down by an SA-7. Choppers or aircraft are defenseless against the SA-7. The only way to deflect the missiles is to use flares, but I am not sure whether the aircraft we are using are equipped for that. Of course, we have to do our mission, but if the risk becomes too great, we may need to turn off the lift.

President: If the risk is too great, the man on the ground has to judge. We cannot. That means we have to move to get the DAO people out as well as the Embassy. That is one possibility.

If they can land, they should carry out the operation as before. But when they find that it is getting too hazardous the last two C-130's have to take the DAO out.

I think we have to continue operations if the people on the ground say that conditions are alright, but if it is a question of two remaining aircraft they should be filled by the DAO personnel and not by Vietnamese.

Kissinger: I have talked to Graham Martin. I think the DAO should come out anyway. I also think the Embassy should be thinned down. If we have to go to suppressive fire, then we must remove the Americans. Otherwise, it is too risky.

Schlesinger: There is no authority now for suppressive fire, only for the chopper lift.

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President: If we do not fire until they do, we are bound to lose some choppers to the SA-7's.

Schlesinger: It is a hard weapon to counter.

Brown: We cannot do much about them.

President: Will there be air cover above?

Brown: Whenever you say. Also, tankers.

President: Should we not have that cover even for the C-130's?

Brown: We can do that, as Jim Schlesinger says. The aircraft and the tankers are ready.

President: How much time will be lost before the aircraft come in?

Schlesinger: There are two issues. First, once we get to the point where we have to have air cover, we should pull out anyway.

Kissinger: I think if they see air cover, it helps.

President: If we have air cover but do not use it, they would still have enough radar to pick up our presence.

Brown: The artillery people do not. Nor do the SA-7 people.

I think we should not commit the air cover until we are ready to use it. The risk is such that they should only be used for a job, rather than to be picked up on radar.

Schlesinger: They may only be doing this shooting to bloody us. If they see fighters, they may hit us hard.

Kissinger: It may, of course, have the opposite effect. Even if some of their local units do not see our aircraft on radar, the high command in Hanoi will know it very quickly. I do not think that they will intensify their attacks.

Schlesinger: They may have pre-positioned orders to attack us.

Brown: I think they have pulled out the stops. The platoons that we have spoken of are being followed by more. They came in through that same area during the Tet offensive. They are ready for the battle of Tan Son Nhut.

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President: If we decide on air cover, we have to go for the evacuation of Saigon and not just Tan Son Nhut. How soon will we know if the C-130's can land?

Brown: Within an hour. We have an open line to Graham Martin.

Kissinger: I think we have three decisions:

-- First, how long to continue to operate, and whether the C-130's should just pull out Americans or Vietnamese as well. In either event, today is clearly the last day for fixed-wing operations.

-- Second, whether you want to have air cover flown over Tan Son Nhut or wherever the evacuees can be picked up.

-- Third, when we order suppressive fire. In this connection, I agree with Jim that it should only be used when pulling out Americans.

My concern is between balancing the risk to pull out all the stops if they have not yet decided to do so. I think if they see American air cover it would have a good effect.

Schlesinger: I think we can go in over the area with less equipment.

Clements: If you decided that this is the last day for civilian evacuation, we can proceed on that basis.

President: I think so. This is the last day for the evacuation of the Vietnamese.

Kissinger: Then the DAO will go out with them.

Brown: Regarding whether our air cover will be seen: We are putting in a Navy CAP above the air cover and Gayler has told them to jam the radar of the SA-2's.

President: Can the SA-7 not be jammed?

Brown: No. It is heat-seeking.

Scowcroft: We have just received a report that the airport is still taking fire. The two North Vietnamese platoons are still in the cemetery near Tan Son Nhut. The C-119 was shot down over the airport, and the other aircraft elsewhere. We also understand the C-130's are still on the way but are not landing.

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Schlesinger: The North Vietnamese have 4,000 sappers in Saigon. They will hit the Embassy if we attack by fire.

Kissinger: I think that, if we fire, we have to pull out the entire Embassy. Maybe we should consider leaving in a nucleus of volunteers, but I would pull everybody out. The North Vietnamese have the intention of humiliating us and it seems unwise to leave people there.

President: I agree. All should leave.

We now have made two decisions:

-- First, today is the last day of Vietnamese evacuation.

-- Second, if we fire, our people will go.

Are we ready to go to a helicopter lift?

Brown: Yes, if you or Ambassador Martin say so, we can have them there within an hour.

Kissinger: I understand your orders are that the Vietnamese should go today, and that the DAO and most of the Embassy should go with the rest of the fixed-wing aircraft.

President: I think they should be phased in.

Kissinger: A reduced staff should be left at the Embassy. If there is suppressive fire, we go to the plan to evacuate all Americans. If we have to go out, priority will go to the Americans.

Schlesinger: We should get Embassy people out today also.

Kissinger: Yes.

We should not let it out that this is the last day of civilian evacuation.

Vice President: Does the press know of the two Marines being killed?

Schlesinger: Yes. We will see how the four Chairmen react.

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Brown: The Secretary said that Americans should have priority if we have to terminate the lift, but we will not know this. We will not know in advance which is the last aircraft.

Schlesinger: We should give them subtle priority.

President: We have to leave it to General Smith to phase them into the evacuation.

Kissinger: If the Americans get on the first aircraft, the situation will be out of control. We have to space them out. The people who should stay to the end are the team to handle the evacuation of the Vietnamese. The others should go.

President: We have to mix them. We do not want too many at the end.

Brown: I do not want to see Americans standing there waiting for the last plane.

Schlesinger: There is one question, Henry, that we need to think about. When it is known at the end of the day that this was the last day, will it not provoke panic against our Embassy?

Kissinger: I believe that, as the new Government comes in, our obligations are terminated.

Even without shelling, we might have a transformation of the Minh Government from a pro-American to a neutralist to an anti-American Government. This could have happened this week.

To answer the question, it could produce panic. It could also make the Government turn on us. With 150 people, this would be more manageable.

President: They are one hour away. Even later today, if the situation deteriorates more rapidly than we think, we can go.

Brown: We are 25 minutes away from a ship to the Embassy. We can go on your orders or Graham Martin's.

Schlesinger: There is a chance of a night attack.

Kissinger: I think the Embassy is safer from a disciplined attack than the DAO.

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I think during the day tomorrow you will probably need to decide whether you want to take out the Embassy tomorrow night. You minimize the panic if you do not take the Embassy to Tan Son Nhut. So you may need the Embassy compound for evacuation.

I think we should take everybody we can out today, and then decide on the Embassy tomorrow.

President: What if the C-130 cannot land; then we cannot get people out by fixed-wing aircraft.

Kissinger: You can then go to an emergency airlift at the DAO and the Embassy, and you have no choice but to evacuate everybody. Then you might also have to go to suppressive fire.

Schlesinger: I think we should still try to get the C-130's in.

Brown: We are more ready to get people out at Tan Son Nhut than at the Embassy, since at the latter we need to blow up trees and to clear the parking lot.

President: We first need to see what happens at Tan Son Nhut. Then we have to use the DAO and Embassy lift.

Kissinger: If they keep up their attacks, it is because they have decided to bottle us up. We should then get everybody out.

President: Who executes?

Kissinger: I suggest we draft a message here, clear it with Jim and George, and show it to you. We will then send it to Graham Martin. Jim can send the same message to Gayler through his channels.

Then everybody should know what we are doing.

Clements: If we cannot get the C-130's in, we will need to make a critical decision at midnight or 1:00 a.m.

President: That decision would be whether to get out or in.

Schlesinger: Should we soften up the artillery first?

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Brown: I would ignore the artillery for the chopper flight if the artillery is on the air field. But if it is on the DAO or on the Embassy, we cannot go in. In the first case, we would hope that they cannot shift too rapidly. In the second case, we may need to suppress.

Kissinger: But you would have air cover any way to protect the lift.

President: Where is the air cover now?

Brown: I recommend that it come in when we go to a helicopter lift.

President: We can await that until we see whether the C-130's can get in. If they cannot, then we go to Option 3. The decision will be forced by whether the C-130's can or cannot operate.

Is that agreed? (All nod.)

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